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“FEASIBILITY STUDY OF HIGH-SPEED RAIL IN THE UNITED STATES” 
ABSTRACT 
The most basic and outstanding argument for High-Speed Rail (HSR) in the United States (U.S.) is the pressing 
global environmental crisis, and the role that the U.S. plays in it. The U.S. contributes to environmental problems 
in a proportion that far exceeds its share of the world’s population, and transportation is a major component of the 
problem. The U.S. transportation sector finds itself locked into a heavily fossil-fuel dependent infrastructure. The 
Interstate Highway system is now in danger as a result of age combined with overuse in many stretches; the U.S. 
airline industry is struggling to meet demand on many routes. The U.S. needs a smart transportation system that 
would satisfy the demands of the 21st century, a system that reduces travel times and increases mobility, a 
system that reduces congestion and boosts productivity. A HSR system would address these concerns while 
adapting U.S. infrastructure to future transportation needs. HSR would reduce traffic from the American highway 
infrastructure, and would reduce the airline congestion. 
 
Today, the U.S. is quite disposed for HSR, but a correct definition of the corridors that are most appropriate for 
HSR service, is critical to the long-term success of America’s HSR program. To date, ten HSR corridors have 
been designated by the U.S. federal government. Given the early stages of these projects, “success” cannot be 
based on implementation, but is defined in terms of whether a given HSR project is still actively pursuing 
development and funding. With the exception of the Northeast Corridor (NEC) operated by Amtrak, there has 
been relatively little forward movement if one looks at the number of years spent on many of these projects. The 
federal government has played and continues to play a minimal role in HSR projects, generally restricting its 
efforts to funding pilot studies and technological research. It is convenient to think that projects of this scope will 
likely necessitate financiers to rise to the occasion, and develop innovative public private partnerships funding 
schemes with adequate types of contracts involved on the various stages of design, construction, and operation. 
When cost-benefit analyses are developed for HSR in the U.S., the focus tends to be on how much money will be 
put in and how much will be generated. Looking on this way, it is unlikely to see HSR implemented in the U.S. 
because of the large capital investment needed to build such systems. If something has to be clear, is that the 
HSR in U.S. is a solution that has to be seen more adapted to the economic future of the U.S. rather than its 
present and broader tabulation that includes non-monetary benefits (such as reduced congestion on the 
alternative modes or reduced environmental impacts) have to be taken into account. 
 
A project of the magnitude of national HSR would undoubtedly not be without its critics. Many are decrying 
additional government spending while others see the complexity as insurmountable. Opportunities for both 
incremental and new HSR exist in the U.S. along those corridors federally designated as HSR corridors. The key 
is to get at least one project fully implemented in a way that is clearly HSR (as opposed to those that are capable 
of high speeds but only run at such speeds for small distances). Once a project is in revenue service, many of the 
concerns expressed by critics (including ridership projections and whether HSR can work in a country where cars 
and air transport are dominant) can be addressed. 
 
The implementation of internationally recognized HSR technologies from European and Asian countries like 
Japan, France or Spain, and the study of their experience with HSR transportation and its economic and 
technologic viability, can serve the U.S. as the best example to introduce the most sustainable existing massive 
mode of transportation.  The U.S. therefore would be able to show to the world that the country that invented the 
largest and most developed networks of roads and air transportation is also able to develop the most advanced 
HSR system to take a turn to a better world. 
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“FEASIBILITY STUDY OF HIGH-SPEED RAIL IN THE UNITED STATES” 
RESUMEN 
La argumentación más relevante para la alta velocidad en los Estados Unidos (EE.UU.) es la presión mundial 
ante la crisi medioambiental y el papel que el país juega en ella. Los EE.UU. contribuye a los problemas 
ambientales en una proporción que supera con creces el porcentaje del resto de población mundial, y el 
transporte es un componente importante de esto. El sector del transporte en los EE.UU. se encuentra encerrado 
en gran medida a los combustibles fósiles y a la infraestructura dependiente de ellos. El sistema de autopistas 
interestatales se encuentra en peligro sin embargo, como resultado de la edad combinada con el uso excesivo a 
lo largo de muchos corredores, y la industria aérea está luchando para satisfacer la sobredemanda de pasajeros 
en muchas de sus rutas. Los EE.UU. necesita un sistema de transporte inteligente que iguale las necesidades 
del siglo 21. Un sistema que reduzca los tiempos de viaje y aumente la movilidad, un sistema que reduzca la 
congestión y aumente la productividad. Un nuevo sistema ferroviario de alta velocidad podría abordar estas 
preocupaciones, mientras que a su vez se adaptaría a las existentes infraestructuras y a las futuras necesidades 
del país, aliviando el tráfico en las carreteras interestatales y reduciendo la congestión en los aeropuertos. 
 
Hoy en día, los EE.UU. está plenamente dispuesto a los trenes de alta velocidad aunque la correcta definición 
de sus corredores es crucial para el éxito a largo plazo del programa propuesto. Hasta la fecha, diez corredores 
de alta velocidad han sido designados por el gobierno federal. Teniendo en cuenta que los proyectos se 
encuentran en fases de iniciación, el "éxito" no puede basarse en la aplicación, sino que debe definirse en si 
determinado proyecto sigue trabajando activamente en el desarrollo y la financiación. Con la excepción del 
Corredor Noreste (Northeast Corridor; NEC) operado por Amtrak, ha habido relativamente poco avance si se 
considera el tiempo y el gran trabajo que se ha invertido en muchos de estos proyectos. El gobierno federal ha 
desempeñado y sigue desempeñando un papel mínimo en los proyectos de alta velocidad, restringiendo sus 
esfuerzos a los estudios piloto de financiación y a la investigación tecnológica. Es conveniente pensar que los 
proyectos de este alcance requieren grupos financieros a la altura de la ocasión y el desarrollo de innovadoras 
asociaciones público-privadas de financiación deben actuar con adecuados tipos de contratos involucrados en 
las distintas fases de diseño, construcción y operación. Al desarrollar análisis de costo-beneficio, por ejemplo, en 
los EE.UU. la atención tiende a ser sobre cuánto dinero se pondrá en y cuánto se generará. Mirando con esta 
perspectiva, es poco probable que veamos llevarse a cabo sistemas de alta velocidad en los EE.UU. debido a la 
gran inversión de capital necesaria para construir tales sistemas. Si algo tiene que quedar claro es que los 
trenes de alta velocidad en EE.UU. son una solución que tiene que ser vista más adaptada para el futuro 
económico del país en lugar de su presente y requiere tener en cuenta una tabulación más amplia que incluya 
los beneficios no monetarios tales como la disminución de la saturación de los modos alternativos o reducir los 
impactos medioambientales.  
 
Proyectos de tal magnitud no pueden existir, sin duda, sin sus críticos. Muchos están criticando el gasto público 
adicional, mientras que otros ven la complejidad como insuperables. Existen oortunidades tanto para trenes de 
alta velocidad como mejoras incrementales de los sistemas existentes a lo largo de los corredores designados. 
La clave será al menos conseguir un proyecto plenamente aplicado a alta velocidad (a diferencia de aquellos 
que solo serán capaces de circular a altas velocidades en pequeñas distancias). Una vez que el proyecto esté 
en servicio comercial, muchas de las preocupaciones expresadas por los críticos, incluyendo las proyecciones 
de pasajeros y si la alta velocidad es factible en un país donde los coches y el transporte aéreo son dominantes, 
podrán ser tratadas.   
 
La aplicación de las internacionalmente reconocidas tecnologías ferroviarias de alta velocidad de los países 
europeos y asiáticos como Japón, Francia o España y el estudio de su experiencia con éste transporte y su 
viabilidad económica y tecnológica, puede servir a los EE.UU. como el mejor ejemplo para introducir el modo de 
transporte masivo más sostenible de los existentes en el presente, y así mostrar al mundo que el país que 
inventó las redes más grandes y más desarrollados de carreteras y transporte aéreo también es capaz de 
desarrollar el mejor sistema de alta velocidad para poder dar así, un giro a un mundo mejor. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Around the world, countries are increasingly turning to high-speed trains to meet the growing 
transportation needs of the 21st century. As countries continue to envision their future, they see 
modern HSR as an essential component to producing a sound economy and society within their own 
borders and beyond. 
HSR began more than fifty years ago in 1964 when the Tokaido Shinkansen left Tokyo moving at 
speeds of 130 miles per hour and scheduling 100 million passengers in its first three years of service. 
Takaido-Shikansen was an unparallel success and became the model for the rail transportation 
revolution worldwide. In 1981, the TGV began operations in France drawing a billion passengers in 
twenty years and revolutionizing European travel. 
Twelve countries around the world have HSR systems in place with the reach of new high-speed lines 
ever expanding. Eight more countries including Mexico, Russia and Argentina are currently building or 
planning to build their own HSR systems. European or Asian countries today would not imagine 
moving forward in their transportation developments without HSR. These countries are all investing in 
HSR. Every European country is investing heavily in what woulde a first class HSR system that will 
connect the entire European community. 
Today HSR is faster, quieter and more energy efficient than ever before. Today’s 8th Shinkansen 
trains  timidly operate at 185 mph. The French TGV currently operates at 200 mph in regular service. 
China has recently opened a new train line designed for speeds above 217 mph. HSR technology has 
not yet reached its limits. An operational German ICE train has reached 252 mph. Test runs on Japan 
Shinkansen have reached 277 mph and in 2007 an experimental French TGV train reached the world 
record rail speed at 357 mph. The latest improvements now make it possible to go from downtown 
London to downtown Paris in 2 hours and 15 minutes and as a result are getting  enormous ridership. 
Clean, electrically powered HSR technology also provides critical environmental dividends. One trip 
on a French TGV train produces four to five times less carbon emissions than traveling the same 
distance by air. 
In the world’s densest urban centers, HSR provide complementary transportation technology that 
eases congestion on highways. These trains face capacity at increasingly crowded airports by 
seamlessly integrating high-speed trains with airports and other modes of transit such as subways, 
light rail, buses and commuter rail. For passengers travel on high-speed trains offers safety and 
accessibility, rivals times with air travel on trips of up to 500 miles and easily outstrips travel times by 
automobile and conventional rail service. It also offers passengers a functional transportation 
alternative while at the same time promoting sustainable patterns in an already existing urbanized 
society. 
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The existing transportation system in the U.S. requires significant investments simply to rebuild and 
maintain critical infrastructure and modernize aging technologies. Meeting the 21st century challenges 
requires new transportation solutions and HSR is the best for all these concerns as has been 
demonstrated worldwide. 
After decades of relatively modest investment in passenger rail, the U.S. has a dwindling pool of 
expertise in the field and lacks the means to manufacture capacity. Federal and state governments 
face a difficult fiscal environment in which to balance critical investment priorities, and many will have 
to ramp up their program management infrastructure. The country’s success in creating a sustainable 
transportation future depends on how the public and private sectors will overcome these challenges 
and make the appropriate choices to meet the goals. 
In late 2008, the U.S. suffered a major political and historical change. The economic hit that the 
country suffered imposes new challenges to the introduction of HSR. This report attempts to 
understand and analyze in depth the current transport situation in the United States. By understanding 
the particular mobility operations in this country, reviewing past trajectory and comparing with 
European and Asian countries are the best tools for predicting and encouraging development in 
America’s transportation future. 
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2. HISTORY OF AMERICAN RAILWAYS 
There was a time in the U.S. when railroads crisscrossed the nation and one could find a pair of 
railroad tracks only a very short distance from their home, and almost every town, large and small, 
boasted a train station of some type. Sadly, as the 20th century progressed rail began to lose its luster 
and in the waning days between the 1950s and 1970s enormous amounts of rail heritage was either 
abandoned or ripped up. 
Before introducing the actual situation and future plans of the railroads in America and the role they 
play compared to other modes of transportation, it is important to understand and analyze their 
evolution during the past two centuries and the importance that the rail passenger transportation have 
had on it. The following pages give the reader a summary of this evolution and a broad view of all the 
changes that both freight and passenger rail transportation has suffered. 
 
2.1 Evolution of the American Railways 
The evolution of rail transportation in the U.S. can be conceptualized as a cycle composed phases of 
introduction and acceptance, rapid growth, maturity and rationalization. 
2.1.a Introduction (1830-1860) 
The concept of constructing a railroad in the U.S. was first conceived by Colonel John Stevens in 
1812. He described his theories in a collection of works called "Documents tending to prove the 
superior advantages of railways and steam carriages over canal navigation." The earliest railroads 
constructed were horse drawn cars running on tracks used for transporting freight. The first to be 
chartered and built was the Granite Railway of Massachusetts, which ran approximately three miles in 
1826. The first regular carrier of passengers and freight was the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, 
completed on February 28, 1827. It was not until Christmas Day, 1830, when the South Carolina 
Canal and Railroad Company completed the first mechanical passenger train, that the modern 
railroad industry was born. This industry would have a profound effect on the nation in the coming 
decades, often determining how an individual lived his life. 
From modest beginnings and unsure technology, rail transportation emerged in the 1830s with the 
construction of numerous local lines in the East, dominantly in the Northeast. During the decade 
1830-1840 the total length of completed railroad lines increased from 23 to 2,808 miles. By 1835, 
dozens of local railroad networks had been put into place. Each one of these tracks went no more 
than a few miles, but the potential for this mode of transportation was finally being realized. With every 
passing year, the number of these railway systems grew exponentially. By 1840, 2,808 miles of tracks 
were laid, but rail transportation was still uncompetitive in view of waterways which had a wider 
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coverage (e.g. Erie Canal, Mississippi). A set of independent feeder rail networks was being 
established. During the next ten years (1840-1850), more than 6,200 miles of railroad were opened, 
bringing the total network up to 9021 miles in 1850 (see Figure 1). The most intensive growth during 
this period was in the Atlantic and Seaboard States. In 1850, a trip from Boston or New York to 
Chicago was made by rail and lake steamers or by stagecoaches, and required several days. One 
could travel all the way from Boston to Wilmington, NC, by rail, with several changes of cars and a few 
ferry trips en route. 
 
Figure 1. Growth status of American railroads in decades 1830-1850 (Source: [A]) 
Along with the proliferation of railroads came increased standardization of the field. An ideal 
locomotive was developed which served as the model for all subsequent trains. Various companies 
began to cooperate with one another to both maximize profits and minimize expenditures. During the 
first twenty years of railway development, the population of the U.S. nearly doubled. This interaction of 
various companies initiated the trend of conglomeration which would continue through the rest of the 
19th Century. In 1850, the New York Central Railroad Company was formed by the merging of a 
dozen small railroads between the Hudson River and Buffalo. Single companies had begun to extend 
their railway systems outside of the local domain and between 1851 and 1857 the federal government 
issued land grants to Illinois to construct the Illinois Central railroad. The government set a precedent 
with this action and fostered the growth of one of the largest companies in the nation [1]. 
The decade 1850-1860 was a period of rapid railway expansion, characterized by the extension of 
many short, disjointed lines into important rail routes. This decade marked the beginning of railway 
development in the region west of the Mississippi River and rail transportation was able to compete 
more effectively in the resource-rich Midwest. The cost of moving farm produces and manufactured 
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goods over long distances fell by 95% between 1815 and 1860. As shown in Figure 2, by 1860, the 
American railroads had penetrated westward to the Missouri River and were beginning to make it felt 
in Iowa, Arkansas, Texas and California. This demonstrated the capacity of the rail system to answer 
the needs of the national economy and insured a subsequent rapid phase of expansion. 
 
Figure 2. Growth status of American railroads in 1860 (Source: [A]) 
2.1.b Growth (1860-1910) 
As the advantages of rail transportation became widely acknowledged, a massive phase of growth 
ensued and rail achieved dominance over the road and waterway modes. Although the Civil war 
between the States (1861-1865) temporally halted railway development felling dramatically the 
production of new railroads, usage of this mode of transportation increased significantly. Many 
projects were resumed or initiated soon after the close of that conflict and by the conclusion of the 
war, the need for an even more diverse extension of railways was extremely apparent. 
One priority was the construction of transcontinental line linking the East and the West coasts. Soon 
after the war, the first transcontinental railroad was constructed (see Figure 3), making it possible for 
the first time to travel all the way across the country by rail. The Union Pacific Railroad company 
started building from the east, while the Central Pacific began from the west. The two companies met 
at Promontory Point, Utah, on May 10, 1869. As they drove the Golden Spike uniting the two tracks, a 
new age was born. From that point, numerous branches and trunks were constructed leading to an 
interconnected national rail system. A standard gauge of 1.4351 meters was also agreed upon (in 
1860, 23 different gauges were still in use). However, there were many accusations made stating that 
1860 
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the rates charged by railroad companies were high and discriminatory, particularly because of the 
monopoly they had on several parts of the emerging railway system. Slowly, the small railroad 
companies would die out or be absorbed by large businesses. The nation’s network increased from 
30,626 miles in 1860 to 52,922 miles in 1870. 
 
Figure 3. Growth status of American railroads in 1870 (Source: [A]) 
In 1880, every state and territory was provided with railway transportation. A second line of railroads 
to the Pacific was nearing completion, and other transcontinental railroads were under construction. 
Railroad development was exerting a powerful influence upon immigration, agricultural and industrial 
growth throughout the country. The period from 1880 to 1890 was one of rapid expansion. More than 
70,300 miles of new lines were opened in that decade, bringing the total network up to 163,597 miles.  
By 1890, several trunk line railroads extended to the Pacific (see Figure 4). In addition, labor unions 
were developed to protect the rights of the workers. As companies grew larger, they began to take 
over other related fields. Soon, large trusts were formed that controlled many aspects of both the 
economy and society. In thirty years from 1860 to 1890 every decade brought increased 
standardization, the total mileage of the region west of the Mississippi River increased from 2,175 to 
72,389 miles, and the population of that area increased fourfold. As more and more areas became 
controlled by the railroad industry, it became apparent that regulation was imperative [2]. 
1870 
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Figure 4. Growth status of American railroads in 1890 (Source: [A]) 
By the beginning of the 20th century, 193,000 miles of rail were in operation and several lines were 
being electrified. By 1900, much of the nation's railroad system was in place. The railroad opened the 
way for the settlement of the West, provided new economic opportunities, stimulated the development 
of town and communities, and generally tied the country together. There was a time in the U.S. one 
could find a pair of railroad tracks only a very short distance from their home, and almost every town, 
large and small, boasted a train station of some type. 
2.1.c Maturity (1910-1950) 
This period marks the age of rail transportation dominance as of 1930, the 260,000 mile rail network 
accounted for about 65% of all the freight tonnage carried in the U.S.. Rail technology was 
standardized and showed little improvements in terms of speed. By 1950, the American Railroads 
embraced 224,511 miles of tracks (Figure 5). These railroads handled approximately 54% of the 
commercial passenger and 61% of the freight business of the nation, carried more than 97% of the 
U.S. mail, and performed nearly all of the commercial express traffic of the nation. During World War 
II these railroads handled more than 90% of the war freight and 97% of the organized troop 
movement. However, competition from trucks was starting to being felt, notably for short distances. In 
addition, heavy regulations from the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) created by Congress in 
1887 in response to regulate the rates railroads could charge, led to a standard private sector 
response; lack of investments, increased accidents, reduced punctuality and the bankruptcy of 
several companies [3]. 
1890 
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Figure 5. Growth status of American railroads in 1950 (Source: [A]) 
2.1.d Rationalization (1950-2000) 
The post World War II era was one of intense rationalization for rail transportation. By the 1970s, the 
US railway system was facing serious financial difficulties; several railway companies were going 
bankrupt, accounting for about 20% of the track mileage and deregulation ensued. In 1980, the 
Staggers Rail Act enabled rail companies to fix their own rates, service levels, as well as to abandon 
or sell unprofitable rail segments. Between 1950 and 2000, 123,750 miles of tracks were abandoned 
which left the rail system with just below 100,000 miles of tracks in 2000, a mileage similar to the mid 
1880s. Rail transportation was losing passengers to road and air modes at an accelerated rate, which 
meant loss of revenue and the abandonment of numerous passengers lines. While there were about 
2,000 scheduled passenger trains per day in 1950, this number fell to 200 in the 1990s. As a result, 
rail transportation became dominantly freight oriented and the development of intermodal 
transportation in the 1970s justified further rationalization within the rail industry, mainly through 
mergers. Among the most significant was the Burlington Northern / Santa Fe merger in 1995, followed 
by the acquisition by Union Pacific of Southern Pacific Railroad in 1996 and the split up of Conrail 
between Norfolk Southern and CSX in 1999. Freight rates were cut in half and while in 1960 there 
were 106 rail operators, this figure dropped to 7 in 2005 as shown in Figure 6. 
1950 
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Figure 6. Growth variation of American railroads (made based on Source: [B]) 
2.1.e Resurgence (2000 - Today) 
 As of the beginning of the 21st century, rationalization appears to be completed, leaving a more 
efficient rail system based on high capacity long distance corridors connecting major maritime 
gateways and inland terminals. These corridors are almost all double-tracked. Additionally, rail freight 
has faced a surge in demand linked with globalization, a level of deindustrialization of the North 
American economy, as well as rising energy prices making rail more competitive. The three most 
important factors behind the recent growth of rail traffic involve a growth of international containerized 
trade, growing quantities of utility coal being shipped to power plants (namely from the Powder River 
Basin) and the growth of Mexican trade. A new wave of investments along long distance corridors 
(double or triple tracking) and intermodal rail terminals has improved the efficiency and the capacity of 
the system. Prospects about the future of rail transportation appear positive. 
 
2.2 The Rail Passengers Transportation in America: Amtrak 
The National Railroad Passenger Corporation, better known as Amtrak, is the U.S. national rail 
passenger service, providing train transportation between major cities as well as commuter service 
and delivery of mail and express freight. A private corporation, Amtrak is almost wholly owned by the 
U.S. DOT.  
Congress had created the company on May 1, 1971, with the passage of the Railroad Passenger 
Service Act. The Act established a private company, incorporated in the District of Columbia. Most of 
the new company's stock was owned by the DOT, and it was governed by a board of directors made 
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up of the Secretary of Transportation, the head of the corporation, and eleven other members, the 
majority appointed by the president. During its first year of existence, the corporation was known as 
Railpax but after it began operations, the nickname was changed to Amtrak, a contraction of the 
words America and track.  
Amtrak was charged with accomplishing three goals described in the Amtrak Source Book as: "To 
operate rail passenger service on a for-profit basis, to use innovative operating and marketing 
concepts to fully develop the potential of modern railway passenger service to meet intercity 
transportation needs and to provide a modern, efficient intercity rail passenger service." Congress 
authorized grants of $40 million for operations and loan guarantees of $100 million for new 
equipment. Direct funding was to last only two years, by which time the corporation was to be 
completely self-supporting. As described previously, by the time Congress created Amtrak, intercity 
rail passenger service in the U.S. had been in a 20-year decline. Until the 1950s, railroads were the 
only way to travel long distances. But during that decade, the federal government began financing the 
interstate highway system, a $41 billion 16-year project, and as jet airplanes were introduced, 
significantly increased its support for the construction and improvement of airports. Airplanes, 
personal automobiles, and buses began competing with the country's railroads for long-distance 
travel. The railroads responded to the competition with new equipment on their prestige long-distance 
routes, replacing steam locomotives with diesel engines and introducing lightweight stainless steel 
passenger cars with air-conditioning and double glazed windows. But as the number of passengers 
continued to drop, the rail companies had little incentive to make major capital investments to upgrade 
their tracks, signaling, stations and maintenance facilities. By 1958, rail service accounted for just 4% 
of intercity travel.  
The decline in rail passenger service and the deterioration of passenger facilities continued during the 
1960s. Most of the loss was on long-distance, intercity travel. Commuter and suburban lines were less 
affected by airlines and, at least during the 1960s, lost little ridership to buses and private cars. Many 
of the railroad companies filed applications to get out of the intercity service on most or all of their 
routes. Among the most critical was the proposal by Penn Central (the merged Pennsylvania Railroad 
and New York Central Railroad) to eliminate all its passenger service in the Northeast and Midwest. 
As a federal action, the Railroad Passenger Service Act allowed the railroad companies to transfer 
their money-losing passenger operations to Amtrak in exchange for either a tax write-off or Amtrak 
stock. Only three lines, the Denver & Rio Grande Western, the Rock Island and the Southern, did not 
join Amtrak, opting to continue their own passenger service [4].  
The basic network of routes for Amtrak was developed by the DOT with assistance from the Interstate 
Commerce Commission, the railroad unions, 15 railroad companies, 43 states, some 3,000 members 
of the public, and numerous U.S. Senators and Representatives. Factors considered in selecting the 
routes included existing routes, cost, ridership potential, size of the terminal cities (had to have a 
population of at least one million), and the condition of the tracks and facilities (no funds were 
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allocated for improving these). Between January and May 1971, as the new corporation got itself 
organized, a major argument developed regarding the company's objective: was it to reintroduce the 
traditional long-distance routes of the past, such as the Empire Builder, San Francisco Zephyr and 
Super Chief, or to concentrate on introducing HSR corridors. Those two visions of passenger service 
in the U.S. would haunt Amtrak for decades.  
The creation of Amtrak seemed to generate three conclusions. Some people believed the new entity 
was really expected to revive intercity rail traffic. The more skeptical seemed to think that this was a 
last gasp effort and that once the equipment finally gave out, that would be the end of it. Others within 
the industry and among the passengers saw it as a ruse to eliminate routes in sparsely populated 
areas while keeping rail service along corridors between major cities in the Northeast and on the West 
Coast. 
During the last half of the 1970s, Congress changed the way they financed Amtrak's capital 
improvements. Instead of loan guarantees, which had mounted to $900 million between 1971 and 
1975, or a designated source of income that was provided for highways and airports, Amtrak began 
receiving direct capital grants, which had to be requested and approved annually, making it difficult to 
plan and finance capital investments. Amtrak continued to receive separate annual operating grants. 
The company's annual revenue during the first decade averaged $252 million, and represented less 
than 40% of its operating expenditures. The growing deficits led the Carter Administration to push for 
more efficient operations and cuts in costs. Proposals to eliminate routes as a means of reducing 
costs generally went nowhere as Senators and Representatives fought to keep trains running in their 
states, whether the routes were profitable or not. In fact, by 1977, the number of miles in the Amtrak 
system had grown to 27,000. Finally, under restructuring in 1979, several routes were dropped as the 
basic network was cut to 24,000 miles [5]. 
During the 1980s, Amtrak continued to move from supervising to operating the nation's passenger rail 
system. Amtrak's partnerships with various states improved passenger service in their jurisdictions but 
the core route and services faced financial cuts as the Reagan Administration convinced Congress to 
significantly reduce both the operating and capital grants each year. As President Reagan told an 
audience, "On the New York to Chicago train, it would cost the taxpayer less for the government to 
pass out free plane tickets." In 1985, Amtrak's supporters argued that shutting down Amtrak 
completely would result in costly drops in productivity due to traffic jams and crowded airports in the 
major corridors, especially in the northeast. The prospect of more cars and planes (and the resulting 
pollution) effectively dampened enthusiasm for eliminating all support for Amtrak, at least for a while.  
By the end of the decade, Amtrak operations were bringing in more than $1.2 billion in revenues (see 
Figure 7). But with operating expenses in fiscal 1989 of nearly $2 billion, it continued to have an 
operating loss larger than the $554 million operating grant it received from the federal government. In 
1994, Congress and the Clinton Administration demanded that Amtrak operations become self-
sufficient by 2002. To accomplish this, the company adopted a strategic and business plan for the 
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period of 1995 to 2000. As part of the plan, Amtrak decentralized itself into three business units to 
increase accountability and responsiveness: the Northeast Corridor (NEC), covering services from 
Virginia to New England; Amtrak West, which operated state-supported corridor trains and the long-
distance Coast Starlight on the West Coast; and Amtrak Intercity, responsible for most of the long-
distance routes as well as corridor trains in the Midwest. The company also began raising fares, 
cutting routes and service, and implementing cost reduction programs for its operations. However, 
Amtrak needed new rolling stock to replace old equipment, to achieve better travel times, and to meet 
the requests from states for new intrastate rail services. 
Through 1990, Amtrak had spent $1.6 billion for cars and locomotives and the capital investment 
continued during the decade with the delivery of new diesel locomotives, 195 bi-level Superliners, and 
in 1996, 50 Viewliners, the first single-level sleeping cars made in the U.S. in 40 years. In California, 
14 new dual-level dining cars were introduced on the state-supported routes, and in Washington, 
three pendular "tilt" Talgo trains were ordered by Amtrak and the Washington DOT for delivery in 
1998. Trains able to travel 150 mph were added to service the NEC beginning in 1999. Although 
revenues increased to $1.6 billion in fiscal year 1996, debt and capital lease obligations were almost 
$1 billion. By 1997, Amtrak was in danger of going bankrupt. Congress debated the company's 
request to designate one-half cent of the Interstate Highway Trust for capital expenditures, but instead 
passed a tax rebate package of $2.3 billion for Amtrak capital spending over two years and adopted a 
package of reforms changing various labor requirements, allowing Amtrak to alter the basic system of 
routes inherited in 1971, setting a cap on liability costs, and establishing a new Reform Board [6]. 
Funding for the DOT for fiscal year 1998 included $344 million for Amtrak operations and $250 million 
for the NEC capital. It also included $23 billion for highways, $9 billion for aviation, and $4 billion for 
transit.  
 
Figure 7. Amtrak revenues and expenses in period 1988-2004 (made based on Source: [C]) 
Despite the shakeup at the top and numerous skeptics, Amtrak survived. The company continued its 
efforts to improve service, spending $26.6 million to overhaul 212 passenger cars. Buttressed by the 
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 Amtrak launched a $360 million capital improvement program. They 
spent $100 million for eight new five-car train sets for San Diego service, purchased eight 
locomotives, 64 carriers, 43 coaches, several improved refrigerator cars, and numerous expensive 
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equipment updates. New lines and improved travel times resulted in several cities. In December 1998 
Amtrak agreed to purchase 44 RoadRailer Mailvans. Acting President and CEO George D. 
Warrington cited increasing rail revenues which had been rising 10% each year as reason for the 
investment, which he stated could only bolster their bottom line. Warrington continued to assemble a 
new management team, envisioning an Amtrak that featured HSR corridors across the country and 
high-quality service. Statistics had confirmed that Amtrak continued to improve between 1998 and 
1999, the percentage of riders was the highest it had been in a decade, on-time arrival was the 
highest it had been in 13 years (Figure 8), and passenger revenues had topped $1 billion for the first 
time.  
 
Figure 8. Amtrak short and long distance on-time performance (made based on Source: [C]) 
In March 2000 Amtrak introduced the Acela Regional passenger service, creating the long-awaited 
electrification of the NEC linking Boston, New York, and Washington, D.C. The result was a reduction 
in travel time from Boston and New York by up to 90 minutes. Further improvements were unveiled in 
November 2000, after months of delay. The Acela Express, the nation's first HSR system began 
travelling the Northwest Corridor's tracks at up to 150 mph, reducing a Boston to New York trip to 3 
hours and 15 minutes, a New York to Washington, D.C. trip to 2 hours and 28 minutes. The Acela 
beat its projected profits by 12% in the first quarter of 2001 and launched Amtrak into its most 
profitable year yet [7]. The success prompted Congress to reconsider a controversial bill to allow 
Amtrak to issue bonds to raise $12 million dollars for the HSR system. 
Today, federal government, states and local decision makers have had a renewed interest in looking 
at how HSR might fit into the American national transportation system and address increasing mobility 
constraints on the nation’s highways and at airports due to congestion. Although the current economic 
downturn has recently reduced the level of highway and air travel, projections show that intercity 
travel will grow again and that existing transportation capacity limitations will constrain mobility. The 
DOT estimates that several intercity highways linking major urban markets will experience significant 
congestion by 2035. Capacity limitations will constrain air traffic at 14 airports in 8 metropolitan areas, 
even if planned capacity improvements are carried out through 2025. In addition, the dependence of 
growing highway and air travel on fossil fuels raises significant environmental concerns regarding 
greenhouse gas emissions. As a result, transportation decision makers are exploring options that not 
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only expand transportation capacity and relieve increasing congestion but also minimize the 
deleterious environmental impacts of increasing highway and air travel. The average intercity 
passenger train can produce significantly less emissions than other transportation modes. Amtrak has 
seen nearly a 20% increase in riders in the last 2 years, in part because of service enhancements in 
some intercity corridors have improved overall travel time and reliability, making the train more 
competitive with highway and air travel. Still, Amtrak does not offer service in many heavily traveled 
intercity corridors. Moreover, Amtrak’s service, shown in Figure 9, continues to have slow average 
speeds relative to other transport modes, and experiences significant delays, often resulting from 
sharing track with commuter and freight rail. 
 
Figure 9. Actual Amtrak routes (Source: [D]) 
Proposals for investment in HSR in the U.S. have existed for decades. However, corridor service that 
exceeds Amtrak’s predominant top speed of 79 mph currently only exists on Amtrak’s NEC between 
Boston, MA, and Washington, D.C., and in a few other corridors (including New York City, NY, to 
Albany, NY; Philadelphia, PA, to Harrisburg, PA; and Los Angeles, CA, to San Diego, CA) and on a 
segment of track between Chicago, IL, and Detroit, MI. By contrast, countries in Europe and Asia 
have developed extensive rail systems with top speeds exceeding 150 and even 200 mph, which 
have attracted a relatively high number of riders compared with other transportation modes.  
Throughout history, Amtrak has been funded at a rate of tenths of times lower than the rate at which 
Congress has funded highways and aviation, and continued to own little of its own track. Still, with the 
new HSR, rising passenger rates and improved funding, the future looked if not rosy, then far more 
promising than it had in many years. 
Feasibility Study of High-Speed Rail in the U.S. 
Modal Split of Transportation in the U.S.  15 
 
3. MODAL SPLIT OF TRANSPORTATION IN THE U.S. 
Transportation in America contributes 11% of the Nation's gross domestic product, amounting to 
approximately $950 billion. Transportation accounts for 19% of spending by the average household in 
America (as much as for food and health care combined) and is second only to spending on housing. 
The US transportation system carries over 4.7 trillion passenger miles of travel and 3.7 trillion ton 
miles of domestic freight generated by about 305 million people. Rail and maritime transportation 
each account for over 11% of the tonnage carried. The transportation system comprises more than 4 
million miles of public roads and 2 million miles of oil and natural gas pipelines. There are networks 
consisting of 120,000 miles of major railroads, over 25,000 miles of commercially navigable 
waterways, and over 5,000 public-use airports. This vast system also includes over 500 major urban 
public transit operators and more than 300 ports on the coasts, Great Lakes, and inland waterways. 
After 60 years and more than $1.8 trillion of investment, the U.S. has developed one of the world’s 
most advanced highway and aviation systems. Yet these systems face mounting congestion and 
rising environmental costs. Moreover, the U.S.’ current transportation system consumes 70% of the oil 
demand of the country and contributes 28% of greenhouse gas emissions. 
While it was once the preeminent mode of travel, intercity passenger train travel in America has 
played a relatively minor role in the second half of the 20th century. With the expansion of the highway 
and aviation systems, total intercity travel in the U.S., has grown dramatically. Much of this growth in 
intercity travel has been fueled by an aggressive public investment strategy. For six decades, federal 
transportation policies have focused most intercity transportation investment in the highway and 
aviation systems. Passenger rail has represented less than 3% of the rapidly growing Federal 
investment in intercity transportation, and until 2009, that share has been shrinking. The existing 
infrastructure is insufficient to handle the future passenger and freight mobility demands. A possible 
solution to solve the problem and improve the transportation in America would be to build an efficient, 
HSR network of 100 to 600 mile intercity corridors, as one element of a modernized transportation 
system. 
To understand the HSR proposal in the U.S. and its viability, it is necessary to first start analyzing and 
understanding the paper of the different modes of transportation in America and comparing them 
internationally with other countries where the HSR has been established during the past decades. The 
HSR infrastructures depend on many geographical, demographic, cultural and economical factors that 
are very different in every country and continent and that determine the efficiency and viability of all 
the HSR projects. 
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3.1 Demography 
The U.S. has a total population of 305 million with a very urbanized nation, with 81% of the population 
residing in cities and suburbs as shown in Figure 10 (in 2005 the worldwide urban rate was 49%) and 
a population density of 86 habitants/mile2. The mean population center of the country has consistently 
shifted westward and southward (see Figure 11), with California and Texas currently the most 
populated states. 
 
Figure 10. American Population in Rural/Urban areas (made based on Source: [E]) 
 
Figure 11. American Population by Regions (made based on Source: [E]) 
The U.S. doesn’t have a very high population density compared to countries with planning or having 
HSR projects (see Appendix 1, Source: [F]). Important HSR countries like Japan have ten times more 
population density and in Europe, countries like France or Spain have three times more. 
Although this could be seen as an inconvenience when trying to analyze this important factor, the 
population of some states is very low because of the geographic and climatic conditions (Figure 12). 
The large extension of those states with their low levels of population, decrease the average of 
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population density of the country (see Appendix 2; Source: [G]). See also Appendix 3 (Source: [H]) 
for the states Geography. 
 
 
Figure 12. Population Density by States (Source: [E]) 
 
3.2 Passenger Transportation 
With any transportation decision, speed to destination is an important factor in choosing any particular 
type of infrastructure, and distance remains a significant factor in passengers’ modal choice (see 
Figure 13). However, in a motorized society such as the U.S., the automobile plays a significant role 
for short distances and, moreover this has a lot to do with the physical setting which tends not to be 
favoring walking. 
 
Figure 13. Modal Split in the U.S. by Passenger Travel Distance, 1995 (made based on Source: [8]) 
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All this factors, including the government support, has brought the country to use the road and air 
transport as the main modes of passenger transportation. 
In comparison to other modes of transportation and other countries in the world, the U.S. relies much 
more heavily on its roads both for commercial and personal transit (see Figure 14). There are more 
than 2,615,870 miles of paved roads and 1,401,791 miles of unpaved roads. The network is 
composed by the Interstate system, the US Highway system, the individual networks of State 
Highways, and other jurisdictional highways such as those of counties, municipal streets, or federal 
agencies. 
 
Figure 14. U.S. Intercity Travel Trends by Modal Share, 1929-2004 (Source: [9]) 
Road development in the U.S. accelerated in the first half of the 20th century. By the 1920s, the first 
transcontinental highway, the Lincoln Highway, spanned 3,389 miles between New York and San 
Francisco. The post World War II era represented a period of rapid expansion of road transportation 
networks worldwide with the most remarkable achievement in the U.S. with the American Interstate 
highway system initiated in 1956. Its strategic purpose was to provide a national road system 
servicing the American economy and also able to support troop movements and act as air strips in 
case of an emergency. 
From its inception, the Interstate highway system expanded substantially, but at a declining rate as 
the system reached its planned size of 46,000 miles (Figure 15). About 35,000 miles was built from 
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the 1950s to the 1970s, but between 1975 and 2006 only 9,000 miles were added to the system, 
underlining growing construction costs and diminishing returns. By 1991, the system was considered 
completed, almost to the initial plan, with a total cost of about $129 billion. Between 1954 and 2001, 
$370 billion were invested by the federal government in the construction and the maintenance of the 
system. However, the Interstate is facing diminishing returns due to high construction and 
maintenance costs, which is forcing many state governments to consider privatization of several 
highway segments. Construction costs went from $4 million per mile in 1959 to $20 million in 1979. 
Still, the system has returned more than $6 in economic productivity for each dollar it cost, placing it at 
the core of American economic productivity in the second part of the 20th century. Overall, about 
46,837 miles of four-lane and six-lane highways were constructed, linking all major American cities, 
making it both the largest expressway system in the world and the largest public works project in US 
history. 
 
Figure 15. Length in miles of the Interstate Highway System, 1959-2006 (Source: [I]) 
An interesting ratio that shows the dimensions of the American road system compared with the 
population and extension of the country, it is the following Figure 16. The two density measures 
portrayed reveal different geographical settings and levels of motorization of some different countries 
in the World. Although the U.S. and Canada have low levels of road density per square kilometers 
comparatively to Japan and Western European countries, they are significantly committed to road 
transportation. This commitment is reflected in the availability of roads per capita (km per million 
people) where significantly higher figures are observed. 
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Figure 16. Road Transport Density Measures, G7 Countries, 1996 (Source: [J]) 
In terms of car density in the population among U.S., Japan and the average of the 27 countries in 
Europe, there is less than one car for every two inhabitants in the EU-27 compared with almost one 
car for every inhabitant in the U.S.. From 1990 to 2005, the number of cars per 1 000 inhabitants in 
the EU-27 grew at an average annual rate of 1.9 %, exceeding the rate of 1.6 % in Japan over that 
period, and more especially the rate of growth of 0.4 % in the USA (see Figure 17). It is interesting to 
note that, in Japan, the motorization rate in fact remained constant after the year 2000. 
 
Figure17. Number of passenger cars per 1000 inhabitants, EU-27 and U.S. during period 1990-2006 
(Source: [10]) 
Comparing the passenger transportation in the U.S. with countries with existing HSR lines, it is been 
observed a huge difference on the modes of transportation used. U.S. is the country with a major use 
of the car and less use of the railway (see Figure 18). 
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Figure 18. Modal split for passenger transport in selected countries in 2007 (made based on Source: [11]) 
Analizing Figure 19, the long-distance travel in the U.S. (roundtrips at least 50 miles away), 66% of 
the trips are done within 300 miles and the use of the air flights is higher than the car when distances 
are above 750 miles (see Figure 20). Taking into account that the road system has arrived to its 
completion and that the HSR is time competitive with air and auto for travel markets in the 
approximate range of 100 to 500 miles (160 to 800 kilometers), it is interesting to see the possible 
positive introduction of the HSR in America. 
 
Figure 19. Long-Distance Travel in the U.S. (Source: [J]) 
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Figure 20. Mode Share for Personal vehicle and Air at Various Trip Lengths in 2001(Source: [12]) 
When trying to understand the introduction of HSR in America it is important to take into acount the air 
transportation system. Commercial air transportation is a young industry which has made rapid 
progress (more than any other mean of transportation has made before). The growing pervasiveness 
of air travel can be seen by the increasing numbers of people who have flown on a commercial jet: 
less than 50% in 1975 compared with more than 80% today. In terms of passengers, 17 of the world's 
30 busiest airports in 2004 were in the US, including the world's busiest, Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta 
International Airport. 
The new era of commercial jet transportation in the U.S. was introduced in October 1958. Pan 
American World Airways inaugurated regular scheduled service from New York City to Paris, and later 
the National Airlines inaugurated the first domestic jet service with leased Pan American jets. The jet 
era entered a second generation in February 1970 when Pan American World Airways introduced 
Boeing 747 service between New York and London. The 747 is capable of carrying 420 passengers 
and the Boeing 707, which Pan American flew in 1958, carried 150 passengers. 
The economic effects of the present air transportation in U.S. have been a shrinkage of distance in 
terms of time, an expanded jet transport capacity in comparison to propeller-driven aircrafts, an 
increase in the number of people using air transportation for business and pleasure and a shift of 
traffic volume from surface to air. Recession and inflation, the latter highlighted by soaring fuel costs, 
combined in 1980 to produce an operating loss and a sharp decline in passenger traffic for the 
nation’s major scheduled airlines. The weakness in the economies of the world over the past several 
years has caused the air carrier industries to experience its worst financial years in its history. Two of 
the oldest and greatest names in the industry, Eastern Airlines and Pan American, ceased operating 
years ago and others are facing bankruptcy. Althought the industry’s overall financial fortunes have 
improved, not all carriers have shared equally in the financial turnaround. There have been eleven 
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bankruptcies since deregulation began in 1978 and more would have occurred except that failing 
carriers merged with or were taken over by other carriers. 
To a certain extent, the airline industry is a victim of its own success. Commercial aviation has growth 
faster than airports and airway systems in which it operates giving rise to many of the industry’s 
current problems. Twenty-one airports in US are labeled seriously congested by the Federal Aviation 
Administration. The agency warns that another twenty may qualify for this dubious distinction if there 
are no additions to system capacity. According to agency forecasts, large hub airports, which account 
for virtually all this congestion, can except a 28% increase in air traffic and a 70% increase in 
passenger enplanements by the year 2020. Without offsetting increases in systems capacity and 
efficiency, which will not be easly achieved, the system will be under even more pressure in the 
future. 
In Europe, the air transportation system is not at the level of congestion as it is in the United States. 
Next Figure 21 shows annual passenger traffic growth in the US and Europe between 1999 and 2008.  
 
Figure 21. Annual Air Traffic Growth in the U.S. and in Europe, 1999-2008 (Source:[13]) 
Until 2004, growth rates evolved in similar ways on both sides of the Atlantic, but there has been a 
notable difference since then. In Europe, air traffic continued to grow at around 4% annually while it 
decreased significantly in the US. 
 
3.3 Freight Transport 
Four eras describe the evolution of the U.S.’ freight system. Three are characterized by the 
development and maturation of a single transportation technology while the fourth is characterized by 
the emergence of information and communication technologies to manage and utilize all modes of 
transportation. 
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The colonial economies of the 18th century were built on water transport (“Sail Era”). At the time of 
the American Revolution, it cost as much to move a ton of goods 30 miles inland as it did to move it 
across the Atlantic. Two out of three settlers lived within 50 miles of the Atlantic coast. Coastal and 
Atlantic trade dominated the freight system. 
The introduction of rail technology (“Rail Era”) in the mid-19th century freed businesses and industries 
from the need to be located near seas, rivers, and canal ports. Within a matter of decades, railroads 
opened up much of the interior of the country. East–west rail routes were built to follow development 
of the Midwest, and after the Civil War, to solidify political and military control of the West. But north–
south rail routes were slow to develop because the railroads could not compete effectively with water 
transport for coastal trade. Dense urban centers grew at major inland rail hubs and in coastal cities 
that benefited from the new mode of transportation. Domestic inland trade dominated the freight 
system. 
The development of truck and highway technologies (“Truck Era”) in the early 20th century freed 
businesses and industries again, this time from the need to be located near rail lines and terminals. 
An east–west and north–south interstate highway grid was built to connect cities and regional 
economies. Production and consumption centers migrated outward from city centers, taking 
advantage of inexpensive land made newly accessible by the trucking and highway systems. Long-
haul trucking captured a large share of east–west freight traffic from railroads and much of the north–
south freight traffic from coastal steamers and river barges. While rail and water continued to serve 
some traditional markets, trucks were the only way to serve the new suburban and ex-urban markets, 
and trucking became the dominant mode of freight transportation. 
The global economy of the 21st century is being built on information, telecommunications, and low-
cost, long-haul transport by water, rail and air (“Integration and Information Era”). Containerization 
(first introduced in the 1950s), efficiently linked trucks, double-stack trains, and containerships, 
significantly reducing transport costs, cargo pilferage and damage. The parallel development of 
information and communication technologies made it possible to manage global freight flows that 
were reliable, visible, reasonably secure, and cost-effective [14]. 
During the last 50 years, the Class I rail and trucks have been established as the most important 
modes of freight transportation in the U.S. (see Figure 22). Unlike passenger transportation, the 
freight-rail system is an important part of the America’s freight transportation system and is critical to 
the economy. Freight rail carries 16% of the U.S. freight by tonnage, accounting for 28% of total ton-
miles, 40% of intercity ton-miles, and 6% of freight value. 
Feasibility Study of High-Speed Rail in the U.S. 
Modal Split of Transportation in the U.S.  25 
 
 
Figure 22. Ton-Miles of Freight in the U.S., 1960-2005 (made based on Source: [J]) 
Comparing these numbers with those in Europe and Japan, modal split reflects different geographical 
conditions in which transport systems operate (Figure 23). While within the European Union and in 
Japan road and coastal shipping account for the great majority of tons-km, rail dominates in the U.S.. 
The continentality and the fragmentation of the American economy in specialized regions are prone to 
long distance rail shipments as well as reliance on pipelines to supply large consumption of fossil 
fuels, namely petroleum and natural gas. In the case of the EU and Japan, the high densities, 
relatively short distances involved, and the maritime exposure favor trucking and usage of coastal 
shipping. 
 
Figure 23. Modal Split in the EU, U.S. and Japan, 2006 (in % of tons-miles) (made based on Source: [10]) 
Because of its cost (Figure 24) and limitations, the air freight industry remains a mix of dedicated large 
companies (such as FedEx), small-time operators (such as OCS Air Freight), and passenger airlines 
(such as United Airlines) that operate cargo divisions, which have a minor impact on the global 
transport of goods in the country. 
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Figure 24. Freight Transport Costs in US $ Cents per Ton-Mile, 1998 (made based on Source: [15]) 
 
3.4 Actual status of the Transportation in the United States 
The combination of economic prosperity and a population that just passed 300 million have produced 
a high demand for personal and freight mobility in the U.S.. Congestion is one of the single largest 
threats to American economic prosperity and lifestyle. Whether it takes the form of trucks stalled in 
traffic, cargo stuck at overwhelmed seaports, or airplanes circling over crowded airports, congestion is 
costing America an estimated $200 billion a year. 
Each year, Americans lose 3.7 billion hours and 2.3 billion gallons of fuel sitting in traffic jams and 
waste $9.4 billion as a result of airline delays. Congestion is not a fact of life. It is not a scientific 
mystery, nor is it an uncontrollable force. Congestion results from poor policy choices and a failure to 
separate solutions that are effective from those that are not.  
The U.S. Administration’s objective must be to reduce congestion and not simply to slow its increase. 
Congestion is not an insurmountable problem. However, solutions will require a smarter approach to 
capacity expansion and improved productivity of existing transportation assets. Reducing congestion 
is about making the right investments in transportation capital stock. The public sector has limited 
funds and the needs are great, despite record funding for surface transportation in recent decades. 
The federal government’s most important role is to establish mechanisms to ensure that the right 
investments are made. Today, the HSR in the U.S. has a great opportunity to be introduced as the 
perfect alternative to solve the overload of existing infrastructures. 
 
Feasibility Study of High-Speed Rail in the U.S. 
Approach to the HSR in the U.S.  27 
 
4. APPROACH TO THE HSR IN THE U.S. 
Since the 1960s, HSR has held the promise of fast, convenient, and environmentally sound travel for 
distances between 40 and 600 miles around the world. Japan was the first to deploy HSR in 1964 
when the Shinkansen bullet train began service between Tokyo and Osaka, with top speeds of 270 
km/h (169 mph). This was followed in 1982 by France’s Train à Grande Vitesse (TGV), linking Paris 
and Lyon at speeds of 300 km/h (188 mph), and later by Germany’s Intercity Express (ICE) that also 
operates at speeds up to 300 km/h (188 mph). South Korea recently began HSR service and Taiwan 
is expected to follow shortly, the former using French technology and the latter using Japanese bullet 
train technology [16]. 
The international definition of HSR is considered as new lines with a speed of at least 155 mph 
(250 km/h) and existing lines with a speed of around 125 mph (200 km/h) [F]. In the U.S., high speed 
ground transportation is been defined by the FRA as rail or Maglev systems capable of speeds of 90 
mph (145 km/h) or more [K]. These systems have been classified in three different forms, and 
described as follows: 
•   Incremental HSR (INCREMENTAL HSR): Consists on making incremental 
improvements to the existing conventional tracks, signaling systems, grade crossing and existing 
technology and purchase modern trains that could permit speeds between 90 and 150 mph on 
existing ROW. In the U.S., most projects aim for 110 mph (177 km/h) using electrified or non-
electrified systems. 
•  New high-speed rail (New HSR): Build completely new rail infrastructures to support 
very high-speed operations of 200 mph or more. This requires new ROW and imported technologies 
currently used in Asia or Europe that typically allow speeds greater than 200 mph. 
•  Magnetic levitation (Maglev): Build Maglev systems that could permit speeds 
around 300 mph by doing away with steel-wheel-on-steel-rail. 
 
4.1 Efforts to develop HSR in the U.S. 
The U.S. experience with HSR has differed greatly from that in Asia and Europe. American Congress 
first authorized studies aimed at deploying HSR with the HSGTA of 1965, but to date there is only one 
example of such systems in the U.S. (the NEC) and whether these systems are truly high-speed is 
debatable. Despite numerous efforts by States and the federal government, nearly all U.S. HSR 
projects have failed to progress significantly, and none has come close to matching the performance 
levels of Asian and European systems. 
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Unlike its European and Asian counterparts, which made HSR a national priority once it became clear 
that railroads were either in or potentially headed for decline, the U.S. government has been reluctant 
to develop such projects. The only intercity rail effort moved forward by the federal government 
beyond pilot studies and technological research has been Amtrak. Ironically, the creation of Amtrak 
led to a stalemate regarding intercity passenger rail’s relationship with other transportation modes and 
with government. As discussed on the first chapter, since its creation, Amtrak’s relationship with other 
modes has been characterized by a division between passenger and freight rail and the isolation of 
the former from earmarked tax returns and cooperative planning and management. Both of these 
issues also plague HSR efforts, along with other political and financial difficulties [17].  
Since 1980, there have been 19 efforts to develop and deploy some form of HSGT in the U.S. These 
projects have taken different forms, both in terms of business models (which range from entirely 
public led and financed, to privately funded, to public private partnership) and in the type of 
technology they have sought to employ. Some of these projects have been formally designated by the 
U.S. DOT as federal HSR corridors or identified under the FRA’s Maglev program. Such identification 
opens the door for federal funding that might not be available otherwise. Other projects have been 
pursued without federal designation, although several (as in Nevada) are hoping to achieve this 
status. Complicating the situation is the fact that in some cases, states or groups of states have been 
pursuing HSR systems that include all or part of federally designated corridors, but expand upon them 
by adding additional linkages. 
While incremental and new HSR projects differ in several ways, both the basic technologies and the 
markets they would serve are similar. Maglev is fundamentally different than HSR: it uses a 
completely different technology; it offers competitive service at a broader set of distances (40 to 600 
miles versus 100 to 500 miles); and its federal funding sources are different. 
4.2 Case Studies: Japan, Spain and France 
Before starting to study the different HSR projects that have been proposed or existed in the U.S. 
during the last decades, it would be interesting to take an overview on three of the most important 
countries in the world with HSR systems. Reviewing the background, funding, operations and 
infrastructure of the HSR in these countries, will give us a better idea to start analyzing the HSR in the 
U.S.. 
4.2.a Japan 
Background: Japan was the first country in the world to develop HSR operations, which occurred in 
1964 with the opening of the Shinkansen between Tokyo and Osaka. In addition, in 1970, the 
Nationwide Shinkansen Railway Development Act was established, which created a master plan for 
the expansion of HSR lines throughout Japan. After this, four HSR lines were constructed prior to the 
1987 reform of the passenger rail industry in Japan. The 1987 reform broke the fully integrated state 
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railway entity, Japanese National Railways, into six private intercity passenger rail operators based on 
six distinct geographic regions (see Figure 25), as well as a freight operator. Since then, three HSR 
lines have been built under the reformed structure, and the HSR system continues to expand on the 
basis of the HSR master plan. The length of the Japanese HSR system is about 1,360 miles and its 
ridership in 2006 was approximately of 300 million. The top commercial speed of its trains is 188 mph 
[L]. 
Funding: Prior the 1987 reform, the construction of HSR in Japan was funded through debt incurred 
by the national government and JNR. After the 1987 reform, the national government funds two-thirds 
of the construction cost, and local governments fund one-third of the construction cost under the 
Nationwide Shinkansen Railway Development Act. The national government funding is derived from 
the revenues from the sale of rail lines to private companies and the national public works budget. 
Private companies purchased the four constructed HSR lines from the national government in 1991, 
and in turn the companies have to pay an annual fee to the national government for 60 years. For 
HSR lines built after the 1987 reform, the companies pay a lease payment to the Japan Railway 
Construction, Transportation, and Technology Agency for the use of the HSR lines, on the basis of 
projected ridership. The national government does not provide operating subsidies for HSR 
passenger operations [18]. 
 
Figure 25. Japan's HSR Network (Source: [M]) 
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Operations: Prior to the 1987 reform, JNR was a fully integrated state-owned entity that was the sole 
HSR operator in Japan. After the 1987 reform, JNR was split into six private operators, three are on 
the mainland (JR East, JR Central, and JR West) and the other three are each on an island (JR 
Hokkaido, JR Shikoku, and JR Kyushu). JR East, JR Central, JR West, and JR Kyushu operate HSR 
lines. JR East operates Shinkansen lines between Tokyo and Nagano, Tokyo and Niigata, and Tokyo 
and Hachinohe; JR Central operates the Shinkansen line between Tokyo and Osaka; JR West 
operates the Shinkansen line between Osaka and Fukuoka; and, JR Kyushu operates the Shinkansen 
line between Kagoshima and Shin Yatsushiro. The three mainland operators are considered fully 
privatized entities [19]. 
Infrastructure: HSR lines built after the 1987 reform are constructed and owned by the Japan 
Railway Construction, Transportation, and Technology Agency, and are leased to the JR companies. 
As a result of the 1991 law, JR East purchased the HSR line from Tokyo to Niigata and the track from 
Tokyo to Morioka. JR Central purchased the HSR line from Tokyo to Osaka, and JR West purchased 
the HSR line from Osaka to Hakata. 
4.2.b Spain 
Background: Spain first developed HSR lines with the opening of the Madrid to Seville line in 1992. 
Since then, Spain has constructed additional HSR lines from Madrid to Barcelona and Madrid to 
Valladolid, in 2007 and 2008, respectively, and from Córdoba to Málaga, with extensions built off 
these main lines as well (i.e., to Toledo in 2005). The construction of these lines was based on a 
national rail plan created in 1987 and national transportation plans created in 1993, 1997, and 2005. 
In 2005, Spain’s railway system was restructured in accordance with the European Union directive 
requiring the separation of passenger operations and infrastructure management. In accordance with 
these directives, Spain passed its own legislation, which split its state railway entity, RENFE, into two 
entities, ADIF and RENFE-Operadora. ADIF is responsible for infrastructure management and 
capacity allocation, and RENFE-Operadora is responsible for passenger operations. The Ministerio de 
Fomento (Ministry of Public Works) is responsible for setting policy, enforcing laws and regulations, 
and approving and financing projects. Spain most recent national transportation plan calls for $103.9 
billion in investment for creating 5,592 miles of HSR lines. The actual length of the Spanish HSR 
system is 981 miles (Figure 26); it has a top commercial speed of 186 mph and a ridership of 9 million 
passengers in 2007. 
Funding: After the 1997 European rail legislation, Spain created ADIF, a state-owned company under 
the Ministry of Development, similar to RFF in France. Of the HSR lines built since then, construction 
costs have been derived from funding from the national government, the European Union, and ADIF. 
A majority of funding to construct the Madrid to Seville HSR line was provided by the national 
government. Moving forward, it is planned that funding for expansion of the existing HSR network will 
be derived from the national government, local governments, ADIF, and loans from the European 
Investment Bank. For cross-border HSR lines, it is also planned that funding will be derived from the 
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European Union as part of the Trans-European Transport Network [20]. 
 
Figure 26. Spain's HSR Network (Source: [N]) 
Operations: RENFE-Operadora is the sole provider of HSR operations in Spain. According to 
European Union directives, international HSR lines must be opened to competition starting in 2010. 
Therefore, Spain will be required to allow private and public competitors to operate their trains over 
these international lines.  
Infrastructure: In terms of track ownership, ADIF owns the current HSR lines as well as passenger 
rail stations, freight terminals, and the telecommunications network. In addition, ADIF constructs and 
maintains HSR lines, allocates capacity to passenger rail operators, and manages traffic control 
operations and safety systems. RENFE-Operadora pays ADIF infrastructure fees to use the HSR 
lines. 
4.2.c France 
Background: France first developed HSR lines with the opening of the TGV Sud-Est line from Paris 
to Lyon in 1981. Since then, France has constructed additional HSR lines connecting major cities in 
France, as well as connecting HSR lines to cities in Germany, Belgium, and the United Kingdom. The 
rail business model in Europe was strongly affected by 1997 European legislation which required the 
separation of passenger operations and infrastructure management. This legislation was enacted to 
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standardize the business model structure in Europe and led to the creation of nationwide rail network 
infrastructure managers in Europe. The French railway system had undergone a major reform with 
this legislation, creating on 1997 the RFF, France’s national intercity rail network infrastructure 
manager. In addition, the ownership of the rail network, including the HSR network, was transferred 
from the national government to RFF. RFF is also responsible for capacity allocation, contracting, 
traffic management, and maintenance, although it subcontracts the traffic management and 
maintenance to the passenger rail operator, SNCF. The Ministry of Ecology, Energy, Sustainable 
Development, and Spatial Planning sets policy, enforces laws and regulations, and approves and 
finances projects. Moving forward, France is pursuing a HSR plan on the basis of a recommendation 
from a national environmental conference (Le Grenelle Environnement), which called for investments 
in sustainable transportation modes [21]. Specifically, it recommended building about 1,200 miles of 
additional HSR lines before 2020 and studying the viability of another approximately 1,500 miles of 
HSR lines. The actual length of the French HSR system is 1,180 miles (Figure 27). Its top commercial 
speed is 199 mph (320 km/h) and the ridership of the system was approximately of 100 million in 
2007. 
 
Figure 27. France's HSR Network(Source:[O]) 
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Funding: Prior to the creation of RFF in 1997, most of the funding for the construction of HSR lines 
came from the national government (through SNCF). Since then, funding for HSR construction is 
derived from a variety of sources, including the national government, regional governments, RFF, 
SNCF, and the European Union. 
Operations: SNCF is the sole provider of domestic HSR operations in France. The Eurostar and 
Thalys TGV, of which SNCF is a shareholder, provide international HSR operations to locations in 
Belgium, Holland, and the United Kingdom. According to European Union directives, international 
HSR lines must be opened for competition starting in 2010. Therefore, France will be required to allow 
private and public competitors to operate their trains over these lines. 
Infrastructure: In terms of track ownership, RFF is an owner of all intercity railway property in 
France. RFF is also responsible for allocating capacity for the HSR infrastructure and for the 
maintenance and management of traffic of the HSR system. However, these responsibilities have 
been subcontracted to SNCF. SNCF pays RFF infrastructure fees to use the HSR lines. 
 
4.3 Previous HSR Attempts in the United States  
Since the 1980s, there have been several failed attempts to implement HSR in the U.S.. The most 
notable of these were the Pacific Northwest projects on the states of Oregon and Washington (1992-
2001), the Texas TGV to link Dallas/Fort Worth, Houston, and San Antonio (1989-1994), and the FOX 
project to link Miami-Orlando-Tampa Bay (1991-1999). 
It is very important to analyze the following three case studies that offer interesting counterpoints and 
put the reader in a familiar environment in regard to the HSR in America. In the history of Florida there 
have been two HSR projects, one was a new HSR plan and the other was an incremental system. 
The case of the Pacific Northwest focused on an incremental HSR and was driven mainly by state 
agencies. It has demonstrated the difficulties of the efforts of several states, while the Florida case 
showed that state efforts alone are also often hard. In Texas, the funding problems between the public 
and private sector killed the TGV project. 
4.3.a Florida 
The history of HSR in Florida covers more than 30 years including several starts and stops, numerous 
corridor studies and proposals, and millions of dollars in investments. It is a state with an anti-tax 
culture and is historically dependent on the automobile, with little commuter rail or transit. 
In 1976, the Florida legislature mandated the Florida Transit Corridor Study to determine the feasibility 
of HSR between Daytona Beach and St. Petersburg. The study concluded that, if implemented in 
stages using existing highway corridors, HSR would be marketable in Florida. The study proposed 
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using existing rail corridors and the possibility of locating HSR within limited access highway medians, 
an idea with which the FDOT agreed. 
Six years later, in 1982, Governor Bob Graham (D, 1979–1987) visited Japan and traveled on the 
Shinkansen. He returned to Florida a strong supporter of HSR and authorized the creation of the 
FHSRC, a Florida HSR Committee, as a first step toward creating such a system in his state. In 1984, 
the committee released the Florida Future Advanced Transportation Report, which concluded that 
Florida’s transportation infrastructure could not accommodate future growth and that an advanced 
HSR system was necessary to maintaining mobility in the state. The report recommended developing 
public-private partnerships and using existing publicly owned ROWs. During that same year, Florida’s 
legislature enacted the FHSRTCA, a Commission Act, which created the seven-member FHSRC and 
authorized it to grant a franchise to build a privately funded and operated HSR network serving Miami, 
Tampa, and Orlando [P]. 
In 1986, the HSR Commission released its own study by Barton Aschman Associates that 
recommended proceeding with a 356-mile HSR system connecting Miami, Orlando, and Tampa. 
Requests for proposals were issued; two were received in 1988, one from Florida TGV, Inc., and one 
from Florida HSR Corporation. The former proposed using French TGV trains, which could run at 
speeds of 170 mph. The estimated cost of building the system was $2.2 billion, with ridership 
projections of 5.9 million annually. The latter proposed using Swedish-built ABBX2000 trains with tilt 
technologies that could run at speeds of 150 mph. Estimated costs were $1.9 billion, with projected 
ridership at 3.7 million annually. Both proposals assumed some public spending and/or real estate 
development rights, but when it was clear that there would be no support for public funding, Florida 
TGV, Inc., withdrew. 
Florida HSR Corporation submitted a revised proposal in 1990 that proposed financing the project 
with a combination of tax increment financing, benefit districts, impact fees, and a new gas tax. One 
year later, Governor Lawton Chiles (D, 1991–1998) rejected the proposal, citing high costs. Despite 
the lack of support in the governor’s office, the legislature enacted a new HSR Act in 1992, 
transferring the FHSRC’s responsibilities to FDOT. FDOT also was charged with providing an updated 
rail system plan every other year that incorporated both passenger and freight components. That 
same year, on October 16, the Miami-Orlando-Tampa Corridor was federally designated as a HSR 
corridor by the U.S. DOT, allowing the possibility of federal funds for studies. During the next two 
years (1992-1994), more corridor studies were conducted by FDOT to evaluate the feasibility of a 
network of HSR corridors connecting major cities around the state. Based on the findings of these 
studies, FDOT announced its commitment to fund HSR, setting aside $70 million per year, plus a 4% 
inflation adjustment, for at least 30 years. The funds would service infrastructure bonds using a 
portion of Florida’s gasoline tax that had been earmarked for non-highway expenditures [22]. 
In 1995, five proposals were submitted, offering a range of public-private options for the Miami-
Tampa-Orlando corridor, including plans aimed at incremental improvements, new HSR using bullet 
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trains, and two proposals for Maglev technologies. Cost estimates on the proposals ranged from a low 
of $740 million to a high of $20 billion. After evaluating the proposals, FDOT selected the FOX. FOX 
proposed to build and operate a new grade-separated, fully dedicated HSR serving the three cities at 
an estimated capital cost of $6.1 billion. FOX officials felt strongly that sharing tracks through an 
incremental approach would never allow the speeds and frequency of service of a dedicated ROW. 
Like the earlier proposal from Florida TGV, Inc., FOX planned to use French TGV technology for its 
rolling stock. Although other technologies were available, the selection of the TGV was aimed at 
minimizing risk, particularly in the eyes of the financial industry. Because HSR did not exist in the 
U.S., it was (and still is) considered a high-risk venture; using a proven technology could at least 
mitigate risk on the technological side. In revenue service since 1981, the TGV had demonstrated the 
fastest trip times, the most reliability, and the best safety record of the potential technologies 
available. Envisioned as a private-public partnership, franchise and precertification agreements were 
executed in 1997, with the understanding that FDOT would provide $70 million per year (escalated at 
4% per year) for 30 to 40 years. Using a portion of Florida’s gasoline tax revenues, a percentage of 
which had been earmarked for non-highway related expenditures, these funds would be used to 
service infrastructure bonds. FOX would contribute $349 million in equity funds over the construction 
period to capitalize FOX. Although a significant amount of money, the $349 million only accounted for 
4% of the total projected costs (see Figure 28), estimated at up to $9.3 billion total. The remainder of 
the costs would be financed through debt financing and bonds, repaid by revenues and a portion of 
the annual state contributions, although $2 billion in federal loans through the Transportation 
Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act (TIFIA) were also sought.
 
 
Figure 28. Sources of Funding for the FOX Project (Source: [22]) 
FDOT viewed the project as playing a key role in an integrated transportation system that would link 
various modes and meet the travel needs of tourists and residents, while being environmentally and 
fiscally responsible. Regarding the need for a HSR project, some studies noted that Florida’s 
population grew by 91% between 1970 and 1990, and they projected an additional increase of 38% 
by 2010. Tourism was projected to increase by 82% during that same period. Increased numbers of 
residents and tourists was expected to create a tremendous increase in demand for highway capacity 
that would exceed the projected 18% increase in highway lane miles through 2010. 
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Bolstered by these findings and FDOT’s support, FOX began its preliminary engineering and 
environmental work in 1998. Opponents quickly sprang up, questioning everything from costs and 
environmental issues to the use of imported technology. A grassroots campaign called Derail the 
Bullet Train actively campaigned against FOX, suggesting that the new HSR project would lead to “an 
ineffective use of public money.” State Senator Ron Klein, founder of Derail the Bullet Train, said that 
public transportation was and continues to be underdeveloped in Florida and, given the costs 
involved, he and many others would rather see such funds used toward regional forms of public 
transportation than intercity HSR. Others began poking holes in FOX’s ridership projections and 
revenue estimates, often arguing that the U.S. was unlikely to follow European and Asian experiences 
with HSR. Although FOX’s ridership study was said to have included “a more intense review and 
detailed ridership study than anywhere else in the world” at that time, many were skeptical because 
there was no HSR in the U.S. For example, FOX assumed that some airlines would agree to code-
share agreements so travelers could easily transfer from planes flying into the cities onto HSR, as 
was done in Europe. FOX also assumed that some air passengers would choose HSR over air 
because of lower fares. However, the report stated that in many cases, air fares were already much 
lower than FOX projections. It also was assumed that more than 50% of the riders would be 
automobile drivers who would shift mode. Many people thought that FOX’s ridership and revenue 
projections were too optimistic in an environment in which HSR was unproven. 
Shortly thereafter, U.S. House Budget Committee Chair John Kasich (R-Ohio) asked the U.S. GAO to 
review FOX’s proposal. GAO noted that because it was in the early phases of development, the FOX 
project faced “several uncertainties regarding its cost, ridership, and schedule… It will be at least 2 
more years before sufficient information would be available to comprehensively assess the project”. 
The review had a strong chilling effect, especially among potential investors, and lent further credence 
to concerns over the ability to secure federal funding for the project. Upon taking office in January 
1999, Governor Bush terminated funding (as Governor Chiles had eight years earlier), citing both 
environmental and financial concerns and the uncertainties identified in the GAO report. The funding 
that would have been used for HSR was redirected toward highway and aviation projects, dealing a 
devastating blow to HSR.  
In May 2000, Amtrak and FDOT issued the joint Florida Intercity Passenger Service Rail Vision Plan. 
It took a different approach to HSR, focusing on incremental rather than new HSR. Although the FOX 
project was not implemented, the benefits of rail were recognized by FDOT. The Vision Plan 
connected major urban centers, tourist attractions, and intermodal transportation centers. 
The Vision Plan remains in place and has some support, but many in Florida are skeptical of 
incremental HSR. Although an incremental approach may be cheaper, it is still not cheap, and the 
issues of funding and public investment still need to be resolved. Finally, finding political support for 
incremental rail remains difficult because one still needs to make the case for a statewide benefit. 
With either this approach or with new HSR built in segments (for example, Tampa - Orlando first, then 
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Miami, then other cities), many people do not see initial benefits where they live or work and wonder if 
they will see a benefit to their region, given the costs and time involved. 
In 2000, the Florida legislature authorized another feasibility study, initially titled the Coast-to-Coast 
Rail Feasibility Study and later renamed the Cross-State Rail Feasibility Study, to be conducted by 
STV, Inc. At the same time, the legislature asked voters to decide on a constitutional amendment. It 
passed with 52.7% of the popular vote, although regional differences existed: On a county-by-county 
basis, 30 counties voted in favor and 37 against the amendment. The legislature enacted the FHSRA 
Act in June 2001. FHSRA was charged with locating, planning, designing, financing, constructing, 
maintaining, owning, operating, administering, and managing HSR in the state. It was further 
authorized to “seek and obtain federal matching funds or any other funds to fulfill the requirements of 
this act either directly or through the DOT.”  It appeared that progress was again being made.  
The FHSRA proceeded initiating a Project, Development, and Environment (PD&E) Study in late 
2001. The first report of the FHSRA to the governor was made in 2002. Later that year (on October 7), 
the FHSRA issued a request for proposals for the design, build, operation, maintenance, and finance 
(DBOM&F) of a HSGT. Around that same time, the FHSRA also released several documents as part 
of the PD&E Study, including the Florida HSR: Screening Report and the Investment Grade Ridership 
Study [23]. The former documented the initial decision-making process used to determine which 
segments within the potential corridors between Orlando and Tampa would be moved forward for 
further analysis. It also reviewed the need, purpose, and markets for HSR in Florida noting tourist 
travel, commuters, businesses and freight movement 
In August 2003, after two of the four proposals submitted were found to be preliminarily responsive to 
the 2002 Request for Proposals, a Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) was issued for the 
Tampa-to-Orlando HSR, noting that “the purpose of the proposed project was to enhance passenger 
mobility between Tampa and Orlando” and that such mobility “was viewed as essential for the 
sustained economic growth of the region, as well as the quality of life of the region’s residents and 
visitors. After taking into account the potential impacts and revenues for each of   the technologies, 
running in each of the four possible alignments, the FHSRA named Fluor-Bombardier as the first-
ranked proposer and selected the Greeneway as the preferred alignment in Orlando, noting that the 
environmental impacts for both Orlando alignments were similar but the Greeneway alignment offered 
a potential for higher ridership revenues, lower cost, and the least financial risk. The FHSRA executed 
a contract with Fluor-Bombardier to provide professional services in support of the completion of a 
Final EIS (FEIS), to be conducted at no cost to the FSHRA or the state. Work on the FEIS began in 
January 2004. By the end of 2003, the Florida Legislature had authorized $14 million for the HSR 
project, but then Governor Bush vetoed $5 million of those funds and stated he would not support 
further new HSR efforts [24]. Governor Bush and Thomas Gallagher (Chair of Derail the Bullet Train 
and state CFO), actively engaged in the campaign to repeal the amendment in November 2004. By 
June 1, 2004, they had 54,774 signatures deemed valid, but for the repeal to appear on the 
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November 2004 ballot, they needed 488,722 signatures. By November of that year, however, enough 
signatures were declared valid that the repeal was placed on the ballot and was overwhelmingly 
supported in the November 2004 general elections, with 63.7% voting for the repeal. 
For 30 years, the state of Florida has pursued HSR in one form or another. Each time progress is 
made, setbacks occur and the process begins again. The situation now appears to be more of a 
stalemate with three discernible positions: those advocating new HSR, those opposed to all HSR 
plans, and those who want an incremental approach. However, Florida’s experience offers some 
powerful lessons and issues for consideration for HSR elsewhere in the country.  
4.3.b Pacific Northwest 
When Amtrak assumed passenger rail services from the 
railroads in May 1971, it continued limited passenger service. 
There was one train on the Burlington Northern (BN) Railway 
track between Portland, Oregon, and Seattle, Washington. 
There was another additional Amtrak train per day, the Coast 
Starlight between Seattle and Los Angeles, which ran on the 
BN between Seattle and Portland and on the Southern Pacific 
between Portland and Eugene, Oregon. There was no rail 
service between Seattle and Vancouver, B.C., after 1981. 
Often, it’s been told that people in the Pacific Northwest pride 
themselves on environmental sensitivity and look for ways to 
reduce reliance on the environmentally unfriendly automobile. 
For example, Figure 29 shows important hiking and biking trails 
together with the BNSF rail corridor. This has led to attacks on 
the automobile culture in the public at large and required a 
change of philosophy about railroads. In the 1980s, however, 
sentiment began to grow in Washington State to develop the 
obsolete rail passenger service into a modern, high-speed, 
high-intensity rail corridor. The Washington State Legislature 
began funding improvements to railroad stations, apparently a 
first step toward the treatment of a rail passenger system as a 
state concern, not simply an obligation of Amtrak and the private railroad companies. 
Similar efforts were underway in state of Oregon. The state withdrew funding between Portland and 
Eugene in 1980 and 1981 and the trains were discontinued officially because of lack of funds. In fact, 
ridership had been low because of poor schedule adherence and substandard track conditions on the 
Southern Pacific line. It was easier and faster to drive. The Oregon Legislature established a State 
Rail Rehabilitation Fund in 1985, but never appropriated money for it.  
Figure 29. BNSF Corridor 
(Source: [Q]) 
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In 1991 Congress passed ISTEA, which, among other things, required the U.S. DOT to identify 
potential major HSR corridors. In 1992, the U.S. DOT identified the Pacific Northwest Rail Corridor 
(PNWRC) as one of five potential HSR corridors. This designated corridor extended from Washington 
State south to Eugene, Oregon, and north to Vancouver, B.C. 
Washington efforts preceded ISTEA. In the late 1980s, the legislature requested the WSDOT to 
conduct a “HSGT Study.” Upon enactment of ISTEA, the Washington State Legislature took the next 
formal step with a directive to WSDOT to develop a “comprehensive assessment of the feasibility of 
developing a HSGT system in the State of Washington”. WSDOT responded in October 1992 with a 
HSGT Study, which confirmed the feasibility of HSR in Washington. Based on that study, the 
Washington legislature in April 1993 directed WSDOT to develop “high-quality intercity passenger rail 
service through incremental upgrading of the existing service”. WSDOT had used the term “high-
speed”; the Washington legislature did not. The legislature specifically wanted to build a “rail culture” 
to “make rail a competitive and viable alternative to automobile and commuter air travel [25]. 
Unlike Washington, Oregon’s plans did not specify high-speed. Oregon DOT would be happy if two or 
three additional trains could traverse the 124 miles from Portland to Eugene in 2 hours, 15 minutes, 
an improvement of only 20 minutes over current scheduled performance. In a brief three paragraphs, 
the 2001 ORP dismisses HSR; that is, train speeds in excess of 150 mph. Oregon is pursuing an 
incremental approach, as “an effective plan...that can be implemented in the next six years.” Oregon 
calculates that real HSR would cost 12 to 15 times as much as the incremental plan, but would only 
attract five times as many riders. This thinking reflects highway planner logic, as if the comparisons 
were between two different highway alternatives. The three-paragraph dismissal of HSR in 2001 ORP 
makes no effort to place any value on the consequences that might result if significantly more riders 
choose to use rail instead of the highway. Oregon does not compare the cost of rail per mile with the 
cost of a highway per mile, as WSDOT does.
  
The incremental approach: The Washington legislature specified an incremental approach to what 
was loosely termed HSR. Many reasons were given for an incremental approach instead of a new 
dedicated HSR system like better chance to obtain funding over a period of years, market demand-
driven development, rail culture development, freight improvement and less costly. 
The most important development was the WSDOT decision to experiment with Talgo technology. As 
discussed in a following chapter, this Spanish technology features a pendular process that allows rail 
cars to tilt on curves. Tilting makes the ride on curved track more comfortable to passengers and 
allows faster operation on curves. Talgo trains also are lightweight, have a low center of gravity, and 
are articulated, creating smoother ride on curved track. The trains are largely manufactured by the 
Talgo Company in Spain, with some final assembly performed in Washington to comply with local-
manufacture requirements. Talgos have been used successfully in Europe for many years. 
Washington leased two Spanish Talgo trains in 1995 for use on the PNWRC, and Amtrak operates 
them under the marketing name “Cascades.” Oregon began to support the service in 1995 and paid 
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Amtrak to extend one Cascade per day from Portland to Eugene. Washington paid to extend one 
Cascade per day to Vancouver, B.C. The introduction of the Talgos, reduced the operating time from 
Seattle to Portland by 30 minutes, largely due to higher speed capability on curves. 
WSDOT initiated the experiment with Talgo technology in 1993, before WSDOT published the various 
studies in response to ISTEA. The trains were popular with passengers, so Washington returned the 
leased Talgos and bought two new, customized Talgo trainsets. Amtrak also bought two such 
trainsets. Talgo built a fifth trainset on spec and leased it to Oregon in 1999. Seattle-to-Portland 
ridership in 1993 was 94,000 per year; it grew to 590,000 per year by 2003.
 
The increase of ridership 
on the PNWRC started being large due to the popular introduction of the Talgos. Talgos are designed 
for European standards, and have some minor discrepancies with FRA train regulations. The FRA 
waived the discrepancies but limited operation to a maximum of 79 mph because PNWRC track 
conditions will not support speeds in excess of 79 mph. BNSF engineers, worried about increased rail 
wear on curves, studied the issue and determined that the Talgos did not materially increase wear on 
rails. 
4.3.c Texas TGV 
In 1982, a Texas legislature joint committee recommended that feasibility studies were examining the 
potential of conventional rail and HSR between Texan cities. Proposed legislation to enact the joint 
committee report recommendations, failed. Three years later, a German Consortium reported that a 
HSR system would be viable from Dallas to Houston if the project obtained $500 millions for startup 
contributions and was financed with tax exempt bonds. Two years later, the German Consortium 
unsuccessfully lobbied the Texas legislature to undertake the proposal. A job creation task force 
created by the then-Governor recommended that the Governor support enabling legislation for the 
Texas Turnpike Authority to conduct a HSR feasibility study. The enabling legislation passed.  
In 1989, after receipt of the study, the Texas legislature created the Texas HSR Authority (THSRA). It 
was charged with determining if HSR was in the public interest and, if so, awarding a franchise to 
develop and operate such a system. During the next three years, the THSRA issues requests for 
proposals, in which two of three applications met the criteria. Texas TGV Corporation was ultimately 
granted the franchise after evidentiary hearings were held on franchise applications. Court dismissed 
lawsuits filed by Southwest Airlines to postpone the hearings and to rescind the rules of the THSRA. 
Texas TGV Corporation, the THSRA, and FRA signed a memorandum of understanding establishing 
environmental review responsibilities as well as other responsibilities. The 1993 security offering was 
for $200 million in notes, backed by a $225 million letter of credit from the Canadian Imperial Bank of 
Commerce and a $75 million counter-guarantee to be provided by Morrison Knudsen Corporation 
(one of the original project developers). The Texas HSR Authority Act prohibited use of public funds 
for constructing the system, and, as a result, all construction costs would have been privately 
financed. 
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After this, the THSRA and Texas TGV Corporation signed the franchise agreement and outlined 
responsibilities of Texas TGV Corporation, many of which were time-sensitive. Work began on 
environmental review and ridership studies, but environmental review work was eventually stopped 
because of cost overruns. The first portion of public financing offering of Texas TGV Corporation was 
delayed until December 31, 1993. The Texas TGV argued it was due to lack of progress on 
environmental review and investment grade ridership studies as well as other reasons. 
During that year, delays forced renegotiation of franchise agreement, and additional requirements 
were placed on the Texas TGV Corporation. The corporation submitted a plan to the THSRA, which 
did not include required detailed financial and milestones information, and released its independent 
ridership study. Texas TGV Corporation issued its initial security offering as previously described. A 
day before the pricing and sale of the notes was scheduled to occur, Morrison Knudsen announced 
that it was no longer going to provide the counter-guarantee, and that the offering was going to be 
withdrawn. The Texas TGV Corporation could not meet its deadline of December 31, 1993, and next 
year, work was halted by the Texas TGV Corporation, which led to the termination of the franchise 
agreement. The Texas legislature abolished the THSRA and its enabling legislation.
 
 
Texas TGV’s investors lost about $40 million by the end of the process. More importantly, according 
to [17], “The Texas TGV’s failure was a delegitimizing event for the proponents of market-led rail 
passenger renewal.” The Texas Triangle is a clear example of a failure, as they are no longer actively 
pursuing funding or development. 
 
4.4 The only success in the United States: The Northeast Corridor (NEC) 
Although not formally designated as a federal corridor, the NEC is one of the few U.S. success stories 
in HSR; however, its key successes in terms of speed came by the early 1970s and there has been 
little improvement since then. However, while HSR in the NEC did not keep pace with the speed and 
reliability of European and Asian efforts, it did keep pace with respect to commercial performance by 
covering costs and generating an operating profit. Linking Boston, New York, Washington, and 
intermediate cities, the NEC main line on Figure 30, is America's most highly-developed HSR corridor. 
Background: In 1967, following the High-Speed Ground Transportation Act (HSGTA) two years 
prior, the Office of HSGT at the U.S. DOT committed $6.7 million to support Pennsylvania Railroad’s 
acquisition of new passenger cars that could attain speeds up to 160 mph. The goal was to shorten 
the trip between New York City and Washington, D.C., to less than three hours.  
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Figure 30. The NEC (Source: [D]) 
What made the NEC so marketable was a combination of economic and geographic circumstances. 
Because the NEC lacked the space to add the highway and air capacity needed to match growing 
travel demands, it was a good candidate for enhancing existing infrastructure. The corridor had a well-
developed and modern rail infrastructure when the decision was made, and Pennsylvania Railroad, 
which owned and operated the line between New York City and Washington, D.C., was willing to work 
with the government on the initiative. 
Funding: This was a true private-public enterprise as will be described later: Private partners put 
approximately $860 million into the project, with only about $13 million from government sources. The 
key manufacturing companies (GE, Westinghouse, and the Budd Company) were all U.S. based. The 
partners had the Metroliner HSR system up and running within four years. However, because the 
long-term goal of upgrading the tracks to accommodate the higher speeds was not yet met, the trains 
could only run at speeds as high as 120 mph [26]. 
The partnership ended when Penn Central filed for bankruptcy in 1970, with other railroads following 
soon after. Amtrak took over operation of the Metroliner between New York City and Washington, 
D.C., between 1978 and 1999; FRA invested about $3.7 billion in rehabilitating and upgrading the 
corridor. In 1992, Amtrak initiated the Acela HSR program and has invested $1.8 billion to date in a 
system that could run at speeds of 150 mph. Work focused especially on the New York City–Boston 
segment of the corridor, rebuilding infrastructure and fully electrifying the line to Boston from New 
Haven, Connecticut.
 
Project’s Goals/Scope: Revenue service of the Acela began in December 2000 and trains now 
operate between 110 and 150 mph on parts of the corridor (see Table 1). However, in more than 30 
years, except for the introduction of the Acela, little has changed on the southern section of the 
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corridor in terms of speed and number of trains making the trip on a daily basis, even as the airlines 
have modified their schedules to accommodate more passengers and more trips. This corridor is 
considered a success because the system has been operating at HSR speeds for several decades, 
although the ultimate goal has not yet been achieved on much of the line.  
 
Segment Mileage Top Speed (Goal/Actual) 
Travel Time 
(Goal/Actual) 
Washington to New York 225 150/135 mph 2:50/2:43 
New York to Boston 231 150/150 mph 4:10/3:24 
Table 1. Top Speed and Travel Time Goals for the NEC (Source: [R]) 
The HSR trainsets designed and manufactured under the control of Bombardier for Amtrak, consist of 
power cars at the front and rear with 6 coaches (a first class car, four regular cars, and a café car in 
between, which is completely accessible to passengers with limited mobility; see Figure 31). The total 
capacity is of 304 passengers and it has a length of 665' 8 ¾'' and a width of 10' 5'. Advanced tilt 
technology in the trailer car provides a smooth, quiet, comfortable ride. In addition the train is 
particularly energy efficient and environmentally friendly as a result of the facility for saving braking 
energy, so-called regenerative braking. 
 
Figure 31. Schematic view of the Acela Express in the NEC (Source: [S]) 
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5. THE 10 DESIGNATED HSR CORRIDORS 
Today, at the end of 2009, up to eleven corridors are authorized for designation, of which the 
Secretary of Transportation and/or the Congress have designated ten of them. As said before, the 
NEC it has not been designated a HSR corridor. Of the designated corridors, three were specifically 
named by Congress in law. The other seven were selected by the Secretary of Transportation in a 
competitive process, which in current law involves an evaluation of such factors as projected 
ridership, public benefits, and anticipated partnership participation of States, localities, and the freight 
railroads. The next Figure 32 shows the 10 designated HSR and the NEC. 
 
Figure 32. The 10 designated HSR corridors and the NEC (Source: [T]) 
The corridor authorization program was initiated on December 18, 1991 and the latest extension 
approved was on December 4, 2004.  Since that date, no changes have been made. Five corridors 
(were authorized under the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA) and six 
were authorized under the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21) in 1998. 
On the next page, Table 2 summarizes the different authorized corridors in the U.S. including the 
most relevant designation information for each one. Each HSR project in the U.S. has its own 
characteristics due to large differences between regions and States. The detailed study of each of the 
projects can become very large and complex, reason why this paper has tried to give an idea with 
general features of each corridor to achieve a global vision of the HSR in America. 
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Name of Corridor Designation Date Designated By First Designated Links 
Chicago Hub October 15, 1992 ISTEA Chicago - Detroit & St.Louis - Milwaukee 
Florida October 16, 1992 ISTEA Miami - (Orlando & Tampa) 
California October 19, 1992 ISTEA San Diego - (Los Angeles & Sacramento) 
Southeast October 20, 1992 ISTEA Charlotte - (Richmond & Washington) 
Pacific Northwest October 20, 1992 ISTEA (Eugene & Portland) - (Seattle & Vancouver) 
Gulf Coast November 18, 1998 TEA-21 New Orleans - (Houston & Atlanta) 
keystone December 10, 1998 TEA-21 Pittsburgh - Philadelphia 
Empire State December 10, 1998 TEA-21 New York City - Buffalo 
Northern New 
England October 11, 2000 TEA-21 Boston - (Portland & Montreal) 
South Central October 11, 2000 TEA-21 Dallas - (Austin & Oklahoma) 
Table 2. HSR Corridors and Designations(Source: [T]) 
To describe the various HSR corridors, a summary of the most relevant information for each corridor 
has been created through the following broad headings: Corridor Brief’s Description, Background, 
Project's Goals/Scope and Actual Status. In the next chapter there will be a discussion of the different 
technologies that the different corridors are planning to implement. 
The description of all the corridors has been classified in clockwise order starting with the Chicago 
Hub Network and finishing with the Pacific Northwest Corridor. In this way, the reader can have a 
better orientation around the country when reading the different HSR corridors. The following lines 
show all the basic information of each of the 10 designated corridors. 
 
5.1 Chicago Hub Network 
Corridor Brief’s Description: The Chicago Hub is a hub-spoke model that runs out of Chicago, 
Illinois (see Figure 33). One line runs north to Milwaukee, Wisconsin, before veering northwest to 
Minneapolis/St. Paul, Minnesota. A second line runs south from Chicago to Springfield, Illinois, and 
St. Louis, Missouri, before veering west to Kansas City, Missouri. A third line runs south to 
Indianapolis, Indiana, where it branches into two lines, one running south to Louisville, Kentucky, and 
another running to Cincinnati, Ohio. A fourth line runs east from Chicago to Toledo and Cleveland, 
Ohio. That line then runs south to Columbus, Ohio, before joining the third line at Cincinnati, Ohio. 
Finally, a fifth line runs east from Chicago to Kalamazoo and Detroit, Michigan. 
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Figure 33. Chicago Hub Network (Source: [U]) 
Background: In 1990, the States of Illinois, Minnesota, and Wisconsin signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) aimed at evaluating the potential for a HSR corridor linking Chicago, 
Milwaukee, and Minneapolis - St. Paul. One year later, TMS/Benesch HSR Consultants presented 
their report, Tri-State HSR Study: Chicago – Milwaukee - Twin Cities Corridor, to the Departments of 
Transportation of the three states. The purpose of the report was “to investigate the economic and 
financial potential for constructing and operating a HSR rail system in one of two corridors between 
Chicago and Minneapolis - St. Paul.” The corridors examined were a southern corridor linking 
Chicago, Milwaukee, and the Twin Cities via Madison, and a northern corridor linking the same cities 
via Green Bay. The study concluded that the southern corridor appeared “very promising in terms of 
ridership, revenues, financial, and economic benefits.” The report recommended using existing ROW 
and targeting 125 mph service. By 1994, Illinois planners had completed a study of 125 mph service 
for the Chicago - St. Louis spoke, and the second phase of a study focused on the Chicago - 
Milwaukee spoke recommended incremental nonelectric HSR at 125 mph. 
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In April 1997, Illinois entered into a cooperative agreement (DTFRDV-96-H-60006) with the U.S. DOT 
to perform a Tier I environmental impact study (EIS) of the Chicago - St. Louis spoke of the Chicago 
Hub Network. The final EIS, released in January 2003, proposed that HSR passenger service 
between Chicago and St. Louis be implemented with a maximum operating speed of 110 mph on the 
section south of Dwight and ongoing speeds of 79 mph north of Dwight. Running parallel to the EIS 
efforts, nine Midwestern states (Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, 
Ohio, and Wisconsin) joined to form the Midwest Regional Rail Initiative (MWRRI) in 1996. The goal 
was to develop an implementation plan for a more extensive HSR centered on the Chicago Hub. 
Totaling 3,000 miles, the MWRRI includes the federally designated corridors in the Chicago Hub 
Network, and adds additional passenger rail links at various speeds above and below 110 mph, as 
well as several feeder bus service links. The following additional proposed city links are not federally 
designated:  
• Milwaukee, WI – Green Bay, WI  
• Chicago, IL – Quincy, IL  
• Chicago, IL – Iowa City, IA – Des Moines, IA – Omaha, NE  
• Chicago, IL – Carbondale, MO  
• Kalamazoo, MI – Grand Rapids, MI – Holland, MI  
• Kalamazoo, MI – Lansing, MI – Port Huron, MI  
• Detroit, MI – Pontiac, MI  
In 1998, the Midwestern Legislative Conference formed a HSR Task Force. Out of that task force, the 
Midwest Interstate Passenger Rail Commission (MIPRC) was formed by a compact in 2000. The 
MIPRC works with the MWRRI, providing an advocacy arm for HSR in the region. 
The Chicago Hub Network gives a complex picture of federally designated and non-federally 
designated corridors. There also is a strong rail component, as the state of Illinois pursues its Chicago 
Regional Environmental and Transportation Efficiency Program (CREATE) in tandem with HSR 
efforts. 
Project’s Goals/Scope: In 2002, Amtrak and the states of Illinois and Wisconsin began reviewing 
proposals for 110 mph tilting HSR trains. According to Amtrak, the state of Michigan, Amtrak, and the 
FRA have developed a state-of-the-art incremental train control system that permits passenger train 
operations on the existing ROW at speeds up to 110 mph. The first phase of the system (up to 90 
mph on 45 miles of track along the Chicago - Detroit spoke) was implemented in January 2002. Work 
began to extend the system an additional 20 miles and to seek approval for operations at speeds in 
excess of 90 mph (see Table 3). Speeds have been increased to 110 mph on this section in 
southwest Michigan.
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City Linkages – Federally Designated Distance (miles) 
Top Speed 
Goal (mph) 
Travel Time 
(Hours) 
Chicago, IL – Detroit, MI 279 110 3:49 
Chicago – St. Louis, MO 282 110 3:50 
Chicago – Milwaukee, WI – Minneapolis,MN - St. Paul, MN 445 110 5:52 
Chicago – Indianapolis, IN – Cincinnati, OH 319 110 4:03 
Chicago – Toledo, OH – Cleveland, OH 341 110 4:23 
Cleveland – Columbus, OH – Cincinnati (3C) 254 110 3:28 
Indianapolis – Louisville, KY 111 79 4:00 
St. Louis – Kansas City, MO 282 90 4:14 
Table 3. Chicago Hub Network Top Speed and Travel Times Goal (Source: [U]) 
Actual Status: Stated before, an EIS was completed almost 10 years ago for Chicago - St. Louis and 
an environmental document was prepared for the extension of Chicago to Milwaukee service on to 
Madison, WI. Work has begun along the Chicago - St. Louis spoke of the Hub Network and some rail 
is being replaced between Chicago and Milwaukee. In July 2009, Wisconsin officials announced a 
$47 million deal with the Spanish train manufacturer Talgo including two sets of 14-car passenger 
trains that will operate from Chicago to Milwaukee and will knock 45 minutes off the current 1-hour, 
40-minute trip between this two destinations. Besides this, several other improvements have been 
made to upgrade the tracks to allow for 110 mph speeds on the south of the Dwight–Springfield 
portion of the spoke. A Positive Train Control system demonstration is underway along that same 
spoke.  
With respect to the other spokes of the hub, Indiana has completed a series of HSR public outreach 
meetings to define the state’s interest and participation in the MWRRI. Indiana is working with Amtrak, 
the states of Illinois and Michigan, and freight railroads on the South of the Lake Corridor Study to 
identify the best way to route passenger trains through southern Chicago and northwest Indiana. 
Minnesota is pursuing a $10 million capital budget request for preliminary engineering and 
environmental documentation for the Minnesota portion of the Chicago - Twin Cities (Minneapolis - St. 
Paul) corridor. 
 
5.2 Northern New England Corridor 
Corridor Brief Description: One of the newest of the federally designated corridors, the Northern 
New England Corridor (Figure 34) was formally designated in October 2000. Shaped like a lopsided 
V, the 489-mile corridor connects Boston with Portland and Auburn, Maine, on one side and connects 
Boston with Montreal, Canada, on the other. With Boston as its hub, the Northern New England 
Corridor would serve destinations in Maine, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Hampshire, Vermont, 
and the Canadian province of Quebec. 
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Background:  In January 2002, a meeting was held in Nashua, New Hampshire, to begin a 
Boston–Montreal HSR feasibility study, jointly funded by the FRA and the Departments of 
Transportation of Massachusetts, Vermont, and New Hampshire. The study’s first phase, which 
focuses on ridership forecasts, infrastructure, public participation, and institutional issues, was 
scheduled for completion in September 2002. Ridership forecasts for the 329-mile portion of the 
designated corridor from Boston, MA to Montreal, PQ, Canada, predict that nearly 684,000 riders 
would use a 5:45 hour service between Boston and Montreal. 
 
 
 
Figure 34. Northern New England Corridor Network (Source: [27]) 
Project’s Goals/Scope: As one of the newest designed HSR corridors, few data has been stated on 
the scope of this project. The following Table 4 summarizes the top speed and travel time goals. 
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City Linkages – Federally Designated Distance (miles) 
Top Speed 
Goal (mph) 
Travel Time 
(Hours) 
Boston, MA – Montreal, Canada 339 110 4:31 
Boston, MA – Portland,MN – Auburn, MN 150 110 n/a 
Table 4. Northern New England Corridor Top Speeds and Travel Times Goal (Source: [27]) 
Actual Status: The corridor currently includes routes from Boston to (a) Portland, Maine; (b) 
Montreal, Canada; and (c) Albany, New York, via Springfield, Massachusetts, with an extension from 
Springfield to New Haven, Connecticut. Frequent passenger service currently links Boston with 
Portland, and New Haven with Springfield. Less-frequent service connects Boston with Springfield 
and Albany; there are no passenger trains today between Boston and Montreal. Current speeds on 
the section from Boston to Portland (which began being serviced by Amtrak in December 2001) 
average only 59 mph. The States of New Hampshire and Maine have worked with the host Pan Am 
Railways (formerly Guilford Railroad) to upgrade the Boston - Portland line over which Amtrak's 
Down-easter operates and there have been some studies of the Boston–New Hampshire–Vermont–
Montréal spoke. 
 
5.3 Empire Corridor 
Corridor Brief Description: As designated in 1998, the Empire Corridor extends 439 miles from New 
York City through the Hudson Valley to Albany/Rensselaer and west across the spine of New York to 
Buffalo (see Figure 35). 
 
Figure 35. Empire Corridor Network (Source: [D]) 
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Background: In September 1998, an MOU was signed by the New York State DOT and Amtrak 
that committed the former to rebuilding several old Turboliners and the latter to track improvements 
that would allow speeds of up to 125 mph on the section between New York City and Schenectady. 
The estimated cost of the plan was $185 million, but travel times were expected to be reduced 
significantly throughout the corridor. In January 2004, Amtrak announced its intention to withdraw, 
citing delays and increased costs. In the meantime, three Turboliners were delivered to Amtrak; two 
were placed in regular service until later in 2004, when they were taken out of service as a result of 
high fuel consumption and excessive costs. 
Project’s Goals/Scope: In 2005, the New York State Senate established a HSR Task Force to make 
recommendations to continue the development of HSR throughout the State. Specifically, a major 
study of the Hudson Line between New York City and Albany recently analyzed the freight and 
passenger operations on this corridor through 2020. This study identified necessary infrastructure 
improvements and estimated the cost of those improvements, including those required to increase 
passenger train speeds up to 125 mph (Table 5).  
New York State has run 110 mph passenger rail service on portions of the Albany - New York City 
stretch of the Empire Corridor route since the 1970s. The improvements along the line that allowed 
higher speeds were largely financed through the 1974 Rail Bond Act. 
City Linkages – Federally Designated  Distance (miles)  
Top Speed 
Goal (mph) 
Travel Time 
(Hours) 
New York City, NY – Albany, NY – Buffalo, NY 439 125 n/a 
Table 5. Empire Corridor Top Speeds and Travel Times Goal (Source: [28]) 
Actual Status: Since its 1998 designation, the FHWA and FRA have jointly allocated $3.4 million for 
grade crossing improvements on this corridor, primarily on the Hudson Line between New York and 
Albany. In addition, the State has funded infrastructure improvements on the Hudson Line, enabling 
passenger trains to operate at speeds up to 110 mph over portions of this 141-mile segment of the 
corridor. Speeds along the rest of the corridor are limited to 90 mph at most, in part because of the 
shared ROW with the Metropolitan transportation Authority south of Poughkeepsie and with CSX 
Corporation railroad for most of the corridor between Poughkeepsie and Buffalo. The State has 
conducted discussions with Metro North, CSX, and others regarding improvement implementations. 
An update to the State’s five year multi-modal program is under review, which will define a set of 
capital needs to complete these improvements. As a follow-on effort, the State extended this analysis 
from Albany to Buffalo with a study to develop an Empire Corridor West Railroad Transportation plan. 
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5.4 Keystone Corridor 
Corridor Brief Description: Consisting of 349 miles, the Keystone Corridor shown in Figure 36, was 
designated as a federal HSR corridor in December 1998, and it consists of two very different 
segments: Harrisburg - Philadelphia and Harrisburg - Pittsburgh. 
  
Figure 36. Keystone Corridor Network (Source: [T]) 
Background: The initial designation linked Philadelphia and Harrisburg, with an extension to 
Pittsburgh approved by the U.S. DOT in 2000. In November 1999, Amtrak and the State of 
Pennsylvania entered into an MOU and announced a joint $140 million infrastructure and equipment 
upgrade program on the Philadelphia–Harrisburg segment of the line to reduce trip times to 90 
minutes by 2004, enhance stations, and improve reliability. In October 2003, Governor Rendell 
announced another $3 million for passenger rail service between Harrisburg and Philadelphia as part 
of a $125 million capital budget aimed at improving public transportation. 
Project’s Goals/Scope: The keystone Corridor is another example of an incremental HSR project 
within one state. The two existing segments of the corridor have different characteristics as described 
in the next lines. As shown in Table 6, both segments have 110 mph top speed goal. 
East of Harrisburg:   Sharing some of the operating characteristics of the NEC main line, the Amtrak-
owned and -operated Philadelphia - Harrisburg segment (104 miles) is a mature passenger corridor, 
with frequent intercity trains (14 round trips per average workday, most of which operate on the NEC 
beyond Philadelphia to New York) and commuter trains for part of the route near Philadelphia. This 
line has multiple tracks, full electrification, and almost complete grade separation from the highway 
grid. The remaining three public highway grade crossings on the Philadelphia - Harrisburg segment 
are being eliminated with current projects. Amtrak is planning additional improvements. Speed on the 
line is now up to 110 mph. Station improvements and new construction are being pursued at 
Lancaster and Elizabethtown.  
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West of Harrisburg: In contrast with Amtrak's portion of the Keystone Corridor, the segment between 
Harrisburg and Pittsburgh is a heavy-duty freight railroad, owned and operated by Norfolk Southern 
(NS), with only one passenger train round trip per day, the Pennsylvanian (New York - Pittsburgh), 
over its mountainous topography. A 2005 NS study suggested that significant infrastructure 
improvements would be needed to smoothly integrate additional passenger trains with the dense and 
growing in freight traffic. 
 
City Linkages – Federally Designated  Distance (miles)  
Top Speed 
Goal (mph) 
Travel Time 
(Hours) 
Philadelphia, NJ – Pittsburgh, PA 349 110 5:25 
Table 6. Keystone Corridor Top Speeds and Travel Times Goal (Source: [T]) 
Actual Status: Work continues on the line, although more slowly than anticipated. The remaining 
three public highway grade crossings on the Harrisburg - Philadelphia segment are being eliminated 
with current projects. Amtrak is planning additional improvements, including the installation of the 
Positive Train Control (PTC) technology in use on the NEC. Efforts continue on this line, although it 
appears to have some difficulties similar to the Empire Corridor in terms of Amtrak’s role. 
 
5.5 Southeast Corridor 
Corridor Brief Description: Designated as a federal corridor in October 1992, the initial 
Southeast Corridor linked Washington, D.C., to Richmond, Virginia. In 1995, an extension was 
approved to Hampton Roads, Virginia, with additional extensions approved in December 1998 and 
October 2000. The current corridor links Washington, D.C., with five states and the Gulf Coast 
Corridor (through Atlanta) in the following segments shown in Figure 37:  
• Washington, D.C.–Richmond, VA  
• Richmond, VA–Hampton Roads, VA  
• Richmond, VA–Raleigh, NC–Greensboro, NC–Charlotte, NC  
• Raleigh, NC–Columbia, SC–Savannah, GA–Jacksonville, FL  
• Atlanta, GA–Macon, GA  
• Charlotte, NC–Atlanta, GA  
Southeastern HSR includes the federally designated corridor, but extends the links to include the 
segment to Birmingham, Alabama, covered by the Gulf Coast federally designated corridor and an 
additional segment to Chattanooga and Nashville, Tennessee. 
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Figure 37. Southeast Corridor Network (Source: [V]) 
Background: A report issued in 1997 by the U.S. DOT identified the Southeast Corridor as the 
most economically viable of all the proposed HSR projects. One year later, the Virginia Department of 
Rail and Public Transport, North Carolina’s DOT, the FRA, and the FHWA signed an MOU to jointly 
develop environmental documentation related to implementing HSR on the portions of the corridor in 
Virginia and North Carolina. A Tier I EIS followed in 1999, focused on the Washington, D.C.- Charlotte 
segment of the corridor. The Tier I EIS was completed in 2002 and a Record of Decision on the 
proposed route was issued by the FRA and FHWA, allowing the Tier II EIS to begin. The proposed 
date of completion was 2004. 
Project’s Goals/Scope: North Carolina, Virginia, South Carolina, and Georgia have been 
collaborating to implement HSR in the designated Southeast Corridor. The most intensive effort has 
thus far gone to the originally designated Washington - Richmond - Charlotte segment for which the 
FRA and Amtrak have developed detailed transportation plans, which the Commonwealth and CSX 
Transportation have begun to implement on an incremental basis. Plans show that with up to 110 mph 
speeds, trip times of two hours (Washington - Richmond) and four and one-half hours (Richmond-
Charlotte) would be feasible (see Table 7). Two States have created the Virginia-North Carolina 
Interstate HSR Compact to provide authority and legislative oversight for the implementation of HSR. 
Georgia just completed a planning study for Charlotte to Atlanta improvements. 
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City Linkages – Federally Designated Distance (miles) 
Top Speed 
Goal (mph) Travel Time (Hours) 
Washington, - Richmond, 118 110 2:10 
Richmond, - Hampton Roads, 74 110 1:30 
Richmond, Raleigh, Greensboro – Charlotte 338 110 4:25 
Charlotte – Atlanta 260 110 n/a 
Atlanta – Macon 84 110 n/a 
Table 7. Southeast Corridor Top Speeds and Travel Times Goal (Source: [V]) 
Actual Status: Virginia and North Carolina, together with the FHWA and FRA, in October 2002 
completed a Tier I EIS and selected a route from Washington, DC to Charlotte, NC employing the 
abandoned CSX “S” line between Petersburg, VA, and Norlina, NC. A Tier II EIS is being prepared 
with FRA for the Richmond, VA to Raleigh, NC section of the corridor. A Record of Decision is 
anticipated in late 2010. 
 
5.6 Florida Corridor 
Corridor Brief’s Description: The designated Florida Corridor links Tampa Bay, Orlando, Miami, and 
intermediate points. The Corridor travels north from Miami through West Broward and West Palm 
Beach before turning southwest at Orlando to Lakeland and Tampa. The Florida Corridor plans to 
connect Orlando to Tampa at the beginning (Phase 1), with a later extension to St. Petersburg (Phase 
2). After that, there is a proposed route to extend the network to Miami, Fort Myers, Jacksonville, 
Tallahassee and Pensacola (see Figure 38). 
 
Figure 38. Florida Corridor Network  (Source: [W]) 
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Background: Chapter 4 has a discussion of the different attempts to achieve a HSR system in the 
history of the State of Florida. Florida voters authorized funding for the HSR system by a 2000 
referendum but repealed by 64% of voters in a 2004 referendum. Some have argued that the wording 
of Bush government on the 2004 referendum was misleading, and some may have assumed it was 
the same as the 2000 referendum and voted the opposite of what they meant to vote. Although the 
amendment has been repealed, the Florida HSR Authority Act is still in effect pending any action that 
the Florida Legislature may choose to take in the future. To date, the Florida Legislature hasn't 
appropriated any more funds. 
Project’s Goals/Scope: The State of Florida has attempted more than once to develop the entire 
designated corridor (or portions of it) to support very high-speed (over 150 mph) intercity rail service, 
but has not succeeded thus far in doing so. Tampa to Orlando HSR was most recently advanced as 
the first leg of a statewide system at an approximate cost of $2.5 billion on a dedicated infrastructure 
using the Interstate 4 ROW. The peak speed would be 150 mph with adoption of the electric power 
option. A competitive procurement for this system was put on hold in 2005. Since then, Florida has 
concentrated its study efforts on incremental HSR planning with top speed goals shown in the next 
Table 8. On October 2004, the authority voted to prefer the consortium of Fluor Corp. and Bombardier 
Transportation to build and operate the system, using Bombardier's JetTrain technology. 
 
City Linkages – Federally Designated Distance (miles) 
Top Speed 
Goal (mph) Travel Time (Hours) 
Orlando, FL – Tampa, FL 92 >120 1:00 
Miami, FL – Orlando, FL 282 110 2:57 
Table 8. Florida Corridor Top Speeds and Travel Times Goal (Source: [W]) 
Actual Status: Despite the denial of funding due to the referendum passed in 2004, the Florida HSR 
Authority has completed the Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Tampa to Orlando project 
segment, and the next step will be issuance of a Record of Decision by the FRA. 
 
5.7 Gulf Coast Corridor  
Corridor Brief’s Description: Formally designated as a federal HSR corridor in November 1998, with 
extensions approved in October 2000, the Gulf Coast Corridor covers 1,022 miles and uses New 
Orleans as its hub, with three spokes reaching Houston, Texas, Mobile and Birmingham, Alabama 
and Atlanta, Georgia (see Figure 39). At Atlanta, the Gulf Coast Corridor would connect with the 
Southeast Corridor to Charlotte, Richmond, Washington, and NEC points. 
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Figure 39. Gulf Coast Corridor Network (Source: [T]) 
Background: The lead for planning the corridor is the Southern Rapid Rail Transportation 
Commission (SRRTC), which includes representatives from Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama. In 
September 2002, the SRRTC was awarded a cooperative agreement by the FRA for Phase I of the 
Deep South HSR Corridor Study. In Phase I, it will identify institutional issues, make service 
projections, gather information, and develop a rail operations plan. A specific strategy for 
implementation will form the basis for Phase II. Because funding for the study was scheduled to last 
through September 2004, it is likely that the study is not yet completed. According to the FRA, there 
are physical constraints along the CSX lines between New Orleans and Mobile that might prevent 
HSR for much of this distance.  
Project’s Goals/Scope: The States are aiming to upgrade existing rail lines to 110 mph service (see 
Table 9) and are preparing a strategic plan. The goal is to run HSR at speeds of 110 mph. Louisiana 
received a $1 million earmark in Fiscal Year 1999 and $1.85 million was provided under TEA-21 for 
elimination of at-grade crossings. 
City Linkages – Federally Designated Distance (miles) 
Top Speed 
Goal (mph) Travel Time (Hours) 
Houston, TX – New Orleans, LA 362 110 n/a 
Mobile, FL – New Orleans, LA 139 110 n/a 
New Orleans, LA – Atlanta, GA 521 110 n/a 
Table 9. Gulf Coast Corridor Top Speeds and Travel Times Goal (Source: [T]) 
Actual Status: At present, no corridor-type intercity rail service operates in this corridor, although 
Louisiana has been working with Amtrak and the Kansas City Southern to initiate a commuter service 
between New Orleans and Baton Rouge and a New Orleans gateway rail improvement project. The 
FRA has made study grants to the Southern HSR Commission (SHSRC), formerly known as the 
Southern Rapid Rail Transit Commission), which comprises appointees of the three member states 
(Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama).   
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5.8 South Central Corridor 
Corridor Brief’s Description: As designated in 2000, the South Central Corridor consists of a hub at 
Dallas-Fort Worth, Texas, with spokes extending to Oklahoma City and Tulsa to the north, Texarkana, 
Texas/Arkansas, Little Rock, Arkansas, to the east and northeast, and Austin and San Antonio to the 
southwest (see Figure 40). The entire system covers 994 miles. 
 
Figure 40. South Central Corridor Network (Source: [T]) 
Background: Discussed in the previous chapter, efforts for HSR in Texas began in 1987 when the 
Texas Legislature directed the Texas Turnpike Authority to study the feasibility of HSR in the Texas 
Triangle (Dallas – Houston - San Antonio). The South Central Corridor that was designated a federal 
corridor in October 2000 it is not the same project that terminated in 1993 because of financial 
disagreements between the State and the private Texas TGV Consortium. 
Project’s Goals/Scope: Using discretionary Next Generation HSR Program technology 
demonstration funding, FRA together with the Oklahoma DOT performed precision aerial digital 
mapping of the developing HSR corridor between Dallas - Fort Worth, Oklahoma City, and Tulsa. At 
present, Amtrak serves these markets with a single long-distance train (the Texas Eagle) and the 
Oklahoma-sponsored Fort Work-Oklahoma City Heartland Flyer train. As shown in Table 10, there is 
no information about speeds and travel times goal yet. 
City Linkages – Federally Designated Distance (miles) 
Top Speed 
Goal (mph) 
Travel Time 
(Hours) 
Tulsa, OK – Dallas/Fort Worth, TX 322 n/a n/a 
Little Rock, AR – Dallas/Fort Worth, TX – San Antonio, TX 672 n/a n/a 
Table 10. South Central Corridor Top Speeds and Travel Times Goal (Source: [T]) 
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Actual Status: Currently, the Texas DOT (TxDOT) is conducting an analysis of its statewide railroad 
network, which will support TxDOT’s plan to connect the state's population centers on designated 
freight, intercity passenger, and HSR corridors. Texas has requested federal funding to perform an 
initial feasibility study of high-speed service on the Texas portion of the corridor. However, all eligible 
funding for these activities is earmarked for other projects in the FRA budget. The state has also 
begun a study to identify the risk levels at grade crossings along the corridor. Since 2000, the FHWA 
and FRA have jointly allocated $2.558 million for grade crossing improvements on the corridor in all 
three states. Nothing appears to have moved forward in this corridor. 
 
5.9 California Corridor 
Corridor Brief’s Description: The development of a new electrically powered HSR system would 
serve major population centers from San Francisco and Sacramento to Los Angeles and San Diego. 
Through these connections it will involve other major cities like Merced, Bakersfield and Anaheim. In 
the next page, Figure 41 shows the entire California corridor with the only two diesel intercity trains 
that are included in the project. 
 
Figure 41. California Corridor Network (Source: [X]) 
Feasibility Study of High-Speed Rail in the U.S. 
The 10 Designated HSR Corridors  60 
 
Background: Since the 1980s, the State of California and Amtrak have made significant investments 
in equipment and facilities to develop three passenger rail corridor services: the San Joaquins (Bay 
Area/Sacramento–Central Valley, with bus connections to L.A.); Capitols (San Jose – Oaklan –
Sacramento - Auburn); and Pacific Surfliners (San Luis Obispo - L.A.- San Diego). In 2008, total 
intercity ridership on California's State-supported corridor trains–at 5.5 million–accounted for one fifth 
of Amtrak's passenger-trips nationwide. A strategic plan was prepared for improvement of the Pacific 
Surfliner Corridor from Los Angles to San Diego eventually to speeds of up to 110 mph. On July 2, 
2009, U.S. transportation Secretary Ray LaHood announced extension of the California HSR corridor 
to Las Vegas, Nevada. 
Commercial Feasibility Study forecasts that by the year 2020, rail passenger service with 110 mph top 
speeds in California would generate more ridership than the entire NEC did in 1993; and a new HSR 
system would triple or quadruple Amtrak's NEC 1993 traffic benchmark, according to FRA's 
projections. 
Project’s Goals/Scope: California is pursuing continued improvements to existing passenger rail 
corridor services and a new HSR system. Such a system would operate at sustained speeds of 220 
mph over much of its length as shown in Table 11, except for access to certain urban areas (e.g. San 
Jose - San Francisco). Intercity travelers (trips between metropolitan regions) along with longer 
distance commuters would enjoy the benefits of a system designed to connect with existing rail, air 
and highway systems. The 800 miles system would be electrified, double tracked and completely 
grade-separated. Phase 1 involves San Francisco to Los Angeles and Anaheim and the cost is 
approximately $32.0 billion.  
City Linkages – Federally Designated Distance (miles) 
Top Speed 
Goal (mph) 
Travel Time 
(Hours) 
San Francisco, CA – Los Angeles, CA 432 220 2:38 
Sacramento, CA – Los Angeles, CA 412 220 2:17 
San Diego, CA – Los Angeles, CA 167 220 1:18 
Table 11. California Corridor Top Speeds and Travel Times Goal (Source: [X]) 
Actual Status: The HSR Programmatic Tier 1 EIS is complete. Site-specific EIS and preliminary 
engineering is underway for Phase 1. Also, a Tier I EIS has also been completed for conventional 
improvements to the Los Angeles to San Diego Pacific Surfliner corridor. An EIS and preliminary 
engineering are in an advanced stage for run-through tracks at L.A. Union Station to enhance Pacific 
Surfliner service. 
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5.10 Pacific Northwest Corridor 
Corridor Brief’s Description: The line would run approximately 466 miles and link Portland and 
Seattle with Vancouver and Eugene as shown in next Figure 42. 
 
Figure 42. Pacific Northwest Corridor Network (Source: [T]) 
Background: As discussed in a previous chapter together with the Florida and Texas cases, this 
466-mile route houses Amtrak corridor and long-distance trains, Sounder commuter services in the 
Seattle region, and the freight trains of the owning railroad companies (Union Pacific and BNSF). 
Amtrak's Cascades service links Eugene and Portland, Oregon with Tacoma and Seattle, Washington 
and Vancouver, British Columbia. Since its 1992 designation, the FHWA and FRA have jointly 
allocated $8.395 million for grade crossing improvements on this corridor, primarily between Portland 
and Seattle. Between 1994 and 2007, Washington (with participation from Oregon) invested a total of 
some $700 million from all sources to upgrade track and signal systems, renovate stations, and 
purchase trains to operate on the Pacific Northwest Corridor. 
Project’s Goals/Scope: Incremental improvements are planned to eventually support 110 mph 
service with greater frequencies on the Portland – Seattle - Vancouver portion of the corridor (see 
Table 12). The project's sponsors plan to install a new signal and monitoring system using global 
positioning satellites, renovate stations and improve grade crossings along the current rail line 
between these cities. Also, new sidings and track will be added in some places to add capacity to the 
line, which will serve freight, commuter, and HSR. 
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City Linkages – Federally Designated Distance (miles) 
Top Speed 
Goal (mph) 
Travel Time 
(Hours) 
Eugene, OR – Seattle, WA 310 110 2:30 
Seattle, WA – Vancouver, BC 156 110 2:50 
Table 12. Pacific Northwest Corridor Top Speeds and Travel Times Goal (Source: [T]) 
Actual Status: The State of Washington and Amtrak have purchased three Talgo trains capable of 
traveling 125 mph to meet the growing demand. However, in the Pacific Northwest corridor they are 
limited to 79 mph because of track conditions. These three new Talgo trains replace the leased ones 
and will reduce the travel times along the route. Also, WSDOT and the Oregon DOT are currently 
preparing an environmental impact statement and a 20-year investment plan for the corridor. In 
November 2008, voters in the State of Washington passed a ballot measure called “Sound Transit 2” 
which provided $17.9 billion for transit and commuter rail investment in the Puget Sound region. 
Environmental documents have been prepared for the Vancouver Rail Bypass and Pt. Defiance 
Bypass projects. The project's sponsors have not announced any schedule for the start of HSR 
service. 
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6. NETWORK ANALYSIS 
6.1  Levels of Demand 
Before starting a HSR project and see if it will be viable, it is necessary to identify the factors that will 
influence people’s decision on which method of transport to use. Demand for travel in any HSR 
corridor is the result of four key sources:  
Existing demand for travel in the corridor: The existing travel demand in the corridor is composed 
of current demand for air, auto, bus, and rail modes. 
Amount of demand currently suppressed due to travel conditions in the existing corridor: In 
heavily congested corridors actual demand often outstrips the recorded demand as users choose not 
to make a trip rather than face the congestion in the corridor. The suppressed demand should be 
based on the level of congestion in the corridor and the level of growth in alternative transportation 
modes over the past couple of years. As a corridor becomes congested, growth slows which can 
suggest that demand is being suppressed. 
Amount of demand generated through the creation of an alternative mode choice: Historically, 
when a new method of transportation is offered to users, a certain level of trips that would have not 
been taken without the new option will occur. These trips are called induced trips and are new to the 
system.  For instance, if a new high speed line is operating between two major cities individuals now 
have the choice to take a trip on the rail line that they might not have taken prior to its existence. 
Amount of demand generated through background growth along the corridor: The amount of 
demand generated through background growth is a combination of population, employment, GDP, 
and other socioeconomic factors in the corridor and at the station locations [29].   
During the past few years in the U.S., high levels of population, expected population growth along a 
corridor and strong business as well as cultural ties between cities have been identified as factors that 
can lead to higher demand for intercity travel. In some corridors, riders are expected to come from 
business travelers and commuters due to the strong economic ties between cities along the corridor; 
while in other corridors, a larger number of tourists and leisure travelers comprise the expected riders. 
In Japan, the importance of connecting several high-population areas along a corridor was and still is 
a key factor in the high number of riders on their system, and to effectively serve several travel 
markets, including commuters and travelers from cities along the corridor. The corridor between 
Tokyo and Osaka in Japan is unique in that it is one of the most populous regions in the world, with 
multiple urban areas of several million inhabitants located along the corridor. This corridor attracts the 
highest number of riders of any HSR line in the world—over 150 million annually [19]. In other foreign 
corridors, however, population densities are not as high, but there are indications that HSR revenues 
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in these areas are sufficient to cover ongoing operating costs, although not necessarily sufficient to 
recoup the initial investment in the line. Some, but not all of the corridors under development in the 
U.S. today have population levels similar to corridors in other foreign countries (see Figures 43 and 
44). 
 
Figure 43. Population of Cities Along some Selected Foreign HSR Lines (Source:[Y]) 
 
Figure 44. Population of Cities Along some Current and Proposed HSR Lines in the US (Source:[Y]) 
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HSR also has more potential to attract riders in corridors experiencing heavy travel on existing modes 
of transportation (i.e., conventional rail, air, and highways - including automobile and bus) because of 
congestion and constraints on the capacity of existing transportation systems. These situations lead to 
demand for an additional transportation alternative, or demand for expansion or improvements to 
existing modes that need to be time and price competitive with the alternatives. Also needed are 
favorable service characteristics related to frequency, reliability, and safety. 
In France, Japan, and Spain the high ridership is in most part attributed to the reliability and safety of 
their HSR lines, relative to alternative modes of transportation. In Japan, the average delay between 
Tokyo and Osaka was 30 seconds per train in 2007. This average delay throughout the year includes 
delays caused by typhoons, earthquakes, snowfall, heavy rain, and other natural disasters. Beginning 
in March 2009, up to 13 trains per hour will leave Tokyo for Osaka on any given business day. In 
Spain and France, delays are also minimal, although service is less frequent. Between 20 and 36 
one-way trains run daily on the Madrid to Seville, Madrid to Barcelona, and Paris to Lyon lines. To 
ensure on-time performance in Europe and Japan, train operators are given strong incentives to stay 
on-time, including passengers receiving a full ticket price refund in Spain if the train is delayed more 
than 5 minutes, and driver pay deductions in Japan if the train is delayed more than 1 minute due to 
human error. 
The FRA has found that HSR tends to be most time-competitive at distances of up to 500 miles in 
length. Generally, lines significantly shorter than 100 miles do not compete well with the travel time 
and convenience of automobile travel, and lines longer than 500 miles are unable to overcome the 
speed advantage of air travel [30]. 
Existing HSR lines in Japan tend to be most time-competitive and attain the highest relative levels of 
service in corridors of roughly similar distances. In and of itself, a total travel time advantage does not 
guarantee that a mode is viable, nor superior in those terms to some alternative. In all countries where 
the HSR system has been established, there has been considerable improvement in travel time 
between several major metropolitan areas (Figure 45), on average a 50% reduction. In many cases 
like for example in France on the Paris - Lyon line on the Paris - Marseille axis, the drop in travel time 
has placed new areas within commuting range. 
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Figure 45. Travel Times before and after the Introduction of a HSR Service (time in hours) (Source:[F]) 
Between 100 and 500 miles, HSR can often overcome air travel’s speed advantage because of 
reductions in access and waiting times. Air travel requires time to get to the airport, which can often 
be located a significant distance from a city center, as well as time related to checking baggage, 
getting through security, waiting at the terminal, queuing for takeoff, and waiting for baggage upon 
arrival at a destination. By contrast, HSR service is usually designed to go from city center to city 
center, which generally allows for reduced access times for most travelers. Some travelers will have 
destinations or starting points outside of city centers in closer proximity to airports, thus, potentially 
minimizing or eliminating the access time advantage of HSR where HSR service does not connect to 
airports or other locations preferred by travelers. HSR also generally has less security and waiting 
time than airports. For many foreign HSR lines like in Spain, there is no formal security comparable to 
that of airport security, and travelers can arrive at a station just a few minutes prior to departure [31]. 
In France, Japan, Spain, and elsewhere, HSR has been shown to be time-competitive with air travel 
and has relieved capacity constraints at airports. For example, HSR in Japan has resulted in 
eliminating one air route (Tokyo - Nagoya), while several others have lost significant market share to 
HSR. With the introduction of the Madrid - Barcelona HSR line in February 2008, air travel between 
the two cities has dropped an estimated 30% (from 5.0 million to 3.5 million air passengers), while 
HSR riders increased markedly. In France, HSR has captured 90% of the Paris - Lyon air -rail market, 
and Air France estimates that for HSR trips of between 2 and 3 hours, HSR is likely to capture about 
80% of the air-rail market over time. By displacing shorter distance air travel, HSR has freed up 
considerable airport capacity in those cities for other longer distance flights. However, because HSR 
becomes a new competitor with short-distance air travel, airlines have in some cases actively 
opposed its development. In the U.S., most of speed the rail projects will connect metropolitan areas 
with anticipated capacity constraints at nearby airports (see next Figure 46). 
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Figure 46. Future Airport Capacity, by 2025, and Selected HSR Proposals in the U.S.(Source: [Z]) 
While HSR will generally have superior travel times compared with automobile or bus travel for trips 
greater than 100 miles (depending on the service) it is difficult for a HSR service to compete with the 
low price of bus travel and convenience of automobile travel. HSR is therefore not likely to attract a 
sufficient number of these travelers to have a significant effect on highway congestion and capacity in 
a corridor. According to a study on HSR ridership forecasting, intercity bus travel is limited and bus 
riders care more about price than about time. As a result, the extent that a new HSR line provides 
time savings at a somewhat higher cost, the contribution of bus travel to a new HSR line will be 
insignificant [32]. However, this result depends on how the HSR service is priced. If the HSR service 
is publicly funded, then a legitimate public policy question arises regarding fare-setting (i.e., whether 
HSR fares should be set to maximize revenues or to attract higher numbers of riders from other 
modes). The study also contends that those who travel by car tend to care more about price and 
convenience (e.g., leaving when they choose, bringing additional passengers or cargo at no extra 
cost) and less about trip time. 
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The effect on highway congestion of diverting automobile travelers to HSR will vary based on the 
specific locations and times. For example, if HSR can divert travelers from making an intercity trip 
through a congested highway at peak times, then it may have a noticeable effect on traffic. Over the 
long term, however, whatever trips are diverted on a congested corridor to another mode of travel are 
likely to be at least partially replaced by other trips, since the reduced congestion from diversion 
makes it easier to travel, a phenomenon known as “induced demand” [29]. Nonetheless, given the 
great number of trips by car, the diversion of a small percentage of automobile travelers to HSR could 
have a significant impact on the number of HSR riders, and result in benefits arising from increased 
capacity in the transportation system and thus more trips being carried. For example, in Japan, a 
survey on a recently developed HSR line showed that 21% of riders on a new HSR line diverted from 
the automobile mode. Similarly, in studies conducted for California’s proposed statewide HSR system, 
over 40% of forecasted riders are projected to be diverted from automobile travelers, however the 
HSR line will only reduce automobile travel by an estimated 7%. 
We also have to take into account that in the U.S., automobile travel tends to be significantly cheaper 
than in other countries resulting from lower gas prices, taxes and near exemption of tolls on intercity 
roads. 
 
6.2 Connectivity 
Another factor that affects the competitiveness of HSR relative to alternative intercity transportation 
modes is the extent to which it is part of an integrated transportation system and adequate transit 
services are available at the destination points for travelers. It has to be pointed out that in France, 
Japan, and Spain there is a great importance of strong transit access to, from and within downtown 
areas to attract riders to HSR. European HSR stations are designed to be integrated with the urban 
transportation network, including subways, conventional rail, and local buses. In France, HSR 
connects with airports. In Spain, however, HSR generally does not connect to airports. Japanese 
stations are also integrated with other transit options, although HSR in Japan as in Spain also does 
not connect to airports. In these countries, rail travelers will generally not require an automobile at the 
end of the rail line to get to their final destination in metropolitan areas. Most urban transit systems in 
the U.S. are not as well developed as compared with systems in France or Japan. For some proposed 
lines in the U.S., travelers may need access to an automobile at their destination, potentially making 
travel by HSR a less attractive option for those riders. However, a number of domestic project 
sponsors recognize the importance associated with designing and constructing their HSR systems to 
take advantage of existing transit connections and planned improvements. For example, the proposed 
Maglev line between Las Vegas, Nevada, and Anaheim, California, is being designed to connect to a 
new intermodal transit terminal being built in Anaheim. In addition, the bond measure that was 
recently passed in California to help fund HSR development allocates $950 million for funding toward 
connecting rail transit services. 
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6.3 Public Benefits 
While all U.S. sponsors cite a variety of public benefits that would flow from their projects, such as 
congestion relief or environmental benefits, the extent to which benefits have been quantified and 
valued vary for each project. Several types of public benefits that are significant in determining the 
economic viability of proposed HSR lines are the following: 
Travel time savings: Travelers using alternative modes may experience travel time savings as a 
result of reduced highway traffic and airport use by travelers shifting to HSR. Rail is a cost-effective 
means for serving transportation needs in congested intercity corridors. In many cases, modest 
investment on existing ROW can result in HSR and intercity passenger rail service with highly 
competitive trip times, while also providing ancillary benefits to energy-efficient freight rail service. 
Environmental benefits: Environmental benefits could result from reducing pollution and carbon 
dioxide emissions, provided that the rail service reduces congestion on highways or at airports and 
makes use of fuel-efficient technology. Rail is already among the cleanest and most energy-efficient 
of all passenger transportation modes. A HSR service using diesel locomotives would provide less 
environmental benefit than a service that is electrified. However, creating a future rail network using 
new clean diesel or electric power could further enhance HSR’s advantages. According to one recent 
study, implementation of pending plans for the federally designated HSR corridors could result in an 
annual reduction of 6 billion pounds of CO2 (2.7 MMTCO2) [33]. 
Traffic safety: Increased rail traffic safety directly reduces the number of traffic accidents by reducing 
congestion on highways. Trains also tend to have fewer accidents than on highways. For instance, in 
Japan, the Tokaido Shinkansen trains have operated without a derailment or collision since the 
inception of operations in 1964. 
Economic development, land use and employment: Providing a robust rail network can help serve 
the needs of national and regional commerce in a cost-effective, resource-efficient manner, by 
offering travelers convenient access to economic centers. Implementing a system that encourages 
relocation of households and businesses, in the cities where passenger rail stations are located, a 
potential outcome could include population growth and business presence by increasing retail sales, 
rental income, and property values. Rail transport has generally been associated with “smart growth” 
because it can foster higher-density development when compared to development associated with 
highways and airports. Rail is uniquely capable of providing both high-speed intercity systems as well 
as its own efficient local access and egress system. 
Quantifying public benefits can be difficult and the level of value and importance of these benefits can 
be subject to disagreement. Furthermore, there are currently multiple federal guidelines in the U.S. for 
valuing public benefits, yet none have been designated for use in analyzing proposed HSR projects. 
For example, HSR service that reduces congestion on highways or at airports and makes use of fuel-
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efficient technology may provide an environmental benefit (i.e., reduced pollution and greenhouse gas 
emissions). However, the value to assign to the reduction of pollution and greenhouse gas reductions 
is difficult to determine, since there is no current market for pollution reduction in the U.S.. Thus, the 
valuation of pollution reduction (defined as the public’s willingness to pay) is generally left to 
economists to estimate by indirect methods. The valuation of greenhouse gas reductions entails 
additional considerations that are based on uncertain future benefits. Other intangible benefits, such 
as economic development impacts, are also difficult to estimate and are subject to disagreement. 
In Japan, although they previously calculated regional economic development benefits and included 
them in HSR decision making, they abandoned the practice because it was too difficult to isolate the 
impacts and because they believe that benefits accrued through revenues and passenger benefits 
alone are sufficient to meet their criteria for constructing new HSR lines. Moreover, while benefits 
such as improvements in economic development and employment may represent real benefits for the 
jurisdictions in which a new HSR service is located, from another jurisdiction’s perspective or from a 
national view they may represent a transfer or relocation of benefits.  
Some of the non-monetary benefits that HSR can provide on both a regional and a federal level are 
the following: 
Federal Level: The creation of HSR is in line with the goals of the ARRA program, as it will; 
• Spur new job creation within multiple industries including construction and engineering  
• Update America’s aging transportation infrastructure system  
• Reduce the country’s dependence on foreign oil by shifting users away from automobile and 
air travel  
• Reduction of environmental impacts associated with the transportation sector  
Regional Level: HSR produces a further array of benefits at the regional level such as it will; 
• Reduce congestion on local roads, highways and interstates as travelers shift their mode 
usage from automobile to HSR  
• Reduce airport congestion as HSR captures users from short-haul flights. This could reduce 
the frequency of those flights allowing previously used gate slots to open, and airlines to focus 
on longer-haul, less environmentally harmful, higher-margin flights. 
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7. ECONOMIC VIABILITY 
Factors affecting the economic viability of HSR lines include (1) expected ridership levels, (2) 
construction and operating costs, and (3) public benefits (i.e., benefits to non-riders and to the nation 
as a whole) due, for example, to reduced congestion. 
In the previous chapter, discussion has been focused on expected ridership levels by studying the 
levels of demand in relation with the population density of the corridors and the existing modes of 
transportation. It can be concluded that rider forecasts and cost estimates are inherently uncertain 
and subject to some degree of inaccuracy simply because they are trying to predict future 
circumstances. In the U.S. as well as other countries, HSR tends to attract riders in corridors with high 
population density, especially where congestion on existing transportation modes prevails. Service 
characteristics of a HSR line relative to other travel alternatives (such as trip time, frequency of 
service, reliability, and safety) are also critical factors in determining the economic viability of the 
projects.  
The elements that determine the economic viability of a HSR line are the previous expected demands 
and its associated revenues and the expected capital and operating expenses. Even if the expected 
revenues will not cover the expenses, the project may still be considered worthwhile if it provides non-
monetary benefits such as reduced congestion on the alternative modes or reduced environmental 
impacts. These benefits are typically considered in a cost benefit analysis which converts all the 
project’s impacts into monetary figures and determines the final benefit and cost to the public. 
 
7.1 Forecasting HSR Demand and Expenses 
As previously explained, understanding the viability of a HSR line requires correctly determining the 
demand for travel in the corridor. Once the demand is calculated, the percentage of the demand 
selecting HSR for their travel can be determined using a transportation network model. Transportation 
network models will base a users’ choice of transportation mode to use on tangible elements including 
cost, reliability, and availability as well as intangible elements such as environmental consciousness, 
personal preferences, and perceived level of comfort. The percentage of demand selecting HSR is 
called the rail capture rate. This process is presented in the flowchart on Figure 46. 
The rail capture rate and the rail fare can be used to calculate the expected revenue. There will be an 
optimal rail fare which will establish equilibrium between the highest level of demand and highest level 
of revenue. This optimal fare can be determined through iterations of the model. Overall, this 
framework will allow for the calculation of the expected demand and revenue and help to gauge the 
expected attractiveness of the line to the public. 
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Figure 47. Ridership and Revenue Forecasting Model (Source: [34]) 
In addition to the expected ridership, it is important to study the expenses to analyze the viability of a 
HSR project. To do that, it is necessary to separate the costs into two categories: Capital 
expenditures (Capex) and Operating expenses (Opex). The costs associated with these two 
categories are discussed below. 
• Capital Expenditures: Capex consists of the initial construction costs of the tracks as well as all 
future costs of repairing or replacing the infrastructure and the rolling stock. Of the types of passenger 
rail services available, true HSR service is on the highest end of the scale as it operates mainly on 
dedicated track with grade separated crossings. The passenger rail services by cost levels are shown 
below on Figure 48. 
 
Figure 48. Passenger Rail Services by Cost Levels (Source: [34]) 
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As HSR projects require a significant investment effort, government agencies have historically chosen 
to make improvements to existing tracks - i.e. converting at grade crossings to grade separate 
crossings, reducing the curvature at the curves, etc. These improvements are less costly, but the final 
product is also less competitive with other modes of travel producing a much lower ridership and 
revenue profile. Corridors where ROW is available for rail purposes and are relatively flat with straight 
track alignments can help lower costs compared with corridors that require the acquisition of new 
ROW, substantial tunneling, or bridges [35]. 
Operating Expenses: Opex includes the costs for preventative maintenance of the tracks and 
stations and the operation of the train.  As the HSR service provided is continuously operated, 
preventative maintenance of the track occurs during the off peak hours, typically at night, and is 
generally low scale maintenance. Operation costs of the train include energy, personnel (crew 
members and administrative staff), onboard service, station operation, traffic control, insurance, and 
also sales and marketing costs.  As HSR Opex is not linked to demand but rather to the operating 
schedule, the operation cost should be within the same range each year.  
To stay within financial or other constraints, project sponsors must typically trade-off some level of 
ridership to reduce costs. For example, most domestic projects currently under consideration are 
incremental projects on tracks shared with freight operators, a choice that limits the travel time 
competitiveness and reliability valued by riders that would be possible on more expensive, dedicated 
tracks. As mentioned earlier, research on ridership and cost forecasts for transportation projects has 
shown that such forecasts are often significantly optimistic and different ridership forecasting methods 
may yield diverse, and therefore uncertain, results [36].  
In foreign countries, the ability to achieve the time-competitiveness, frequency, reliability, and safety 
previously described is attributed to operating on dedicated track and having no at-grade highway or 
other crossings. These systems though, cost billions of dollars to construct, although construction cost 
per mile vary substantially (see Table 13 on the next page). In Spain, construction costs have ranged 
from $37 million to $53 million per mile, the latter heavily influenced by the construction of two tunnels. 
In Japan, construction costs are typically higher because of antiseismic safeguards, high land costs, 
and the number of bridges and tunnels needed to accommodate straight-and level-track through 
Japan’s mountainous terrain. 
The cost figures for different projects are not strictly comparable because they may be calculated with 
diverse accounting conventions; however they give the reader an excellent approximation for 
analyzing the range of construction costs. These cost estimates are based on different foreign 
currencies with varying rates of inflation and fluctuating exchange rates. The International Union of 
Railways note that, historically, one HSR trainset costs between $32 and $40 million. 
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High-Speed Rail Project Length (in miles) 
Approximate construction 
Cost (per route mile) Cost (in 2008 $) 
Construction 
Completion 
Date 
Europe Dollars in millions 
Cordoba - Malaga (Spain) 96 $37 $3,558 December 2007 
Madrid - Barcelona - Figueras 
(Spain) 468 $39 $18,223 February 2008 
Paris - Strasbourg (France) 186 $42 $7,730 June 2007 
Madrid - Valladolid (Spain) 111 $53 $5,894 December 2007 
Japan Dollars in millions 
Yatsushiro - Kagoshima 79 $82 $6,508 March 2004 
Takasaki - Nagano 73 $143 $10,403 October 1997 
Table 13. HSR Construction Costs Comparison(Source: [Y]) 
7.1.a Cost/Benefit Scenario 
HSR has historically faced difficulty in generating adequate revenue to cover the capital investment 
and operating costs. Even in the strongest corridors, HSR will typically only be operationally profitable 
(revenues will cover Opex) but will not generate enough profit to cover the high construction costs 
(Copex). This funding gap is typically identified prior to open, yet, the corridor may still be developed 
as even with this deficit it may provide enough benefits to the public for the government to endorse 
the project and bridge the funding gap.   
In a cost benefit analysis, the conventionally non-monetary effects associated with a project are 
quantified in a monetary amount. All of these benefits have an inherent public benefit that is not 
included in a standard economic analysis of a HSR line’s feasibility. For example, the Texas 
Transportation Institute publishes a bi-annual report examining congestion levels in major cities as 
well as the cost of this congestion to the public. They reported that in 2007 the cost of congestion was 
approximately $87.2 billion for 439 urban areas, an average of $199 million in each area. Those 
numbers are even higher when focusing on larger markets, such as those that would be considered 
for HSR.  In the nation’s largest 14 urban areas, the average congestion cost per urban area was 
$3.55 billion. As congestion levels decrease so does gasoline consumption, pollution, foreign oil 
dependency, and time loss, translating into lower costs for many goods and services as well as higher 
productivity within the economy. A full detailed analysis of the cost and benefits to the public of HSR 
will be required to quantify the true cost/benefit impact to the public. This analysis will help determine 
if a particular HSR project serves a public purpose and is worth public funding.  Additionally, this type 
of analysis can help the government rank potential projects and allocate funding accordingly [37]. 
HSR projects also require a very long lead time. The lengthy development periods can increase the 
uncertainty over future costs and benefits and the front-loaded nature of the required spending can 
increase risk. The main challenge is securing the investment necessary to fund the substantial up-
front capital costs, such as those incurred for planning and preliminary engineering, building the 
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infrastructure, and acquiring train equipment. In addition, passenger fares are generally insufficient to 
finance the capital and operating costs of a HSR system, and the public “external” benefits cannot 
necessarily be captured in a revenue stream based on prices. Therefore, public subsidies are 
generally required, at least for the initial investment. In France, Japan and Spain, the central 
government paid the up-front construction costs of their country’s HSR lines, and did so with no 
expectation that its investment would be recouped through passenger revenues. 
 
7.2 Funding 
Most of the actual proposed HSR projects indicate that they have or will need some federal or state 
funding to develop and construct their projects. 
7.2.a Federal Funding 
In the U.S., federal funding for rail in general, and HSR in particular, has largely been derived from 
general revenues, as opposed to trust funds or other dedicated federal funding sources that support 
other transportation modes. In addition, HSR projects must compete with other non-transportation 
demands on federal funds, such as national defense, education and health care, as opposed to only 
competing with other alternative transportation investments or policies in a corridor. 
The other transportation modes are funded through federal programs – such as federal-aid highways, 
the FTA’s New Starts Program, and the federal Airport Improvement Program which benefit from (1) 
dedicated funding sources based on receipts from user fees and taxes, (2) a format for allocating 
funds to states, and (3) in some cases, a structure for identifying projects to be funded. The following 
Figure 49 illustrates how state capital dollars can be leveraged by matching federal dollars for each 
mode of transportation. 
 
Figure 49. Example of Historical Federal Funding Leverage by Mode (Source:[9]) 
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Given the lack of dedicated federal grant funding currently available for HSR projects, project 
sponsors are exploring other federal financing mechanisms for HSR projects, such as federal loan 
programs. Alternative federal funding sources, such as authorized under the Transportation 
Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act of 1998 (TIFIA), are available, however, they may be limited 
in their ability to help fund the substantial cost of HSR projects or the number of projects competing 
for federal loans. The TIFIA program offers credit assistance to surface transportation projects and 
according to their documents, the $122 million authorized by Congress annually for the program 
provides over $2 billion in credit assistance. Sponsors of HSR projects could request that amount or 
more for one loan, thereby constraining TIFIA’s ability to fund other projects in the same year. 
Other challenges may arise as well. For example, because TIFIA assistance cannot exceed 33% of a 
project’s construction costs, project sponsors must secure other sources of funding to construct a 
project, which can prove difficult. In addition, the availability of TIFIA funds, or other federal funding, 
may be questionable since the federal government faces significant future fiscal challenges. Lastly, 
the TIFIA program’s requirement that loans and loan guarantees be repaid may be another limitation 
on the program’s usefulness in funding HSR projects. 
As mentioned before, in France, Japan and Spain, the central government generally funds the 
majority of up-front costs of their country’s respective HSR projects, and they do so without the 
expectation that their investment will be recouped through ticket revenues. The public sector’s ability 
to recover its financial investment has varied on the basis of how revenues have grown, but in Japan 
and Spain a public subsidy was generally necessary because ticket revenues were insufficient to fully 
recoup the initial investment. In Japan, while two early lines developed in the 1960s and 1970s may 
have fully repaid the initial investment and debt related to their construction, three of the HSR lines 
built since the 1987 privatization have been able to recover 10%, 52%, and 63% of their construction 
costs through ticket revenues. In Spain, the original high speed line between Madrid and Seville has 
been profitable on an operating cost basis but has not covered all of its costs, including the original 
construction costs. Also the government has told that future lines in this country might not cover even 
their operating costs. 
7.2.b State Funding 
Apart from federal funding, another important funding source is state funding. For HSR this can be 
limited by the lack of dedicated funding sources and restrictions on the use of gasoline tax revenues. 
Currently, none of the American project sponsors have obtained funding from a dedicated source of 
state funding for HSR; one project sponsor (i.e., the Virginia Department of Rail and Public 
Transportation), however, noted that it had a dedicated rail funding source available. Another report 
by the Brookings Institution, 30 states (including states where HSR projects are proposed, such as 
Minnesota, Nevada, and Pennsylvania) are restricted from spending revenues from excise taxes on 
gasoline, which typically is a state’s main source of transportation revenue [38]. 
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Instead of a dedicated source of state funding, some project sponsors have sought funding directly 
through appropriations of state revenue or bond measures, which compete with numerous other state 
budgetary needs. New York State DOT mentions that appropriations from general state revenue and 
bonding measures enable them to fund only incremental improvements along the New York, NY, to 
Albany, NY, corridor, and not to the major expansions that had been planned. 
The choice of a financing mechanism can have serious implications for state and local governments, 
which will face broader fiscal challenges over the next 10 years, because of increasing gaps between 
receipts and expenditures. In November 2008, California voters passed a ballot initiative that would 
allow the state to issue $9.95 billion in bonds, $9.0 billion of which would go toward the construction of 
a statewide HSR system. According to information prepared by California, this bond issue, including 
principal and interest, could cost the state general fund about $19.4 billion over 30 years. Bonding 
mechanisms also may cost more than using appropriations of general revenues.  
Another possibility is tax-exempt private activity bonds, which can be used to finance HSR facilities. 
These bonds are used for purposes such as transportation and water infrastructure, including HSR 
facilities. This means that the interest paid to bondholders is generally not included in the gross 
income of bondholders for federal income tax purposes. Private activity bonds allow tax-exempt debt 
to be used by private entities to help finance qualified facilities. 
At first, such bonds were formerly restricted to high-speed intercity passenger rail facilities that 
operate at speeds in excess of 150 mph and proceeds could not be used for rolling stock (passenger 
rail vehicles). ARRA modified these restrictions to make eligible projects that are “capable of attaining” 
maximum speeds in excess of 150 mph, rather than operating at such speeds. This modification may 
increase the number of projects that can qualify to use tax-exempt private activity bonds for high-
speed intercity passenger rail facilities. 
7.2.c Attracting Private Capital 
Given the significant financial risks HSR projects pose, it is difficult to obtain private financing. The 
Public Private Partnerships (PPP) can provide potential benefits, such as transferring some risk from 
the public to the private sector, and an increased potential for operational efficiencies. The level of 
private sector involvement anticipated by some American HSR projects is unprecedented, particularly 
given the limited private sector involvement with operating domestic HSR to date. 
On the following pages, focus will be on the possible links between the public (federal government 
and states) and the private sector (companies). The addition of this connection to a proper business 
model can make the PPP, the perfect tool for HSR success in the U.S.. 
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7.3 Public Private Partnerships 
The major benefit of a Public Private Partnership is the fact that the goals of the private and public 
sectors are aligned. The success of a PPP is directly linked to the factors discussed below: the 
institutional and legal framework, the commercial, financial and environmental considerations, the 
stakeholder consultation, and the allocation of risk among the partners [39]. 
7.3.a Institutional and Legal Frameworks 
When engaging in a PPP, the roles and responsibilities of the public and private sector must be 
clearly defined. The private sector will expect that the appropriate legislative and institutional 
framework will be in place before engaging in the procurement. A public authority, with the legal 
capacity to engage in PPPs, will need to take responsibility for obtaining the required environmental 
clearance, approvals, facilitation of ROW acquisition and provide any necessary financial support for 
the project. This public entity will need to have support from the government including local, state, and 
federal level. 
The public authority needs to manage the project from inception to completion. The designation of a 
lead authority for HSR is complex as many of the corridors identified in FRA EOI include connections 
to destinations across states and would require multiple agency participation and collaboration. 
Unless effectively addressed, this issue has the potential to create legal and institutional impediments 
that will delay the process. 
Clarifying the role, form and responsibilities of the public and the private sector is a precondition to 
project development. Until then, development priority should be given to corridors situated in states 
with past experience or strong commitment to incorporate innovative financing and project delivery 
methods. 
7.3.b Commercial, Financial and Environmental considerations 
Rail PPPs are a developing concept and their application will require substantial legal, regulatory and 
institutional reforms to carry out the necessary contract procurement and administration. In particular, 
there will certainly be commercial, financial, and environmental considerations as will be discussed 
below. 
Commercial considerations include: 
‐ Freedom to optimize route utilization: HSR is most efficient when the stations are less dense and 
are spaced appropriately. The Operator will need the ability to designate stops along the line at 
optimal locations, which add sufficient demand to offset the time required to make the stop. Any 
excess political pressure to add stops to non-optimal locations will increase costs and reduce the 
overall efficiency of HSR. The Operator will also need the ability to set its own service frequency 
Feasibility Study of High-Speed Rail in the U.S. 
Economic Viability  79 
 
and the ability to run express trains or skip stations as it see fits to maximize the feasibility of the 
project. 
‐ Freedom to set fares: Unlike traditional transport PPPs where toll rates are limited by the 
concession agreement, the Operator must have the ability to charge market fares for their service. 
Any attempt to limit the fare-setting ability will result in reduced operational viability, and possibly 
create the need for an operational subsidy. For instance, in Europe some low cost airlines have 
cut prices to compete with HSR.  Without the ability to react to this type of action, the HSR will not 
generate optimal revenue. 
Financial considerations include: 
‐ Funding subsidies: Due to high construction cost, projects will require significant financial support 
for them to reach feasibility. The profitability of the line will determine if these subsidies extend 
beyond the construction period and into the operational period.  
‐ Government sponsored financing mechanisms: The key government mechanisms are the TIFIA 
and the RRIF program. In order to reduce uncertainty regarding the RRIF program, it would be 
beneficial for funds to be appropriated prior to the beginning of a competitive procurement 
process. Additionally, other tax beneficial financing mechanisms could be implemented to improve 
the feasibility of the project.   
‐ Appropriate risk mitigation: To obtain debt financing, the developer will need a level of certainty 
regarding the financial viability of their revenue source. If the government is paying for the 
availability payments, these payments must have a seniority level equal or higher than general 
obligations bonds issued by the same governmental authority. If the source of the availability 
payments is a newly formed multi-state authority, the payments will need to be backed by the 
various states or the federal government.  Methods of backing could include direct guarantees or 
an initial capitalization of the newly formed entity.  
‐ Tax considerations: The development of the project will need to be structured to reduce or 
eliminate certain tax obligations.  Examples of this include, but are not limited to, property taxes 
on the land.  
Environmental considerations include:  
‐ Environmental clearance: The project will require that an Environmental Impact Assessment is 
conducted to assess the natural, social and economic benefits and impacts of the project. 
Generally, the private sector will only embark on a project if the environmental clearance process 
is substantially underway and the private sector will be hesitant to submit a bid until the process is 
complete. Full environmental clearance in a corridor will be required before reaching financial 
close. 
‐ Process acceleration: As a measure to accelerate project development, the FRA should consider 
ways to make the environmental clearance process executed in a more timely and efficient 
manner. 
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7.3.c Risk Allocation 
An effective risk allocation between the involved parties will result in costs savings over the lifecycle of 
a project. The risk must be allocated to the party that is best able to manage it at the lowest cost. Risk 
allocation generally comes with the precondition that when the public authority or grantor transfers 
risks to the private sector, the rights and authority to manage such risks are transferred with it (see 
Table 14). For facilities such as roads, bridges and tunnels, as well as other transportation facilities 
including ports, airports, and rail, the private sector typically manages the following risks included with 
the infrastructure: design, construction, financing, operations and maintenance. 
 
Table 14. Risk Allocation and Responsabilities (Source: [34]) 
Regardless of the procurement and operation methods that are implemented, it should be clear that 
the transfer of demand and revenue risk to the developer is not considered practical or cost effective 
for the public authority. For example, there is little value in transferring demand risk if the project is 
unable to generate sufficient revenues to pay for the development phase. 
Proper risk allocation must occur in the beginning of the process to prevent obstacles from developing 
in the final process stages. Improper risk allocation itself can create unforeseen risks such as 
increased costs in operations, construction, financing or inability in the final steps to reach financial 
close. 
ALLOCATION OF RISKS 
RESPONSIBILITY  
GRANTOR   PRIVATE 
DEVELOPER   OPERATOR  
Environmental Clearance   ●      
Archeological   ●   ●    
Geotechnical condition     ●    
Hazardous materials   ●      
ROW / Access to the land   ●   ●    
Engineering risk     ●   ●  
Utility relocations     ●    
Construction     ●    
Community & Government relations  ● ● ●  
Warranties, hand‐back procedures     ●   ●  
Operations and Maintenance     ●   ●  
On‐going capital improvements       ●  
Rolling stock       ●  
Demand and Revenues   ● ● ●  
Tariff setting   ●     
Financing   ● ●  
Changes in law  ●  
Force Majeure  ● ● ●  
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7.3.d Stakeholder Consultation and Political Support  
There should be an early and constant dialogue between the government, various stakeholders and 
the private sector to define the objectives and contractual structure of a HSR PPP. The designated 
public authority will need to have the political will to lead and ensure a transparent process is 
conducted. An early dialogue with all stakeholders will allow the government to understand the 
stakeholders’ expectations, identify political constraints, and identify potential project risks. If any 
significant issues arise, they should be resolved promptly, and certainly before competitive proposals 
are due.  
In structuring the procurement process, private investors should be engaged to comment on the 
proposed project structure to ensure they include the following: 
• sufficient opportunity for private sector innovation  
• appropriate business model structure   
• efficient risk allocation   
This dialogue will ensure the project will provide benefits to both public and the private sector. Once 
the PPP moves to the implementation phase, public consultation will remain critical to raise public 
awareness and support for the project.  
7.3.e Project Procurement  
Project procurement involves a formal process of public notice and solicitation to bidders. The process 
generally includes the issuance of a Request for Proposals (RFP) instructing proposers of the rules 
and terms of the anticipated bid process, the evaluation criteria, and a draft form of the concession 
agreement.  Often, this process is preceded by a preliminary stage seeking to gauge the interest of 
and prequalify potential bidders through the release of a Request for Expressions of Interests (RFEI) 
or a Request for Qualifications (RFQ). In the RFQ phase, the criterion is largely based on the financial 
and technical capabilities of the bidder, as well as the relevancy and extent of prior project experience 
of the companies involved. In the RFP phase, proposals are evaluated in terms of the technical and 
financial value they provide.  
7.3.f Project Delivery 
The involvement of the private sector in the delivery of transportation infrastructure can help improve 
the cost effectiveness and timelines of project delivery by combining design and construction phases 
under a single contract, as illustrated in the Figure 50. 
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Figure 50. Construction Phases and Timelines of a Traditional HSR Project (Source: [AA]) 
All stakeholders are a component of the schedule and unless properly coordinated, the time savings 
provided by the private sector will erode and compromise the value of the project. 
 
7.4 HSR Business Models 
Since the first HSR line inaugurated in Japan 45 years ago, several business models have been 
utilized for the development of HSR lines. Recently, there has been a shift in the trend from a fully 
public sector model to a public and private sector partnership. This trend has allowed for the 
transference of the responsibilities of the different components of the system to the private sector – 
i.e. track development and maintenance, service operations or signaling. 
There are different types of contracts that can be used for a HSR project. Each of them involves 
public and/or private entities for various stages of design, construction, and operation. Provided in this 
section is a description of these alternative business models with examples of countries that have 
developed HSR lines in the past decades. 
7.4.a Design-Bid-Build (DBB, Traditional Model)  
Traditionally, civil infrastructure projects in the U.S. have been delivered through the use of DBB 
contracts. Under these arrangements, a state usually contracts design and construction to separate 
private entities while retaining the finance, ownership, operation, and maintenance responsibility. This 
model was heavily used during the early development of HSR in Europe. Table 15 assigns 
responsibilities among the public and private sector.  
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Table 15. Design – Bid -Build (DBB, Traditional Model) Schematic (made based on Source: [40]) 
Two clear examples that have been following a DBB model are France and Spain. 
France has historically been the European leader of HSR infrastructure. Formally, the finance was 
handled by the government through a number of lump-sum construction payments and operational 
subsidies, intended to assure the profitability of the operations. The design and construction used to 
be subcontracted to the private sector and initially the operation and maintenance was the 
responsibility of the fully public company SNCF. After the 1997’s legislation reform, RFF has received 
financing through the collected infrastructure charges paid by rail operators such as SNCF. The 
charges consider the cost of infrastructure, the situation of the transport market and characteristics of 
transport supply and demand, the requirements for the optimal use of the rail network, and 
harmonization of intermodal competition. 
Spain’s rail network has historically been financed through the national government’s funding 
contributions to the public railway company, RENFE. The company both operated trains and 
managed the railway infrastructure. Now, ADIF owns the Spanish high-speed system, the passenger 
and freight stations and the telecommunications network. ADIF is also is in charge of managing rail 
infrastructure (tracks, stations, freight terminals, etc) and rail traffic, allocating track usage rights to rail 
operators, and the collection of fees for infrastructure, station and freight terminal use. RENFE now is 
the public operator, similar to SNCF’s new role in France. Government funding contributions in the 
Spanish DBB model come from a variety of sources: budgetary investments (through ADIF), subsidies 
and tax exemptions, and debt financing (financial institutions and European Investment Bank (EIB). 
European Union funding contributions also come from a variety of sources: The Cohesion Fund, 
European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and TEN-T subsidies. The additional subsidies from 
the EU have allowed for implementation of superior infrastructures, advancement of technological 
innovation, and increased environmental sustainability. 
7.4.b Design Build Finance Maintain (DBFM)  
The DBFM model is the most appealing PPP structure for the public and private sectors as the 
division of responsibility balances the benefits and risks. In this model, the public retains ownership 
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and is responsible for oversight of the project including ensuring that the private sector meets its 
contractual infrastructure maintenance obligations. The private sector is responsible for the design, 
construction, finance, and maintenance of the asset. The private sector is able to bring innovative 
solutions to the design and construction process, and most importantly is able to access new funding 
sources unavailable to the government.  This allocation of responsibilities ensures that the asset is 
constructed and maintained at a high level of quality.   
Within the DBFM model, the train operations are a separate concession(s) and are handled by a 
public operator, such as Amtrak, or a separate private operator (Operator). Rail projects are large 
scale and are composed of a variety of clearly defined components which makes them ideal for 
separate concessions.  Rail projects can be divided into the track construction and maintenance (the 
developer or infrastructure/asset manager), the signaling and technology components (the systems 
supplier) and the train operations (the operator). This is further illustrated below on Table 16.  
 
Table 16. DBFM Partners & Responabilities (made based on Source: [40]) 
Depending on the specifics of the corridor, a private sector partner could assume more than one of 
the responsibilities identified in the table above. In addition, a public regulator may oversee traffic 
management, network integration and regulatory responsibilities. To the extent that regulatory 
principles are included within the contract (contractual obligations, service standards and network 
connectivity considerations), these responsibilities may be passed down to the concessionaire or the 
operator, as applicable. The below Table 17 clarifies these responsibilities among the public and the 
private developer.  
 
Table 17. DBFM Schematic (made based on Source: [40]) 
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Portugal is an example of a DBFM model. The Portuguese HSR network is in its startup phase and is 
note worthy as Portugal has chosen to lean heavily on the private sector. The model proposed by 
Rede Ferroviaria de Alta Velocidade S.A. (RAVE), utilizes a DBFM structure. RAVE is the public 
entity that handles the development and coordination of HSR activities in Portugal.  
Portugal has chosen to separate the procurement of the HSR lines into the Developer and the System 
Supplier. The procurement process for the line Operator has not yet been structured.  The Developer 
will be awarded a concession for 40 years and will be responsible for design, construction, financing 
and maintenance of the infrastructure. The System Supplier will be awarded a concession for 20 
years and will be responsible for the signaling and telecommunications systems. At this stage, the 
Portuguese State will be responsible for acquiring the rolling stock needed for the operation portion of 
the project and as mentioned the structure will be determined as the process evolves. 
France first structured most HSR lines with the traditional DBB but looking to expand their HSR 
systems, they are exploring private sector participation, among other reasons, to attract additional 
financing, and to tap private sector management and technical expertise with a DBFM model. France 
is contemplating a public-private partnership contract scheme where risks associated with financing, 
designing, building, and maintaining a HSR line are allocated to the private sector (see Figure 51). 
 
Figure 51. Proposed French and Spanish Public-Private Partnership Contract Model (Source: [Y]) 
7.4.c Design Build Finance Maintain Operate (DBFMO) 
In the DBFMO model, the private sector is responsible for the design, construction, finance, and 
maintenance of the asset as well as the operation of the trains (see Table 18). The government still 
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retains ownership and oversight capabilities. The limitation of this structure is that often the scope and 
risks associated with the project are too great for one consortium to manage.  
 
Table 18. DBFM Partners & Responabilities (made based on Source: [40]) 
The below table 19 clarifies these responsibilities among the public and the private developer. 
 
Table 19. DBFMO Schematic (made based on Source: [40]) 
With a DBFMO, in Japan (where the rail system was privatized in 1987) the national and local 
governments still assume the financial risk of constructing a new HSR line, investing 2/3 and 1/3 of 
the construction costs, respectively (see Figure 52). With the government’s financial commitment, the 
private railroad operating companies undertake the operational risk and rely on ticket revenues to 
cover operating and maintenance costs. The railroad operating companies business model, which 
includes various business ventures and non-rail revenue streams, also helps them assume this risk 
for rail lines with relatively low numbers of riders, since these additional revenues may be able to 
cover HSR operating losses, if they occur. 
 
Figure 52. Public and Private Sector Roles in HSR Development and Operation in Japan (Source: [Y]) 
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Florida attempted to enter into a DBFMO in 2002 for its Tampa to Orlando corridor. The Florida HSR 
Authority (FHSRA), which had the right to enter into agreements with private companies, issued an 
RFQ for a business model establishing that the concessionaire would provide all design and civil 
infrastructure, including the signaling, control systems, and rolling stock components, and have a 30 
year operations and maintenance contract. The contract was structured such that the public sector 
was heavily protected from revenue risk and would retain ownership of the system and its 
components as well as the right to any excess operating revenues. The public sector would provide a 
yearly subsidy to the private concessionaire, a maximum of $75 million a year, to cover the 
infrastructure and operating costs. Though a private bidder was selected and complied with the 
Florida business model, the public sector, particularly the state government, was reluctant and 
withdrew their pre-committed financial commitments. With the loss of these funds and no way to 
guarantee the payment of the yearly availability payment to the concession company, the project 
became unfeasible. The process is currently being reexamined as a candidate for the ARRA funds. 
The Texas TGV project also was a DBFMO business model allocating the responsibilities for the 
design, construction, finance, operation, and maintenance of a HSR facility to the private sector. The 
private sector was to bear all risks including the revenue risk. The public sector would have been 
involved only in a regulatory role and would have not provided any subsidies. At the end of the 
procurement process, a private sector company, which had initially submitted a compliant bid, was 
selected. Unfortunately, the private sector partner was unable to secure financing, and the concession 
process was canceled. 
7.4.d Build Own Operate (BOO)  
The BOO PPP structure is seldom used for transportation projects as typically the ownership remains 
with the public sector, and in the BOO the private sector takes on the ownership and all risks 
associated with the project. The below table 20 clarifies these responsibilities among the parties in the 
BOO structure. 
 
Table 20. BOO Schematic (made based on Source: [40]) 
The BOO model has been less frequently applied for the development of transportation infrastructure 
as government entities are reluctant to part with their ownership and regulatory role in a project. 
Efforts to develop entirely privately financed HSR projects in the U.S. have proven unsuccessful to 
date. Currently, a private company, DesertXpress Enterprises, is investing a substantial amount of 
resources in developing a HSR line called the Desert Xpress project from Victorville, California, to Las 
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Vegas, Nevada. As of February 2009, the project had not secured private financing. This project has 
made progress on its planning and environmental review studies, but has not yet started ROW 
acquisition or construction. If this project is successful, it will represent the first BOO HSR line in the 
US. 
All of these business models offer different advantages and disadvantages in their allocation of 
responsibilities, and a summary of the responsibilities of each model is provided below on Table 21.  
 
Table 21. Summary of Allocation of Responsibilities for the different HSR Models (made based on 
Source: [40]) 
 
7.5 Public Sector Challenges 
After analyzing the previous HSR business models and the public sector concerns, there is a need to 
address several challenges before to obtain economic viability on the designated HSR corridors in the 
U.S.. These public sector challenges can be described below. 
7.5.a Timelines 
HSR projects require long lead times. In France a HSR project takes approximately 14 to 16 years to 
complete. This time comprises when project planning begins to when the project opens for revenue 
service. A considerable amount of this time is for studies and analysis as well as public debate about 
the merits of a project. Sustaining public support over this length of time can be difficult and have 
significant impacts on a project. As the experience with the FOX project demonstrated, development 
of HSR projects can occur over multiple electoral cycles, which not only can change the course of 
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project development but can also lead to project termination if public and political support is not 
sustained. For example, as explained in a previous chapter, the Florida DOT had planned to provide 
$70 million annually to help construct the FOX project. The project began under one gubernatorial 
administration that supported the project. The project was terminated under a different administration 
that did not support the project. 
There is always a need for someone or some organization to champion a project over a long period of 
time. Historically it appears that it is easier to sustain public support for a HSR project once it has the 
commitment of the central government. 
7.5.b Transparency and Confidence 
There are also challenges associated with the ability to provide transparency and confidence in 
project cost estimates and rider forecasts. These estimates and forecasts can often be inaccurate, 
which may erode public support for HSR. During the FOX project, advocacy organizations and state 
transportation agencies questioned the reliability of project cost estimates and rider forecasts. The 
governor of Florida decided to cancel state funding for the project, in part due to the skepticism raised 
by these organizations. Cancellation of state funding led to termination of the project. More recently in 
California, a report by numerous advocacy organizations raised similar concerns about the rider 
forecasts and costs estimates for the statewide HSR project. Although the public approved a nearly 
$9.95 billion bond to support this project, over time public support could erode, along with public 
funding, if confidence in rider, revenue, and cost estimates is lost.  
7.5.c Reaching Consensus 
Reaching consensus on project decisions, such as a rail line’s actual route, involves difficult 
negotiations, which can cause substantial project delays and disagreements among stakeholders. 
Given that HSR projects can span hundreds of miles and occasionally cross multiple states, 
numerous stakeholders and jurisdictions are involved. Stakeholders typically include, among others, 
federal, state, and local governments; the private sector; and advocacy organizations. For example, 
the Southeast HSR Corridor (a project from Washington, D.C., to Charlotte, North Carolina) involves 
some 50 federal, state, and local government agencies as well as a 214 member advisory committee. 
Coordinating on project decisions with these stakeholders (each with their own priorities and views) 
can be difficult, particularly without an established institutional framework within which this can occur, 
as exists for other transportation modes. For example, in planning highway and transit projects, 
federal agencies, local transit agencies, metropolitan planning organizations, and state transportation 
departments benefit from established procedures for planning and public involvement.  
Development of domestic HSR projects may typically be led by rail divisions within state DOTs or by 
HSR authorities and commissions. These organizations are often limited in terms of institutional and 
financial resources. In the case of the California HSR Authority, funding has fluctuated from a little 
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over $1 million per year to reaching just beyond $14 million as a result of changes in its annual 
appropriation from the state legislature. The $3.9 million in state funding for fiscal year 2005-2006 
was planned to support approximately four staff members in developing a $45 billion, 800-mile 
statewide HSR system [Y]. Rail divisions within state DOTs also face similar funding and manpower 
issues, since there is typically no dedicated state funding for rail service. In addition, rail has 
generally not been a primary focus of state transportation plans, which tend to be more focused on 
highway projects. 
7.5.d Define the Role of the Authorities 
The role of HSR authorities is many times unclear. Rail authorities can at times be conflicted between 
advocating for a HSR project and objectively determining whether a system is in the public 
convenience and necessity. In the case of incremental projects, stakeholder consensus among 
Amtrak, commuter railroads and private freight railroads can be difficult because each one has its own 
interests. Projects that cross state lines pose additional stakeholder challenges, particularly with 
respect to allocating benefits and cost among the states. To address multistate issues, some states 
have pursued interstate compacts and commissions as a means of formalized decision making. 
However, interstate compacts can be difficult to implement and involve work. 
7.5.e Federal Leadership 
Although the federal government in the U.S. has not historically exercised a strong leadership role in 
the development of HSR, the recently enacted PRIIA will likely increase the federal role. The PRIIA 
authorized annual funding (a total of $1.5 billion for fiscal years 2009 to 2013) for HSR corridor 
development across the entire U.S.. ARRA appropriated $8 billion for HSR and intercity passenger rail 
congestion and capital grants (the latter of which were authorized by the PRIIA). However, this 
funding will not likely be sufficient to fund large-scale projects. For example, project sponsors for the 
proposed HSR line between Los Angeles, California, and San Francisco, California, are anticipating 
$12 billion to $16 billion in federal funding alone yet, according to the California HSR Authority, total 
project costs are expected to exceed $40 billion if the entire system is constructed.  
The national rail plan required by the PRIIA provides an opportunity to identify the vision and goals for 
U.S. HSR and how HSR might fit into the national transportation system already in place. Identifying 
the appropriate federal role in achieving the established goals will also be vital to success of HSR. 
Previously, there has been little effort to identify the role of HSR, and the national rail plan required by 
the PRIIA does not explicitly include HSR, although it must be consistent with state rail plans that are, 
among other things, to include a review of proposed HSR lines. In France, Japan and Spain, national 
rail plans have proven instrumental in guiding HSR development. 
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8. TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT & SUSTAINABILITY OF THE FUTURE U.S. HSR 
CORRIDORS 
HSR is used to improve the speed and efficiency of ground transportation by moving people and 
freight while benefiting the environment. HSR reduces oil consumption, CO
2
, CO, Nox emissions and 
total organic gases. HSR also uses energy more efficiently in comparison to airline or automobile 
travel. At its core, HSR is a product of evolving innovation and technology. Much of the technology 
behind HSR is an improved application of existing technology. 
Building a new rail infrastructure eliminates constrictions such as roadway at-grade crossings, 
frequent stops, a succession of curves and reverse curves, and no sharing of ROW with freight or 
slower passenger trains, therefore maintaining higher speeds. Thus it incorporates advanced modern 
technology while remaining compatible with existing rail networks. 
The basic technology options for HSR service include combinations of equipment, track, and 
propulsion systems. All equipment and track options and several of the propulsion options are in use 
or under development outside the U.S.. This technology can be broken into two main models: HSR 
Technology (and subsequently, High-Speed Tilting Technology) and Magnetic Levitation Technology 
(Maglev). The HSR Technology can be classified in improved conventional equipment on upgraded 
existing track or state-of-the-art equipment, partly or totally new track [41]. A brief discussion of each 
of these technology options and propulsion systems is presented below.  
 
8.1 HSR Technology 
HSR Technology is based on existing passenger rail 
technologies that use fossil fuels or overhead 
electrification for propulsion as shown on Figure 53 to 
the right. It utilizes steel wheels on steel rail to run 
along tracks designed to accommodate higher speeds 
than conventional passenger rail. Both the train and 
the track infrastructure dictate maximum operating 
speeds on HSR systems, which range from 90 mph to 
220 mph or higher. As the maximum operating speed 
increases, so does the need for sophisticated train, 
signaling, and infrastructure technology. 
 
 
Figure 53. Example of train with 
overhead electrification for propulsion 
(Source:[BB]) 
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8.1.a Improved Conventional Equipment on Upgraded Existing Track 
HSR technology can be implemented on existing, dedicated track using very similar components as 
standard passenger rail. This least-cost option uses conventional equipment at a maximum speed of 
125 mph on existing track shared with freight and/or commuter trains and foreign experience shows 
that such equipment can run comfortably and safely up to this speed.  
Existing lines can slow HSR trains significantly due to the curvature of the track and when high-speed, 
freight, and traditional passenger rail share the same track, each one can operate at a different speed, 
which in turn affects the reliability of HSR on time performance. Frequencies of service are contingent 
on coordination with freight and commuter services and are adversely affected when the speeds of 
each service differ widely.  
Grade crossings usually are eliminated on high-speed sections. Stringent safety precautions are 
required where freight shares the high-speed route with the passenger trains. New technology applied 
to vehicles and signal and control systems make faster trips possible on existing track. This existing 
track geometry together with bridges and tunnels, dictate the operating speed of HSR. 
8.1.b State-of-the-Art Equipment, Partly or Totally New Track 
Existing rail lines have established alignments and infrastructure that often are incompatible when 
speeds substantially above 125 mph are desired. In the U.S., the FRA has ruled that trains traveling 
faster than 125 mph must operate on tracks with no grade crossings (meaning no intersections with 
public roadways). Besides being essential to have a complete grade separation, the equipment must 
be designed to new and more stringent specifications to keep the ride quality and the forces exerted 
on the track within the proper limits. Lightweight materials, new and sophisticated signaling, and train 
control systems are desirable as are technologies that reduce weight and pressure on the track, and 
radii of curves must be increased. Where speeds are limited by curves, the use of tilting trains might 
improve trip times. For relatively small changes in elevation en route, heavier gradients can be used 
to reduce the need for expensive viaducts and cuts.  
This option technically allows for design speeds up to 200 mph on new track between cities, though 
lower speeds typically are used in revenue service. Since its introduction in Japan in 1964, HSR 
technology has been continually improving. For example, while the initial Japanese Shinkansen (bullet 
train) Series 100 operated at 130 mph over 40 years ago, the new Series 500 and 700 Shinkansen 
trains currently operate with maximum speed of about 187 mph, but with greater efficiency, less noise, 
and more comfort than the Series 100, and have been tested at speeds of nearly 300 mph. East 
Japan Railways is testing prototype trains capable of in-service speeds of 224 mph.  
The European experience has been similar. While the first French TGV trains operated at top speeds 
of about 168 mph, top speeds were raised to 187 mph with the introduction of next-generation TGV 
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trains in 1989. Currently, TGV trains regularly operate with maximum speeds of 200 mph, but the TGV 
has been tested at nearly 360 mph. In February of 2008, Alstom (the maker of the French TGV) 
unveiled the prototype of the AGV (Automotrice Grande Vitesse) that was presented this October 
2009, being its fourth-generation high-speed electric train. The AGV is designed to reach maximum 
commercial speeds of 224 mph, and Alstom already has its first customer: Italy’s new railway 
operator, Nuovo Trasporto Viaggiatori, which has placed firm orders for 25 AGV trainsets and signed 
a maintenance contract with Alstom. Production of the first trains has begun, and they will start being 
delivered in 2010.  
New steel-wheel-on-steel-rail high-speed train systems have begun operations at 187-217 mph in 
Spain, Korea, Taiwan, and China. European and Japanese networks are continuing to expand (for 
example Spain and Italy are investing about $30 billion each to expand their high-speed train and 
conventional rail networks, and the TGV network is being extended to the Netherlands). By 2020, 
most of Europe will be interconnected by a compatible, electrified, standard-gauge, steel-wheel-on-
steel-rail high-speed train network. 
8.1.c High-Speed Tilting train Technology 
It is a well known fact that all vehicles, when travelling on a curved track, are naturally pushed to the 
outside of the curve, which makes the car bodies tilt in the same direction. In conventional trains, this 
effect is solved by reducing the speed on some curves. With a tilting technology system, this 
movement is reversed and the cars lean naturally “inwards” allowing higher speeds when negotiating 
curves while maintaining the same level of comfort for the passengers. The following figure represents 
how a passenger would feel a curve in a conventional train (on the right) or in a train using tilting 
technology (on the left). 
 
Figure 54. Curve feeling of a passenger in a conventional (left) or tilting (right) train (Source: [CC]) 
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The high-speed tilting train technology is designed to provide comfort to the passengers when the 
train is traversing curves at speeds greater than that for which they are super elevated (banked). On 
tangent track and broad curves passenger comfort is assured by the pneumatic suspension that is an 
integral part of the tilting system. The natural tilting system makes use of the lateral centrifugal force, 
which naturally acts on the vehicles when they negotiate a curve to tilt the cars towards the inside of 
the curve, thus considerably reducing the centrifugal force experienced by the passengers (see Figure 
55). An example of the use of this technology is the Amtrak Acela high-speed service on the NEC. 
 
Figure 55. Forces configuration generated by a natural tilting system train (Source: [CC]) 
As the desired operating speed increases, advanced signaling systems and high-speed tilting train 
technology can maximize the benefit of existing rail infrastructure. 
 
8.2 Magnetic Levitation Technology 
An alternative technology to utilizing steel track HSR is Magnetic Levitation (Maglev) trains. These 
trains utilize an advanced technology that eliminates the need to use traditional steel wheels and 
other mechanical components. On the next page, Figure 56 shows a basic schematic comparison 
between the railroad and Maglev system. 
The magnetic force is used to lift, propel, guide, and brake the train over a dedicated railway. 
Essentially, magnetic levitation is the use of magnetic fields, or magnetic forces, to levitate a metallic 
object. A Maglev train floats several millimeters above the guideway (track) and is powered by 
manipulating magnetic fields to produce sufficient force to lift and propel the train. This method of 
propulsion eliminates wheel/track friction, as is found with a traditional track. This method has the 
potential to be faster and smoother than wheeled mass transit systems, potentially reaching velocities 
comparable to turboprop and jet aircraft. 
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Figure 56. Comparison between railroad (left) & Maglev (right) rolling stocks (Source:[DD]) 
There are two main types of Maglev technology (Figure 57): electromagnetic suspension (EMS) and 
electrodynamic suspension (EDS). In EMS designs, the train chassis wraps around a guideway and, 
when current is applied to the rail, the train rises. With EDS technology, the train does most of the 
heavy lifting, as powerful magnets in the chassis generate an opposing force against conducting 
plates in a guideway. Each technology has its advantages and drawbacks: EMS trains can levitate at 
a standstill, but require a lot of sophisticated electronics to monitor and adjust the gap between train 
and track. EDS trains require less on-board intelligence but they need to build up speed on wheels 
before they can lift off the guideway. 
 
Figure 57. EMS Maglev (left) & EDS Maglev (right) systems (Source: [BB]) 
Maglev trains are capable of 300-plus-mph cruising speeds but a drawback to utilizing this system is 
that it does not benefit from an existing network of rail, and requires new grade separated guide ways. 
The most well known implementation of high-speed Maglev technology currently operating 
commercially is the IOS (initial operating segment) demonstration line of the German-built Transrapid 
train in Shanghai, China that transports people 18.6 miles (30 km) to the airport in just 7 minutes 20 
seconds, achieving a top speed of 268mph (431 km/h), averaging 160 mph (250 km/h). 
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To date, other Maglev test tracks exist in Germany, Japan, and the U.S.. Almost all of the Maglev 
projects in the U.S. are based on the more established EMS technology by Transrapid International, 
the German company behind the Shanghai and the planned Munich Maglev projects. EDS designs, 
on the other hand, are in the experimental stage. But the technology for both systems is still evolving. 
Maglev proponents argue that it is easier to maintain (most designs do not include wheels, 
transmissions, brakes or axles, thus reducing the need for repairs). But Maglev’s skeptics argue that 
lower maintenance costs are just speculation, since there aren’t enough commercially operating 
tracks to know what real-world performance would be. Authority studies in China have shown that 
Maglev technology would have higher potential maximum speeds and could accelerate and 
decelerate more quickly, than steel-wheel-on-steel-rail technology but would require more energy to 
operate and be more expensive to build. The next Figure 58 shows a schematic view of the 
infrastructure used on each system. 
 
Figure 58. Comparison between Maglev & HSR infrastructures (Source:[DD]) 
 
8.3 Propulsion System 
The propulsion system options include diesel power, electric power (including linear synchronous 
motors), and gas turbine power [41]. Gas turbine power has been virtually abandoned due to poor 
fuel efficiency. Linear synchronous motors are being developed for Maglev systems. Only electric and 
diesel power are suitable for state-of-the-art HSR systems. Diesel power is cheaper and more flexible 
than electric power for low-volume operations; however, electric power can provide improved 
acceleration, higher speeds, and better braking. It is less expensive than diesel for high density 
operations, and in the long term maybe preferred over dependence on liquid fuel.  
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8.3.a Diesel Power 
The diesel power unit carries its own primary power supply (the diesel engine) with fuel for 1,000 
miles or more. It uses an onboard generator to provide electric power to motors that drive the axles of 
the power car and to provide heating, cooling, ventilation, and lighting. Although limited in size and 
weight, the diesel-powered train is very flexible and can be moved around the system as traffic needs 
dictate. Nevertheless, a design speed much higher than 125 mph is regarded as impractical by 
engineers because of power constraints inherent in diesel traction.  
8.3.b Electric Power 
Electric locomotives basically are simpler, lighter in weight per horsepower, and cheaper to maintain 
than diesel locomotives. They make it possible to use at least twice as much power continuously as a 
diesel locomotive, with a significantly higher short-term power output and acceleration rate, as well as 
improved braking. However, the necessary overhead power supply installations and substations are 
very expensive, and existing signaling systems usually require renewal to prevent magnetic 
interference from the traction system. Replacement of signaling systems also is required to 
accommodate safe train spacing at higher speeds. To transfer the amount of power needed, high 
voltage systems are a necessity, usually by means of an overhead power supply. Whatever traction is 
used, as speed increases, unsprung axle load must be kept to lower values to avoid too great an 
impact on the track and vehicle. Unsprung axle load can be reduced by suspending heavy electric 
motors on the truck above the primary springs or on the vehicle body itself with flexible drive. Total 
weight on each axle also is important and must be reduced as speed increases to ensure good ride 
quality. 
8.3.c Gas Turbine Power 
While gas turbine power units offer the advantages of rapid power buildup and are very lightweight, 
the escalating fuel costs in the 1970’s and the engine’s lower efficiency except at full power led to the 
virtual abandonment of this technology. 
8.3.d Linear Motors  
To date, electric propulsion has used rotary motors carried on the train. With linear motors, the 
magnetic parts of the conventional rotating motor are replaced by a passive element on the vehicle 
and an active element in the track that interact to accelerate, maintain speed, or decelerate the train. 
Problems of power transmission and wheel to rail adhesion may be reduced by linear induction 
motors (LIMs). 
Maglev vehicles use linear motors for noncontacting propulsion. A variety of such motor types have 
been developed and tested with Maglev vehicles; however, only the linear synchronous motor (LSM) 
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currently is being developed for high-speed applications. While the principle of linear motors is simple, 
Maglev requires a sophisticated power conditioning and distribution system to control the proper 
amount and frequency of electrical power for propulsion.  
Comparison of various propulsion system options indicates that diesel power is flexible and does not 
require a large capital expenditure for fixed installations for power supply. However, it limits train size 
and speed. Electric propulsion depends on expensive fixed installations but offers much higher power 
to weight ratio and thus larger and faster trains. For frequent service, it is simpler and cheaper to 
operate than the diesel and does not necessarily depend directly on oil as fuel. Gas turbine power has 
been discarded because of high fuel consumption and maintenance cost. LSMs for Maglev systems 
theoretically offer very-high-speed at reduced costs but require new guideway construction, and 
sophisticated power conditioning systems. 
 
8.4 Future Technology & Rolling Stock in HSR Corridors in the U.S. 
As discussed in several previous chapters, each HSR corridor in the U.S. is planning to use a different 
type of HSR infrastructure depending on its own interests. Some important factors such as cost, 
capacity, reliability, compatibility with old rail network or speed, are important when a country or state 
decides to invest in rail technologies. The next Table 22 summarizes these important factors 
depending on the three different types of technologies that America is planning to use. 
  Incremental HSR New HSR Maglev 
Price, Cost Cheap Expensive More Expensive 
Seating Capacity 50-60 per coach 60-80 per coach Limited seating capacity per trainset 
Reliability High Very high Unknown 
Compatibility with old rail network Very high High No 
Speed 90 - 155 mph 155 - 220 mph > 250 mph 
Table 22. Summary of Allocation of Responsibilities for the different HSR Models (made based on 
Source: [42]) 
Each HSR corridor in the U.S. is planning to start using one of these types of technology in its first 
steps of implementation of the HSR. Chapter 5 describes all the different corridors that are authorized 
for designation by the FRA in the U.S.. The following Table 23 summarizes all the corridors with the 
different types of technology that they are planning to use. It seems that almost all the HSR corridors 
in America are planning to start this venture improving the infrastructure on the existing rail network, 
investing and adding new add-ons. At this moment, California is the only State planning to build a new 
HSR network and is the one who has the most advanced plan. 
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Name of Corridor Type of proposed Technology 
Chicago Hub Incremental HSR 
Northern New England Incremental HSR 
Empire Incremental HSR 
keystone Incremental HSR 
Southeast Incremental HSR 
Florida Incremental HSR 
Gulf Coast Incremental HSR 
South Central Incremental HSR 
California New HSR 
Pacific Northwest Incremental HSR 
Table 23. Type of proposed Technologies in each designated corridor (Results from Chapter 5) 
Last December 2008, the Secretary of Transportation announced that the FRA would begin accepting 
Expressions of Interest for the development of high-speed lines in the U.S.. By February 2009, more 
than 80 groups, including a number of states, train operators, and train constructors, had sent letters 
describing their interest in being part of the development of American fast train travel. Final responses 
were due on September 14th of this year. Appendix 4 [EE] refers the groups that submitted the basic 
information excepting the governmental agencies and other Corporations or Individuals, including 
small Engineering groups and Architects. 
Recent news [FF] tell that SNCF, the French national railroad operator made famous by its 
development of the TGV system, has responded with detailed descriptions of potential operations in 
four U.S. corridors (California, Chicago Hub, Florida and Texas), all to benefit from train service at 
speeds of up to 220 mph. The organization refers to this service as HST 220 (220 mph HSR). With 
the exception of a description of plans by the California HSR Authority, SNCF appears to be the only 
group that submitted a serious, corridor-based response to FRA’s demand, though infrastructure 
companies Vinci, Spineq, Cintra, Global Via, and Bouygues all sent in letters promoting rather vague 
interest in involvement. There is no funding associated with this call for expressions of interest; it is 
unrelated to the stimulus. Nonetheless, SNCF’s large response exemplifies the degree to which it 
sees American corridors as a good investment and suggests that the French company is planning an 
all-out assault on future U.S. rail operations. 
Important train manufacturers like Siemens, Alstom, Bombardier, Talgo or Hitachi have shown 
important interest in implementing their technologies on the new HSR corridors. Bombardier, Alstom 
and Siemens together, have over 55% of the shares of the global rail market. Bombardier is the 
leader at upwards of 20% followed by Alstom at a little under 20%. The other 45% plus of the market 
is made up mostly of small regional players with small market shares. 
Appendix 5 [GG] includes a summary of some of the most popular trains built by these companies 
over the last decade and trains like these could be implemented in the U.S. 
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8.5 U.S. Passenger Rail Manufacturing Industry  
There is currently no U.S.-owned passenger railcar manufacturer. U.S. manufacturers are not likely to 
decide to reenter the market and manufacture railcars unless the U.S. government (like other major 
Western countries and Japan) assures a stable, predictable, and planned rail equipment market that 
spreads orders out more or less evenly and in manageable sizes. Other factors likely to influence U.S. 
industry reentry into the railcar market are continued standardization of railcar requirements for the 
various passenger rail systems in this country, and continued improvements in some local 
procurement requirements.  
It is unlikely that a U.S. manufacturer will decide to manufacture railcars, or be able to compete 
against foreign manufacturers, unless the U.S., like other industrialized countries with rail systems 
and rail manufacturing industries, has a stable, predictable, and planned rail equipment market, one in 
which orders are spread out in time and in manageable sizes [HH]. Suggestions about the reasons for 
the decline and demise of the U.S. passenger railcar manufacturing industry are described below:  
‐ The steep drop over the past 50 years in the size of the U.S. intercity passenger railcar market, 
and in passenger rail’s share of the growing travel market, as passengers increasingly chose 
other modes, particularly air and auto. 
‐ The continuing erratic nature of U.S. urban rail transit orders, exacerbated by the sudden infusion, 
and later subsidence, of federal funds for mass transit between the late 1960’s and the present. 
‐ The entrance in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s of new U.S. aerospace manufacturers drawn in 
by the dramatic increase in Federal funds, the prospect of a growing mass transit market and by 
Federal encouragement. This market turned out to be too small to support all the suppliers; 
‐ The lack of standardized equipment among various transit agencies plus the diverse special 
features required by them. 
In practice the market for passenger railcars in the other nations with extensive nationalized systems 
is closed to outside manufacturers. The European and Japanese railway equipment construction 
industries historically focused nearly all their efforts on meeting domestic needs. The national 
railways, with the approval of the various governments, normally expect to buy equipment from 
suppliers within the home country, and only buy abroad when the home industry cannot supply what 
is needed. The manufacturers in those countries are assured of a stable, predictable market that is 
effectively closed to outsiders. Manufacturers abroad typically also have a close and continuing 
relationship with the railways, jointly conducting research and development with them and developing 
the basic designs. The national railway systems, which the foreign manufacturing industries support, 
are subsidized in accordance with explicit and consistent national policies that regard passenger rail 
service as a vital part of the national transportation system. In these countries, the passenger rail 
service and the rail equipment manufacturing industry function not as separate industries, but rather 
as two closely related and mutually supporting elements of what is, essentially, a single national 
passenger rail enterprise.  
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Based on examination of U.S. conditions and foreign markets, reemergence of a U.S. passenger 
railcar manufacturing industry is not likely to occur unless there is an assured and predictable market. 
Continued improvements in standardization of U.S. railcars, and continued improvements in 
procurement procedures also have been suggested as important factors in creating a climate 
favorable for manufacturer reentry into the U.S. market. However, the first requirement is by far the 
most critical. Without such a market, which all foreign railcar manufacturers have, no potential 
American manufacturer is likely to regard making railcars as a profitable line of endeavor.  
 
8.6 Passenger Safety and Comfort  
If HSR or Maglev will be introduced in the U.S., certain existing regulations regarding passenger 
safety and comfort would need review, and certification of new technologies would be necessary. The 
following is a brief discussion of the regulatory questions which would need to be addressed.  
8.6.a Speed Limits  
Currently the only HSR trains in the U.S. operate on sections of the NEC. Elsewhere, speed limits are 
generally 79 mph; speeds of 90 mph are permitted on small sections of track, and New York State 
now has trains operating at 110 mph on portions of its rail network. On many lines, lower speeds often 
are in effect because of track conditions or traffic mix. Limitations on speed usually are set for safety 
reasons. Restrictions on speed of passenger trains through curves are also based on passenger 
comfort, although the trains themselves could negotiate the curves safely at higher speeds. Speed 
limitations that would affect implementation of HSR cover such items as track conditions, signaling 
requirements, and maximum speed through curves.  
Track Conditions: FRA track safety standards specify that the maximum allowable operating speed 
for passenger trains is 110 mph on Class 6 track, and lower speed must be observed on track of low-
er categories. France’s TGV has a technical design speed approaching 200 mph and Japan can 
operate its equipment at 160 mph. In any case, the U.S. signaling requirements change according to 
the maximum speeds permitted. 
Signaling Requirements: Signaling systems must assure the safety of HSR trains operation and the 
interoperability of these trains. FRA’s existing signaling requirements limit train speed to 79 mph 
unless signals are displayed in the engineman’s cab or intermittent inductive train stop equipment is in 
use. Some experts believe that above 125 mph, fully automatic train control should be part of the 
signaling system. Fully automatic control causes problems where high-speed passenger, commuter, 
and freight trains of widely different braking characteristics use the same tracks. In France, SNCF 
have increased the train speed for a given signal spacing by using more sophisticated braking 
systems, which can reduce the distance required to stop the train. 
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Maximum Speed through Curves: Speed limits through curves depend on the radius of curvature 
and the superelevation of the outer rail. When a train negotiates a curve, centrifugal force causes 
more of the total weight to be transferred onto the outer rail, and passengers are pulled toward the 
side of the seat nearer the outside of the curve. Thus, speed through curves is determined by the 
need to avoid or mitigate the following:  
‐ Outward weight shifts that could cause the vehicles overturn;  
‐ Overload on the outer rail so that it is displaced, and the train derails; discomfort to the 
passengers from excessive centrifugal forces; and  
‐ Maintenance costs caused by these forces on the rail.  
The lateral component of centrifugal force can be reduced by banking the track (superelevation). Very 
high superelevation (as on auto racetracks) would permit much higher speeds for passenger trains. 
However, if the track is also used for heavy, slow-moving freight trains, the weight of the train on the 
inner rail would be excessive and rapid wear and damage would result. Thus, superelevation in the 
U.S. is limited by Federal regulation to 6 inches. 
8.6.b Safety and Strength Requirements of Passenger Equipment  
Concerned about the possibility of collisions among dissimilar types of equipment, U.S. practice is to 
prescribe vehicle strengths for passenger equipment that are higher than those in Europe. As a result, 
U.S. passenger railcars are far heavier. Power requirements to move these heavier vehicles are 
correspondingly greater as is wearing on the track. European rail practice suggests that the U.S. 
specifications used for railcar equipment strength may, in fact, be counterproductive in a collision. 
However, such practices as well as energy savings from lighter weight equipment might well be 
investigated for possible adoption in the U.S.. Questions of shared versus dedicated ROW no doubt 
would be raised in the context of this issue assuming that heavier freight equipment would be 
operated on the same line with the new, lighter weight designs in passenger equipment. 
8.6.c Safety Issues at the Highway/Rail Interface (Grade Crossings) 
For safety reasons, any proposed high-speed system should avoid crossing highways at grade level. 
Grade crossing fatalities, though declining, represent the highest fatality category for rail in the U.S.. 
New York State has some non-grade separated rail crossings with special sensors for warning auto-
mobile traffic of approaching trains. Location of the grade crossing and type of equipment may dictate 
optimum grade crossing systems for HSR. Rail grade crossings may represent a significant public 
concern in any implementation plan for a high-speed system, according to State transportation 
officials. 
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8.6.d Safety Certification of HSR Technology for Operational Use 
For the most part, HSR technology consists of tried and tested “off-the-shelf” technology. Two 
exceptions, which require separate consideration, are tilting equipment and Maglev. As discussed 
previously, the tilting train technology is intended to enable trains to travel faster through curves 
without sacrificing passenger comfort. Maglev for high-speed operation is so new that it has yet to be 
proved to be an operational largescale people mover for revenue service. Developers and prospective 
buyers are beginning to raise questions about which U.S. Government institutions should certify the 
systems and when they should be certified. 
 
8.7 Environment and Sustainability 
If there can be global consensus on the most pressing issue facing humanity today, sustainability 
would lead the field. Sustainability has received attention at all levels of human activity, both global 
and local, production and consumption. The most basic and salient argument for HSR in the U.S. is 
the pressing global environmental crisis and the role the U.S. plays in it. The scientific community 
overwhelmingly believes that anthropogenic fossil-fuel combustion is accelerating global warming. 
Meanwhile, the documented loss of biodiversity and ecosystem vitality is reaching epic proportions, 
and the concerns about the effects of pollution on human health persist. The U.S. contributes to 
environmental problems in a proportion that far exceeds its share of the world’s population, and 
transportation is a major component of this. The U.S. transportation sector finds itself locked into a 
heavily fossil-fuel dependent infrastructure. 
A HSR system would thus, with respect to the problems of climate change and pollution, have dual 
direct and indirect impacts. It would directly diminish these forms of pollution by shifting travel away 
from fossil fuel intensive driving and flying.  Indirectly, it would mitigate urban congestion by removing 
through traffic from the roadways decreasing pollution from urban commuters and freight shippers. 
The contribution of HSR to sustainability goes beyond its role in a more ecologically sustainable 
transportation system within the U.S. to its role in keeping the U.S. economy strong and its impacts on 
global development. 
HSR is often cited as a solution to many transportation problems: It can reduce congestion on roads 
and at airports, is cost effective and convenient, improves mobility and has environmental benefits. 
The following Figure 59 shows a comparison of the energy efficiency in the different modes of 
transportation and how the HSR is the most efficient transport. 
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Figure 59. Energy Efficiency per Passenger for each mode of transportation (Source: [II]) 
While greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions are likely to be reduced as travelers switch to HSR from 
other modes of travel, little modeling has been done to estimate this potential impact in the U.S. In 
2006, the Center for Clean Air Policy (CCAP) estimated on a corridor-by-corridor basis the annual 
GHG benefits of HSR systems in the U.S. using current plans for HSR development in the federally 
designated HSR corridors. To estimate HSR’s net emissions impact, they calculated the carbon 
dioxide (CO2) emissions saved from passengers switching to HSR from other modes (air, 
conventional rail, automobile and bus) and subtracted the estimated emissions generated by HSR. 
The results showed that passengers would take 112 million trips on HSR in the U.S. in 2025, 
traveling more than 25 billion passenger miles. This would result in 29 million fewer automobile trips 
and nearly 500,000 fewer flights. They calculated total emissions savings of 6 billion pounds of CO2 
per year (2.7 MMTCO2) if all the 10 HSR designated corridors would be built as planned. 
As represented in the next page on Figure 60, the total emissions savings vary greatly by corridor, 
however, as do the source of those savings.  In some regions, such as the Midwest, the impact on air 
travel is likely to be modest. In California, on the other hand, 19 million passengers are projected to 
switch from air. It is worth further study to see if such high levels of mode shifting are likely. In some 
respects, the California system, as it is currently planned, represents what will be the second 
generation of HSR in many of the other corridors. While areas like the Pacific Northwest may increase 
ridership sooner with an incremental approach to HSR that uses existing rail routes, the success of a 
new HSR system like California’s could prove the value of faster trains with higher upfront capital 
costs. 
Feasibility Study of High-Speed Rail in the U.S. 
Technological Development & Sustainability of the future U.S. HSR Corridors 105 
 
 
Figure 60. Emissions by Corridor and by mode of transportation (Source: [33]) 
Trains are the most sustainable & green form of transportation. Electric HSR is the most energy 
efficient of all trains compared with diesel powered and Maglev. The next Figure 61 shows the 
emission per train and emissions per passenger mile for several train technologies around the world. 
The Shinkansen 700, the ICE and the TGV Atlantique are electric HSR trains running in Japan and 
central Europe. The Danish IC-3 is a diesel powered train that has lower emissions per train, in part 
because of its slower speed (99 mph top speed) compared to other HSR technologies. Its low number 
of seats per train (152 maximum, 138 on the route used for these calculations), however, raises its 
emissions per passenger mile. The Maglev technology is the less energy efficient in pounds of CO2 
per passenger mile but at the same time is the fastest ground transportation technology. 
 
Figure 61. Examples of HSR Trains Emissions(Source: [33]) 
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Apart from the energy efficiency of the different HSR technologies, there are other environmental 
concerns when deciding which one is going to be the best choice of HSR technology for each corridor 
in the U.S.. These other environmental concerns can be classified as the land use, the noise, the 
vibration or the visual pollution. 
Land Use: While it is possible (by substantially limiting freight travel), to mix freight with passenger 
trains, HSR is often likely to involve separate dedicated tracks, if not dedicated ROW. Freight traffic 
aside, HSR could be instituted on existing U.S. ROW, although most corridors would require 
modification including upgrading of track, elimination of existing curves, and signaling improvements. 
Reaction of public and private groups to proposals to do so will depend on the impacts, benefits, and 
costs of the changes that have to be made. Land-use issues would be subject to negotiation. 
Proposals calling for the construction of entirely new ROW, or for any transportation alternative, will 
require public agreement on land-use questions. The degree to which local governments, institutions, 
environmentalists, individuals, or other citizen groups will support the implementation of HSR probably 
will be influenced by projections of demand for the service, by the amount of urban land and areas of 
natural beauty through which the line must travel, and by the perceived need to reduce congestion 
elsewhere. These basic concerns will not differ among most transportation alternatives studied.  
The French avoided high capital costs and environmental opposition in building the TGV by using the 
existing line into and out of Paris. The population density of Western Europe indicates that the 
problems of building a new rail line between Paris - Lyon were made much easier by the relatively low 
density of population between the cities. Elsewhere in Europe, choosing an acceptable alignment 
would be exceedingly difficult if not impossible. In the U.S., the NEC and portions of Los Angeles are 
as densely populated as much of England, Ohio and Florida are more similar to France (but without 
any cities on the Paris scale of population) and Nevada has a far lower population density than 
anywhere in Europe.  
In sum, assembly of urban land parcels in a line sufficiently straight to permit genuine HSR service is 
a legally complicated and costly undertaking. The irony of the land-use issue is that HSR promises to 
be most successful in corridors where there are many people to ride it, yet these very same densities 
make the establishment of new HSR lines exceedingly difficult and costly.  
Noise, Vibration, and Visual Barriers: Japan’s bullet train, in operation nearly 20 years, initially 
produced severe noise and vibration due to the materials used in track construction. These problems 
have been mitigated for the most part by cushioning tracks on viaducts and erecting sound proof 
barriers along the ROW. The extent to which such problems exist and the measures necessary to 
satisfy residents of large urban areas through which the train would go probably depend on the type of 
HSR system in question and the measures taken to overcome any problems. The noise generated by 
various rail systems tends to differ slightly due to the way it is measured. Any train traveling at high-
speed will induce vibrations, particularly on viaducts and bridges. Maglev systems are theoretically 
quieter than HSR.  
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In addition to noise, visual effects of viaducts and elevated track may also raise environmental 
concern and affect route designation. However, any transportation alternative is going to raise en-
vironmental questions, and the strength of specific environmental objections cannot be known without 
analysis on a corridor-specific basis. 
A national HSR system is the centerpiece of a sustainable America, and will significantly reduce 
congestion and its dependence on cars and oil, while cutting carbon emissions by epic proportions.  
The entire system can be powered by clean, safe renewable energy including wind, solar, geothermal, 
and ocean/tidal.  Clean electric trains are a major form of daily transportation in numerous countries, 
and are the single most powerful transportation choice that can solve serious mobility, energy, 
environmental, economic, health, and social problems simultaneously on a global scale. 
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9. CONCLUSIONS 
While it was once the preeminent mode of travel, intercity passenger train travel in America has 
played a relatively minor role in the second half of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st.  
Highway and aviation systems expansion and total intercity travel in the United States., has grown 
dramatically. Much of this growth in intercity travel has been fueled by an aggressive public 
investment strategy. For six decades, federal transportation policies have focused mostly on intercity 
transportation investment for the highway and aviation systems but not on intercity passenger trains. 
This is partly due to the commonly accepted myth in America that railroads can pay for themselves. 
The combination of economic prosperity and a population that just passed 300 million has produced a 
high demand for mobility in the United States Congestion is one of the single largest threats to 
American economic prosperity and lifestyle and is costing America an estimated $200 billion a year. 
Aside from this, the heavily fossil-fuel dependent infrastructure is out of proportion and far exceeds its 
share for the world’s total population. The global environmental crisis is pressing the United States to 
find a solution to those concerns. 
The United States local and federal governments are looking for solutions to try and reduce 
congestion but not slowing its increase. Unfortunately, the public sector has limited funds and the 
needs are great, despite record funding for surface transportation in recent decades. The federal 
government’s most important role is to establish mechanisms to ensure that the right investments are 
made and the HSR is often cited as a solution to many of these transportation concerns.  HSR can 
reduce congestion on roads and airports, is cost effective and convenient, improves mobility and has 
environmental benefits. 
Proposals for investment in HSR in the U.S. have existed for decades. However, corridor service that 
exceeds Amtrak’s predominant top speed of 79 mph currently only exists on Amtrak’s NEC between 
Boston, MA, and Washington, D.C., and in a few other corridors. By contrast, around the world HSR is 
proving to use safe and environmentally sustainable technologies which meet the needs of the 21st 
century by offering a fast, frequent and enjoyable travel alternative. Countries in Europe and Asia 
have developed extensive rail systems with top speeds exceeding 150 and even 200 mph, attracting 
a relatively high number of riders in companrison with other transportation modes. 
HSR does not offer a quick or simple solution to relieving congestion on America´s highways and 
airways. HSR projects are costly, risky, take years to develop and build, and require substantial up-
front public investment as well as potentially long-term operating subsidies. Determining which, if any, 
proposed HSR projects should be built will require decision makers to be better able to determine a 
project’s economic viability. Given the complexity, high cost and long development time for HSR 
projects, it will be critical to first determine how HSR fits into the American transportation system. The 
federal involvement baseline will be to establish a strategic vision and goals for such systems.  Failure 
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to incorporate performance and accountability measures to ensure these outcomes are achieved is a 
common drawback of federal transportation programs. Amtrak has attempted to fill this void to a 
degree but has been hampered by politics and funding issues. 
While some U.S. corridors exhibit characteristics that suggest potential economic viability, determining 
whether any specific proposed line will be viable has proven to be difficult. This difficulty is due to the 
uncertainties of ridership forecasts, sponsor produced cost estimates, lack of agreement and 
standards regarding how a project’s public benefits should be valued and quantified and the lack of 
comparison with alternative investments in highway or air infrastructure. At least, guidance and 
standards for successful models might be provided at federal level. Without this, states will continue to 
fill the void with a multitude of models (constitutional amendments and legislation as in Florida and 
California, multistate compacts as in the Pacific Northwest, public-private partnerships) without a 
sense of what is most likely to succeed. 
A need for clarity is not only needed for the goals of a particular HSR project, but also on who is 
reaping the benefits. In Florida, the central concern has been who should bear the risk for a project 
that is described as having a public benefit but looking for private dollars. The private sector would like 
to see the state bear more risk, while the state would like the private sector and the federal 
government to assume more risk. If there are public benefits to an HSR project, then arguing for only 
private funding makes no sense, and such projects are unlikely to succeed. If the public benefits are 
questionable, then private funding is a better choice. Private sector participation is also difficult to 
secure without a substantial public sector commitment, both financial and political. The financial and 
ridership risks associated with HSR projects can also deter private entities from investing. In addition, 
project sponsors must coordinate project decisions among numerous stakeholders and across 
jurisdictional boundaries being a difficult task, especially in the absence of an established institutional 
framework. 
More important, there is an overarching need for a national network strategy for rail (one that 
combines passenger, freight, and HSR).  A vision for how rail connects to and interrelates with other 
transportation modes around the country and how it all might be funded also needs to be addressed. 
Otherwise, the U.S. will continue to miss critical opportunities for key linkages and enhancing 
efficiency, not just for HSR, but also for regular passenger rail and freight transport.  
Opportunities for both incremental and new HSR exist in the U.S. and have for many years, 
particularly among those corridors federally designated as HSR corridors. Whether to develop a new 
HSR or an incremental HSR system depends greatly on what the government hopes to accomplish 
and the context within which they are working. If the goal is to increase the number of commuters 
using rail instead of automobile to minimize highway congestion, the key is to increase frequency and 
reliability of service, reduce travel times, and make the system more accessible. Such goals may be 
better met with an incremental approach that invests in station and equipment improvements, fixing 
curves and improving tracks, and enhancing signals, rather than new HSR. If the goal is to relieve air 
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congestion between urban areas to free up space for more long-distance flights, a new HSR system 
linking key urban areas might be the better approach. However, such discussions do not always 
occur; often the decision to pursue one approach or another is based more on political factors than on 
a clear assessment and explanation of what the specific goals are and how best to meet them.  
The spark for building HSR often has begun with a particular person in a particular state. The 
governor of Florida was the one who visited Japan and believed Florida should have a similar system. 
In California, several legislative leaders visited Europe and Japan and returned with the same 
sentiments. This year President Obama visited Spain and came back with the same enthusiastic 
ideas. While the initial vision is important for beginning an effort, institutionalized support is critical to 
sustain the effort and successfully implement HSR. Without institutional buy-in for a project, as well as 
the authority and responsibility to identify, gather, and manage funding, and the responsibility for and 
capability of seeing a project through, many HSR projects fail as soon as the key supporter or 
visionary is no longer involved in the project. The key will be to get at least one project fully 
implemented in a way that is clearly HSR (as opposed to those that are capable of high speeds but 
only run at such speeds for small distances). Once a project is in revenue service, many of the 
concerns expressed by critics will be addressed including ridership projections and whether HSR can 
work in a country where cars and air transport are dominant. After tackling these issues and 
constructing proper HSR corridors, the United States will then have the opportunity to both develop 
and revive domestic railcar manufacturing while maintaining the option of importing innovative 
international technologies. 
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APPENDIX 
Appendix 1: High-Speed Lines in the World (Source: [F]) 
Continent Country Extension (sq miles) 
Population 
in 2009 
(millions) 
Miles of 
HSR in 
operation 
Miles of 
HSR under 
construction 
Miles of 
HSR 
planned 
Total 
Miles 
of 
HSR 
Population 
Density 
(hab./sq 
mile) 
Rank in 
Population 
Density 
Asia Taiwan 13,972 23 133 0 0 133 1646 1 
Asia South Korea 38,486 48 127 32 0 159 1247 2 
Europe Netherlands 16,040 17 0 46 0 46 1060 3 
Asia India 1,269,219 1198 0 0 191 191 944 4 
Europe Belgium 11,787 11 53 28 0 81 933 5 
Asia Japan 145,914 127 947 228 225 1400 870 6 
Europe United Kingdom 93,784 62 44 0 0 44 661 7 
Europe Germany 137,847 82 496 146 259 901 595 8 
Europe Italy 116,339 60 217 121 153 491 516 9 
Europe Switzerland 15,940 8 14 28 0 41 502 10 
Asia China 3,705,406 1346 321 1314 1573 3209 363 11 
Europe Poland 120,728 38 0 0 275 275 315 12 
Europe Portugal 35,556 11 0 0 388 388 309 13 
Europe France 244,310 62 723 115 1010 1848 254 14 
Asia Turkey 302,535 75 0 288 648 936 248 15 
Europe Spain 195,365 45 615 857 657 2129 230 16 
Africa Morocco 172,414 32 0 0 263 263 186 17 
Asia Iran 636,371 74 0 0 183 183 116 18 
America U.S. 3,537,437 305 140 0 347 487 86 19 
America Brazil 3,287,611 194 0 0 193 193 59 20 
Europe Sweden 173,860 9 0 0 290 290 52 21 
America Argentina 1,073,518 40 0 0 122 122 37 22 
Asia Saudi Arabia 830,000 26 0 0 212 212 31 23 
Europe Russia 6,601,665 141 0 0 251 251 21 24 
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Appendix 2: Cumulative Estimates of Resident Population Change for the U.S. in 2008 (Source:[G]) 
Cumulative Estimates of Resident Population Change for the U.S. 
Future HSR Designated Corridor State FIPS 
Codes 
.Geographic Area 
Population 
Estimates July 1, 2008 
July 1, 
2008 
% 
Distr. 
of 
U.S. 
Total 
Population 
Density 
Area (Sq 
Miles) 
00 United States 304,059,724 100.0 86 3,531,822   
11 .District of Columbia 591,833 0.2 9,687 61   
34 .New Jersey 8,682,661 2.9 1,181 7,354 Northeast 
72 Puerto Rico 3,954,037 (X) 1,155 3,424   
44 .Rhode Island 1,050,788 0.3 1,016 1,034 Northeast 
25 .Massachusetts 6,497,967 2.1 833 7,801 Southeast & Northern New England 
09 .Connecticut 3,501,252 1.2 723 4,840 Southeast & Northern New England 
24 .Maryland 5,633,597 1.9 580 9,705 Southeast & Northeast 
10 .Delaware 873,092 0.3 448 1,949 Northeast 
36 .New York 19,490,297 6.4 414 47,126 Northeast & Empire & Northern New Empire 
12 .Florida 18,328,340 6.0 342 53,603 Florida 
39 .Ohio 11,485,910 3.8 281 40,858 Chicago Hub Network 
42 .Pennsylvania 12,448,279 4.1 278 44,739 Keystone &Northeast 
06 .California 36,756,666 12.1 236 155,766 California 
17 .Illinois 12,901,563 4.2 232 55,518 Chicago Hub Network 
15 .Hawaii 1,288,198 0.4 200 6,428   
51 .Virginia 7,769,089 2.6 197 39,493 Southeast & Northeast 
37 .North Carolina 9,222,414 3.0 190 48,619 Southeast 
18 .Indiana 6,376,792 2.1 178 35,823 Chicago Hub Network 
26 .Michigan 10,003,422 3.3 177 56,528 Chicago Hub Network 
13 .Georgia 9,685,744 3.2 168 57,501 Gulf Coast & Southeast 
47 .Tennessee 6,214,888 2.0 151 41,235   
45 .South Carolina 4,479,800 1.5 149 30,070 Southeast 
33 .New Hampshire 1,315,809 0.4 147 8,952   
21 .Kentucky 4,269,245 1.4 108 39,492 Chicago Hub Network 
55 .Wisconsin 5,627,967 1.9 104 54,154 Chicago Hub Network 
22 .Louisiana 4,410,796 1.5 102 43,199 Gulf Coast 
53 .Washington 6,549,224 2.2 99 66,449 Pacific Northwest 
48 .Texas 24,326,974 8.0 93 261,226 South Central & Gulf Coast 
01 .Alabama 4,661,900 1.5 92 50,644 Gulf Coast & Southeast 
29 .Missouri 5,911,605 1.9 86 68,716 Chicago Hub Network 
54 .West Virginia 1,814,468 0.6 75 24,038   
50 .Vermont 621,270 0.2 67 9,217   
27 .Minnesota 5,220,393 1.7 66 79,607 Chicago Hub Network 
28 .Mississippi 2,938,618 1.0 63 46,920 Gulf Coast 
04 .Arizona 6,500,180 2.1 57 113,595 South Central 
05 .Arkansas 2,855,390 0.9 55 52,030   
19 .Iowa 3,002,555 1.0 54 55,858   
40 .Oklahoma 3,642,361 1.2 53 68,603 South Central 
08 .Colorado 4,939,456 1.6 48 103,641   
23 .Maine 1,316,456 0.4 43 30,841 Northern New England 
41 .Oregon 3,790,060 1.2 39 95,985 Pacific Northwest 
20 .Kansas 2,802,134 0.9 34 81,762   
49 .Utah 2,736,424 0.9 33 82,191   
32 .Nevada 2,600,167 0.9 24 109,780 California 
31 .Nebraska 1,783,432 0.6 23 76,825   
16 .Idaho 1,523,816 0.5 18 82,643   
35 .New Mexico 1,984,356 0.7 16 121,297   
46 .South Dakota 804,194 0.3 11 75,811   
38 .North Dakota 641,481 0.2 9 69,001   
30 .Montana 967,440 0.3 7 145,541   
56 .Wyoming 532,668 0.2 5 97,088   
02 .Alaska 686,293 0.2 1 570,665   
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Appendix 3: Map of the United States of America (Source: [H]) 
 
 
 
Feasibility Study of High-Speed Rail in the U.S. 
Appendix  114 
 
 Appendix 4: Groups that submitted the EOI to the FRA (Source: [EE]) 
 
Construction Groups Country of Origin  
Technology - Rolling Stock 
Companies 
Country of 
Origin 
Flatiron (Grupo Hoechtief) USA American Maglev Technology (AMT) USA 
BOUYGUES Travaux Publics, SA France Bombardier Transportation, Inc. Canada 
Ferrovial Agroman, SA Spain TALGO Inc. Spain 
Skanska USA Civil Inc. Sweden ALSTOM France 
FCC Construcción, SA Spain KAWASAKI Rail Car, Inc. Japan 
Balfour Beatty Rail, Inc. UK SIEMENS Transportation Systems, Inc Germany 
Peter Kiewit Constructors, Inc. USA 
John Laing USA, Ltd UK 
Bechtel USA 
Fluor Enterprises, Inc. USA  Operating Companies 
Country of 
Origin 
SYSTRA, SA (controlled by SNCF) France 
RENFE-Operadora Spain 
First Group America USA 
Industrial Groups Country of Origin  Stagecoach / Virgin Group  UK 
SIERAIL USA Deutsche Bahn AG  Germany 
Sumitomo Corporation of America USA Peter Pan (Buses Operator) USA 
Mitsui & Co. USA Japan Veolia Transportation  France 
Hyundai Totem USA Corporation Korea 
Novi Industries, Inc. USA 
Ansaldo STS Italy 
Hitachi, Ltd (Transportation systems) Japan  Concession Companies 
Country of 
Origin 
Samsung America, Inc. Korea Macquarie capital USA, Inc Australia 
SOJITZ Corporation Japan CINTRA Spain 
INDRA Spain Posco E&C “Korean Consortium” Korea 
 
Note: Governmental agencies and other corporations or Individuals, including small engineering 
groups and architects, are not included. 
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Appendix 5: High-Speed Rail Rolling Stock Examples (Source: [GG]) 
 
HSR ROLLING STOCK EXAMPLES 
COMMERCIAL INFO 
Maker ALSTOM TALGO / BOMBARDIER SIEMENS CAF / ALSTOM 
Model TGV - AVE S-100 350 VELARO E PENDOLINO 
CHARACTERISTICS   
Supply Voltage 25 kV AC / 3 kV DC 25 kV AC 25 kV AC 25 kV AC 
Gauge 1,435 mm / 1,668 mm 1,435 mm 1,435 mm 1,435 mm 
PERFORMANCE   
Max speed 186 mph (300 km/h ) 218 mph (350 km/h ) 218 mph (350 km/h) 155 mph (250 km/h) 
Max traction power 8.8 MW 8.0 MW (2 x 4.0) 8.8 MW 4.4 MW 
CAPACITY   
Typical formation M -8R -Mc M -12R -M 4M – 4T 4M 
COMMERCIAL INFO 
Maker CAF / ALSTOM TALGO HITACHI 
Model ATPRD 250 700 Series 
CHARACTERISTICS   
Supply Voltage 25 kV AC / 3 kV DC 25 kV AC / 3 kV DC 25 kV AC 
Gauge 1,435 mm / 1,668 mm 1,435 mm / 1,668 mm 1,435 mm 
PERFORMANCE   
Max speed 155 mph (250 km/h) @ 25 kV AC  138 mph (220 km/h) @ 3 kV DC 
155 mph (250 km/h) @ 25 kV AC    
138 mph (220 km/h) @ 3 kV DC 
177 mph (285 
km/h) 
Max traction power 4.0 MW @ 25 kV AC             2.7 MW @ 3 kV DC 4.8 MW 13.2 MW 
CAPACITY   
Typical formation Mc -M -M -Mc M -11R -M 12M – 4T 
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ACRONYMS 
ADIF Administrador de Infraestructuras Ferroviarias 
ARRA American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
ATP Automatic Train Protection  
BNR Burlington Northern Railway 
BOO Build Own Operate 
CCAP Center for Clean Air Policy 
CREATE Chicago Regional Environmental and Transportation Efficiency Program 
DBB Design-Bid-Build 
DBFM Design Build Finance Maintain 
DBFMO Design Build Finance Maintain Operate 
DOT Department of Transportation 
EDS Electrodynamic Suspension 
EIB European Investment Bank 
EIS Environmental Impact Study 
EMS Electromagnetic Suspension 
EOI Expressions Of Interest 
ERDF European Regional Development Fund 
FDOT Florida Department Of Transportation 
FHSRA Florida High Speed Rail Authority 
FHSRC Florida High Speed Rail Committee 
FHSRTCA Florida High Speed Rail Authority Commission Act 
FHWA Federal Highway Administration 
FOX Florida Overland Express 
FRA Federal Railroad Administration 
FTA Federal Transit Administration 
GAO Government Accountability Office 
GHG Greenhouse Gas  
HSGT High Speed Ground Transportation 
HSR High Speed Rail 
ICE Inter City Express 
ISTEA International Surface Transportation Efficiency Act 
JNR Japanese National Railways 
JR Japan Railways 
LIM Linear Induction Motors 
LSM Linear Synchronous Motor  
MAGLEV Magnetic Levitation 
MOU Memorandum of Understanding 
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MWRRI Midwest Regional Rail Initiative 
NEC Northeastern Corridor 
PPF Public Private Financing 
PPP Public Private Partnership 
PRIIA Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act 
PTC Positive Train Control  
RENFE Red Nacional de los Ferrocarriles Españoles 
RFEI Request For Expressions of Interest 
RFF Réseau Ferré de France 
RFP Request For Proposal 
RFQ Request For Qualifications 
ROW Right-Of-Way 
RRIF Registered Retirement Income Fund 
SHSRC Southern High Speed Rail Commission 
SNCF Société Nationale des Chemins de Fer Français 
TEA-21 Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century  
TGV Train à Grande Vitesse 
THSRA Texas High Speed Rail Authority 
THSRTC Texas High Speed Rail and Transportation Corp 
TIFIA Transportation Infrastructure and Innovation Act 
TXDOT Texas Department Of Transportation 
U.S. United States 
USA United States of America (same as U.S.) 
WSDOT Washington Department Of Transportation 
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